WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

# *The Evolution of a Conservative*

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# *Preface*

ALMOST twenty years ago I published an autobiography entitled *The Confessions of an Individualist*. During the intervening time, I have experienced an evolution toward conservatism. I believe that the classical conservative ideas of such thinkers as Edmund Burke, John Adams, and Alexis de Tocqueville constitute the best shield for individual liberty at a time when freedom is threatened much more from the Left than from the Right.

This work does not pretend to be a detailed analysis of the origins and development of conservative thought. It is the story of an individual's search for a coherent and logical moral and political faith in an age of unusual turmoil and confusion, when many old and familiar political terms and labels have become obsolete and even misleading.

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William Henry Chamberlin

Cambridge, Massachusetts
May 21, 1959

## CHAPTER ONE

# *The Birth of a Conservative*

HUMAN decisions sometimes produce unexpected consequences. I would probably never have appreciated the values of conservatism if I had not decided, as a young and obscure free-lance writer, to go to Moscow in 1922. At that time, although I was not a member of the Communist Party, I was a convinced sympathizer with the Soviet regime, a devout fellow-traveler. I went to Moscow with no prospect of material advancement, but rather in the spirit of the Moslem making his pilgrimage to Mecca. At that time my Russian-born wife shared my views and enthusiasms, what we have both come to recognize in retrospect as my delusions.

Twelve years later we left Moscow, with completely transformed views of what Soviet communism meant in practice, with unforgettable memories of cruelties visited on many Russians whom we knew and uncounted millions whom we did not know. Instead of liberation, we had found a tyranny far worse than that of the Tsars, if one took such a reasonable standard as the number of executions, the number of persons arrested, habitual use of torture in interrogations, and maltreatment and starvation in concentration camps.

Instead of our early vision of workers freed from so-called capitalist exploitation and advancing to ever higher standards of living, we took away from the Soviet Union memories of robots of an all-powerful state, far more "ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed" than the "underprivileged" of the New Deal conception. Our original idea of the Communist Party as a dedicated elite had melted away as we watched this party, in power, degenerate into a group of hard-faced men who had done extremely well out of the Revolution and had appropriated to themselves the luxurious living standards of the prerevolutionary aristocracy and high bureaucracy.

When I returned to the United States in 1934, I was horrified to find that a considerable number of educated men and women who prided themselves on their humanitarian and progressive outlook regarded the Soviet Union as the embodiment of their dreams, a bulwark against war and fascism. My own earlier illusions should perhaps have given me more understanding and humility, yet I could not help feeling that a good deal more evidence was available about the nature of Soviet rule than one could get in the first confused years of revolution and civil war. And the long-distance admirers of Stalin's empire in the 1930's seemed most uncommonly resistant to this evidence.

What seemed an irrational attitude on the part of people who usually prided themselves on being devotees of pure reason was the double standard of morals which prevailed then among Americans who classified themselves as liberals or radicals. If you pushed one of these Soviet sympathizers into a corner with some unanswerable proof that in some field there was more cruelty and oppression in the Soviet Union than in fascist countries, the reply would be to the effect that harsh means in Russia were doubtless necessary to achieve good ends. A cynical journalist, widely read at that time, won widespread agreement with his favorite formula for explaining away every new Soviet atrocity: You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs.

This obsession with admiration of the Soviet Union found expression in the launching of innumerable "front" organiza-

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tions, in which hard-core communists pulled the strings to make gullible puppets dance, and in the signing of resolutions of commendation for the death sentences meted out to veteran communists on fraudulent charges of treason and espionage. And it paved the way for the deplorable mental and emotional climate which prevailed during the war, when alliance with Stalin's bloody tyranny was hailed as a permanent assurance of world peace instead of being realistically viewed as a distasteful temporary necessity.

Ideas have consequences. For many a student who joined the fashionable Red and Pink organizations on the campus during this time, the commitment was fleeting and quickly outlived, but there were a few who carried their fanaticism to the extreme of treason, taking part in espionage activity against their own government. And many who would have balked at treason developed a soft attitude toward communism and a blind spot for Soviet imperialism that exerted a disastrous effect on policy-making and public opinion during the second world war.

No doubt the economic depression that prevailed in the United States during the thirties contributed to the pro-communist and fellow-traveler upsurge. To me, coming from Russia, the United States looked incredibly rich and prosperous, even during those years of mass unemployment. But few Americans were in a position to compare their own country with the rest of the world. Full employment, growing out of a "planned economy," was a magic slogan. There was little disposition to inquire closely into the terms and rewards of the employment or to examine for what purpose the economy was "planned."

Looking back to my own fellow-traveler phase (documented in writings which appeared under the pseudonym "A. C. Freeman" in Left Wing publications from 1919 until 1923), I can see its roots in a profoundly negative attitude toward the first world war. I am sure that this was also true

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with regard to many young European intellectuals who took part in communist movements and emerged with the singes and burns of disillusionment.

The first world war seemed to me forty years ago—and still seems to me—one of the greatest tragedies of Western civilization. Millions of human beings slaughtered, maimed, gassed. And at the end of the ordeal, not a world made safe for democracy, not a new era of peace under international law, but moods of hatred, despair, revenge, and frustration that made the European peoples all too receptive to totalitarian short cuts.

I had more than the average American college student's interest in and knowledge of history and international politics, and I could not accept the prevalent view, after America entered the war, that the war was solely the product of German villainy. "Four Minute Men," rushing about and selling Liberty Bonds to the accompaniment of such stirring sentiments as "I'd compare those Huns to snakes, only it would be insulting the snakes to do so," excited more ridicule than conviction.

Unable to accept the popular villain of the war picture, I created a villain of my own: capitalism. There was just enough truth in the theory that America's entrance into the war was influenced by war loans and munitions profits to make this the decisive element for a young mind in search of a black-and-white explanation of a tremendous historical tragedy. I came to regard the war as a conspiracy of capitalists and governments controlled by capitalists against the masses of people in every country. Nine-tenths of my initial sympathy for the Bolsheviks was derived from the fact that they took Russia out of the war and called on peoples everywhere to stop fighting and overthrow the governments that wanted to go on with the slaughter.

At that time, my knowledge of socialist theory was vague and sketchy. My first serious study of Marx and Lenin was made in the Soviet Union. But the transition from anti-war feeling to political and economic revolutionism was easier because most of the opposition to the war came from socialist and other Left Wing quarters.

In this respect, there was a significant contrast with America's intervention in the second world war. Most American opponents of involvement before Pearl Harbor were conservatives who had perhaps learned something from America's first crusade. There were some exceptions among people of conservative social and economic views who were emotionally involved in the issues posed by Hitler's policies, but by and large, it was the American Left that was most ardent for America's second crusade, especially after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union caused the communists, overnight, to switch their position of isolationism, adopted at the time of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, to one of all-out interventionism.

It was opposition to the war, intensified by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which made a mockery of Wilson's generally reasonable Fourteen Points and raised the prospect of a Pandora's Box of future international mischief, that brought me into the camp of communist sympathizers. That I accepted the communist economic creed with so little examination was also due, I feel, to a deficiency in my education in political science and economics. In retrospect, it seems almost incredible that I and others who reacted in the same way should have swallowed so easily the myths that there could be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" or that any dictatorship could lead to beneficent results.

Equally amazing is the readiness with which I accepted the proposition that a socialist or communist economic order would be morally superior and practically more efficient than one based on individualist enterprise. This is all the more surprising because during my school and college years, I had been a strong individualist and nonconformist; my literary hero had been Ibsen's Dr. Stockman, the "enemy of the people," with his proud burst of defiance: "He stands strongest who stands most alone."

Without wishing to repudiate personal responsibility for airily coming to some very mistaken conclusions, I think that part of the explanation may be found in the deficiencies of my educational background. I went to an excellent preparatory school and to one of the best small liberal arts colleges in the United States, but I do not recall a single course that gave me any deep insight into the nature and possible abuses of political power and the necessity of keeping it under constant check and curb, in the interest of individual liberty. Nor did my instruction in economics leave me with any strong conviction about the desirability of individual property ownership, not only as a stimulus to efficiency, but also as a means of avoiding a concentration of state power, through nationalization, that would be a serious threat to individual liberty.

During my formative years, 1910-1917, the American political and economic system was so much taken for granted that there was little impetus to explain and justify it. There was no sense of challenge by radically different systems in foreign lands. The main intellectual trend at that time, perhaps naturally, was directed toward criticism and reform, with the result that positive affirmation of the fundamental bases of political and economic freedom was at a discount.

I went to Russia expecting to stay a few months and remained twelve years, the result of acquiring a permanent journalistic connection. My break with Soviet communism, which occurred in two phases, the first gradual and conditional, the second swift and uncompromising, was a response to the two distinctly different periods of Soviet development that I witnessed.

The years from 1922 until 1929 were comparatively mild, for this was the period of the New Economic Policy, when the peasants were left in possession of their small holdings and freedom of internal trade and small industry was permitted.

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During these years, there was an atmosphere of recovery from the abyss of stark hunger, cold, disease, and physical misery into which Russia had been plunged by seven years of world war, revolution, civil war, and fantastic experiments in doing away with money and trying to provide for the needs of the people by an all-embracing system of state production, procurement, and distribution—with bullets from the guns of Chekist secret policemen as the solution for the many problems which Marx and Lenin had failed to foresee. Limited freedom of expression developed along with this economic relaxation, and terrorism, while it never ceased entirely, was much less evident than in earlier and later periods.

Even under these comparatively favorable circumstances, I learned enough about the realities of Soviet life to be cured of the pro-Soviet bias with which I went to Russia. There was a strange death for one A. C. Freeman, the pseudonym under which I had written for Left Wing publications. There were a few A. C. Freeman articles during my first years in Russia; then, as I ceased to feel like A. C. Freeman, this pseudonym disappeared.

My wife, because she spoke fluent Russian, was cured before I was. I recall attending a meeting in a Soviet office where a purge of employees with any taint of "bourgeois" origin was being carried out. My wife could detect the skulduggery, the persecution of the innocent, that was going on and defiantly wrote in her notebook, "I am NOT a Communist," passing it to me as an implied reproach and a declaration of a changed viewpoint

There was no single incident that changed my attitude abruptly. What happened was a process of erosion, one contact with reality after another wearing away the illusions I had brought with me to Moscow. Long trips in the countryside revealed to me what the revolution had done to the peasant majority of the population.

In Russia, as in China, communist propaganda made much of "agrarian reform." The peasants, it was pointed out, had divided up among themselves the land of the big estates. This was the truth, but far from the whole truth. During the civil war, Soviet requisitioning detachments took from the peasants, at the point of a gun, all their surplus produce. As a natural result, the peasants restricted output to the barest minimum. The cities starved, and the government, during the New Economic Policy, gave up the requisitions, substituting a tax, levied first in kind, later in money.

Other means of swindling the peasants were found. The state industries set their prices very high; the prices which state buying organizations paid the peasants for their grain and other foodstuffs were very low. No one could wander through the dusty streets of the villages or sit around smoky huts for long chats in the evening and get the impression that the Soviet Government was regarded with any enthusiasm by the peasants.

A view of a local "election" in the Kuban Cossack region, where resistance to communism had been strong during the civil war, was illuminating with respect to the character of Soviet "democracy." Four very tough-looking characters, each with a revolver strapped to his belt, stalked out of the gathering of peasants and announced themselves as the committee in charge of proceedings. A list of names of candidates was read, and, understandably, there were no audible objections. But one carried away the strong impression of an alien authority, maintained, literally, at the point of the gun.

Another peasant grievance was the inability to acquire land as personal property. Under Soviet law, the peasant family had the right to use land, the amount depending on the size of his family, but the title remained with the government. I still remember the yearning in the voice of the Ukrainian peasant who, when I remarked that the Soviet Government was more tolerant than the Polish Government in permitting the use of the Ukrainian language, promptly retorted: "Yes, but you can't eat language. In Poland, Ukrainian peasants can *buy land.*"

Before I went to Russia, I knew that the country was economically backward, compared with the United States and western Europe, and that it had taken a terrific beating during the revolution and the subsequent civil war. So I was neither surprised nor dismayed by the low standard of living, by the absence of conveniences which most Americans took for granted. But I had taken to Russia the romantic idea that the Communist Party was composed of a dedicated elite, which had earned the right to rule by selfless devotion to the ideal of building a classless society. And among the communists, especially the veterans of the underground movement under the Tsars, there were men and women of this type. Without their passionate fanaticism, the Soviet regime would never have survived the test of civil war.

However, along with these "just men," as impressive and sometimes as terrible in their single-minded secular faith as the Jacobins of the French Revolution, the Communist Party, as I soon discovered, was infiltrated with selfish careerists, whose sole interest in Party membership was the enjoyment of power and privilege. Long before I left Russia, I would have heartily endorsed what Milovan Djilas, Tito's former lieutenant, wrote recently on the basis of his personal experience in Yugoslavia and his knowledge of the international communist movement:

"Power is an end in itself and the essence of contemporary communism. . . . By means of and through power the material privileges and ownership of the ruling class over national goods are realized. . . . With the victory of a communist revolution in a country a new class comes into power and into control."[1]

Far from creating a classless society, the communists constitute a new ruling class that is more absolute and uninhibited in the exercise of power than any ruling class known in

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history because of its combination of political authority with complete control of the national economy.

My last years in Russia, the period from 1929 to 1933, offered a vivid and unforgettable object lesson in the misery which absolute, uncontrolled, uninhibited power can inflict on the people who are its subjects. Every day, I saw unfolding before my eyes dramatic proof of the truth of Lord Acton's dictum: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." During this period of the First Five Year Plan, every consideration of humanity was sacrificed to the twin goals of pushing through industrial development in a poor country without reserves of capital and forcing the peasants to give up individual possession of their holdings and go into collective farms, where life and labor would be under complete state control.

Slave labor became an accepted institution, a basic element in the Soviet economy. I was present at a Soviet Congress when V. M. Molotov, then prime minister (at that time, Stalin preferred to wield his absolute power in his capacity as general secretary of the Communist Party), with the mendacity that is so characteristic of Soviet official statements, denied that there was any forced labor in the Soviet Union. Foreign correspondents, Molotov asserted, had freedom of movement and could report on the truth of his statement.

At the suggestion of my newspaper, I took Premier Molotov at his word and set out for Karelia, a heavily wooded area in northwestern Russia, where forced labor was notoriously employed, both in timber camps and in the building of the Baltic–White Sea Canal. Despite the high official assurance of "freedom of movement," I was curtly refused access to the concentration camp on Solovetski Island, opposite the port of Kem, and to other places where forced labor might be expected to exist. However, I found plenty of evidence to show that Karelia was not being run on the basis of free and voluntary labor.

The old cabman in Petrozavodsk, the capital, remarked that the country should no longer be called Karelia but *Katorga*, the Russian word for imprisonment at hard labor. On many railway sidings one could see freight cars packed with wretched human beings—men, women, and children—given less care than cattle would receive in civilized countries. They were obviously kulaks, peasants who resisted collective farming, destined for slave-labor camps. In the streets of Kem, one saw prisoners being marched under armed guard, many with faces that did not look like those of ordinary criminals.

On another trip, I stumbled onto additional evidence of the use of forced labor in factories. In Chelyabinsk, in the Ural Mountain area, I had occasion to rejoice in my wife's unusual combination of an American passport with a fluent knowledge of Russian. While I carried on stilted, halting conversation on the technical aspects of the plant with industrial executives and engineers, she circulated among the workers and soon discovered that many of them were not there of their own volition. One worker had accidentally broken an unfamiliar machine in another factory. This was considered sabotage and incurred a sentence of forced labor. A peasant had cried out at a collective-farm meeting that there was not enough to eat. This stigmatized him as a counterrevolutionary, and he was sent to Chelyabinsk as a punishment. About this time, one of the local communist bosses felt that my wife was learning things not on the regular tourist's schedule. With a scowl, he asked whether she was a Soviet citizen. When she cheerfully answered that she was an American, he had nothing more to say. I realized how little I would have learned about forced labor if my interpreter *had* been a Soviet citizen.

I can definitely place the time and location of the experience which made my retreat from Moscow final and irrevocable. It was a warm September afternoon in 1933 in an Ukrainian village named Cherkass, which had suffered appallingly in the famine that took some four million lives in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus in the preceding winter and spring. There had formerly been an icon of Christ at the entrance to the village. A zealous local communist had removed the face of the Savior, but the crown of thorns, with grimly appropriate symbolism, remained.

Cherkassy had become a ghost village, with weeds choking its former gardens and fields. The secretary of the local Soviet said that of some two thousand inhabitants, more than six hundred had perished. The famine of 1932-33, with its colossal toll of victims, was entirely man made. Millions of deaths could have been averted if the Soviet Government had relaxed its requisitions and imported food from abroad, two actions which were certainly within its power.

Here, then, were three crimes against humanity that seemed to call out to the whole civilized world for condemnation. There was the introduction of a vast slave-labor system, more cruel than the serfdom which Alexander II had abolished in 1861. There was the so-called liquidation of the kulaks as a class, the expropriation and banishment to hard labor of hundreds of thousands of peasant families whose only crime was that they were a little less poor than their neighbors. And, finally, the ghastly horror of mass starvation, employed as a weapon to break the peasants' resistance to the attempt to force them into collective farms.

What seemed to me almost as terrible as these crimes was their feeble resonance in the Soviet Union and abroad. Russians, all but the most fanatical or cynical communists, privately spoke with horror and pity of the famine, of the sufferings of the deportees, but no voice could be raised publicly —in the Soviet Parliament, in the press, in public gatherings. This fact is the best measure of how much more enslavement of the human mind and conscience there is under communism than there was under Tsarism, for before the Revolution, there were outcries against pogroms, against the shooting of striking workers in the Lena gold mines, and against other abuses of police power.

Because the Soviet peoples were so completely gagged, it was, and still is, difficult to document in Soviet published records the acts of cruelty and repression that affected many millions of people. Stalin's tremendous crimes were also pretty effectively concealed from foreign peoples. Foreign correspondents could not be silenced as completely as the enslaved Soviet peoples. Stories which the censor would pass, often after bitter argument, were so toned down that they did not demand or receive front-page attention. The crimes of the First Five Year Plan are among the best concealed in history.

For me, however, the indelible memories of the last years I spent in the Soviet Union were decisive in replacing illusions with genuine values. I had gone to Russia expecting to witness the evolution of a great act of revolutionary liberation. When I left Russia twelve years later, I was convinced that the absolutist Soviet state is a power of darkness and evil, with few parallels in history. I put aside with finality the specious sophistries with which revolutionary dictatorships are justified: that an elite has the right to coerce the people in the name of its own good, that a larger freedom will emerge from tyranny, that the end justifies the means. Experience had convinced me that it is the means that determine the end. Murder becomes a habit with states even more than with individuals. The idea of doing a little evil that good may come of it invariably ends in doing a great deal of evil with less and less prospect of any good emerging in the end.

Later developments in the Soviet Union did not alter the negative judgment with which I left in 1934. Two sputniks or two hundred sputniks will not bring to life the victims of the man-made famine. The roar of new factories and electric power plants does not drown out the cries of those who were tortured in the examinations of the secret police or worked to death in slave-labor camps.

There has been an abatement of terror since the death of Stalin, but there is nothing in the Soviet administrative system

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that offers any firm guarantee against its resumption in the future. So far, except in the case of Beria and his followers, who were put to death, the losers in the post-Stalin power struggle have been spared. But it took Stalin more than a decade to get around to killing his opponents after first ousting and disgracing them.

One consoling thought about the Soviet Union before the second world war, that it could not be a serious threat to the world outside its borders, no longer exists. Unless they meet firm united opposition and effective deterrence, the rulers of the Soviet Union could bring down on the whole civilized world a doom even more terrible than that which they inflicted on the Ukrainian peasants in 1932-33.

Such prewar and war developments as the fantastic purges of veteran communists, the ghastly details of which were described so eloquently by Khrushchev himself (although he significantly omitted mention of those crimes of Stalin with which he himself and other Soviet leaders are associated); the mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of people from Poland and the Baltic States; the savage record of wholesale murder, loot, and rape which the Red Army wrote across eastern and central Europe during the last months of the war —all these things fit in with the earlier pattern of tyranny and terror. And the brutal repression of the Hungarian people in their fight for freedom in October-November, 1956, should be the final answer to those eternal wishful thinkers who believe that the men in the Kremlin have reformed. It would be heartening if the action of Swiss students, who formed an association with the slogan *Niemals Vergessen* ("Never Forget") after the Hungarian outrage, would find imitators in other free countries.

Retreat from Moscow is a familiar experience for Westerners who first greeted the Bolshevik Revolution with the profound hope that it was an emancipation of the masses from tyranny and war. The time and occasion of the retreat

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and its consequences, in terms of individual faith, have varied. Some felt that the Revolution was lost when Trotsky was ousted from power. Others, like myself, reached the breaking point of sympathy and tolerance with the horrors of the First Five Year Plan. Another group got off the Soviet bandwagon when Stalin made his cynical deal with Hitler for the partition of eastern Europe. A still later crop of ex-sympathizers was harvested when Khrushchev gave personal testimony concerning Stalin's campaign of torture and murder against old communists and when the gallant Hungarian upsurge for liberty was drowned in blood.

My own reaction to a long close-up view of Soviet communism in action was a tremendously strengthened faith in certain traditional values, some associated with historic liberalism, some with conservatism. I sympathized especially with the conservative distrust of change for the sake of change and of schemes for reshaping society in line with doctrinaire blueprints. I also felt a strong sympathy with nineteenth-century liberalism for its rejection of state interference with the political, social, and economic freedom of the individual. It is because, as I realized more and more after my return to the United States in 1940, liberalism has in many respects been distorted out of all recognizable similarity to its historic ideals, at least on this side of the Atlantic, that I have gradually come to regard myself as a conservative of the school of Burke and de Tocqueville.

On the basis of my Soviet experience, I believe that extreme concentration of power, both political and economic, is the supreme evil in government from which all other evils flow. And I regard as the supreme social good the free development of the individual, best assured by a limited government with an abundance of checks and balances and on a free, competitive economic system based on private property.

Because communism has conquered a large part of the world and is constantly seeking to infiltrate, subvert, and finally conquer and dominate the remaining free societies, Americans and other Western peoples face a dilemma in reconciling the equally valid claims of individual liberty and national security. But dilemmas can usually be resolved by the application of reason and common sense. There is certainly a sane middle course between giving communist fifth columnists, spies, and traitors opportunities to infiltrate government service and occupy positions where, without contradiction, they can influence policy and mold public opinion and resorting to measures of undiscriminating and unreasonable repression.

The strongest, most indelible impression that I carried away from the Soviet Union was this: "Beware of any men, any group of men, who claim that, given absolute power, they can create an earthly paradise. Such fanatics are predestined to create the very close approximation to hell which one finds in totalitarian prisons and concentration camps, no matter how pure and idealistic their original purposes may be."

## CHAPTER TWO

# *The Failure of Socialism*

Retreat from Moscow, unconditional rejection of communism, implied the necessity of adopting some other philosophy. Trotskyism and other variant communist heresies held no appeal for me because I believed that the degeneration of the Russian Revolution from the hopes and ideals of its early pioneers was the result of fatal errors in the basic thinking of Marx and Lenin, not of the aberrations of Stalin. I also rejected fascism because it was so very similar, in practice, to communism, although advocates of both of these totalitarian creeds regarded followers of the other (except during the time of the Stalin-Hitler Pact) as arch-enemies. This left moderate socialism, committed to the maintenance of democratic methods, liberalism, and conservatism as the three camps from which one who, like myself, considers himself a libertarian individualist had to make his choice. In this chapter, I will try to show why moderate socialism, given a wide test in western Europe since the end of the second world war, seems to me a failure, both morally and economically.

Immediately after the second world war, socialism looked like the wave of the future. The war had disrupted capitalist methods of finance and accounting and had smashed old social and economic relations. Soviet communism, the brutal Eastern expression of Marxism, had emerged triumphant from the ordeal of war, had overrun Europe as far as the Elbe, and had imposed made-in-Moscow "people's democracies" on Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (where the completion of this process was delayed until 1948), Yugoslavia (a heretical communist state since 1948), and the Soviet Zone of Germany. In all of these areas, private property was blotted out by wholesale confiscation.

It looked as if a similar result might be achieved by milder methods in the West. The British Labor Party had won a decisive victory at the polls, gaining, for the first time, a clear majority in Parliament. Britain's renowned wartime leader, Winston Churchill, had been replaced at historic 10 Downing Street by Clement Attlee. Except for little-regarded Switzerland and isolated Spain and Portugal, there was not a country in Europe at that time in which socialists were not prominent in the government, sometimes, as in France and Italy, in alliance with the communists. And socialism was not repugnant to such advanced New Dealers as Harry Hopkins and Henry A. Wallace. In fact, there seemed to be substantial basis for the hope of Harold Laski and other Leftist British Laborites that western Europe would become a solid socialist bloc, functioning as a kind of bridge between Washington and Moscow.

By 1959, the general European political scene had changed beyond recognition. Communists were out of office everywhere, and the appeal of communism had sunk to an all-time low after the brutal Soviet intervention in Hungary. Jean-Paul Sartre, well-known French intellectual, novelist, and playwright, who had dallied with fellow-travelers for years, announced his break with communism with a pungent message to communists everywhere, denouncing them as "the Party of the murderers." The reasoned indictment of communism by Tito's former lieutenant, Milovan Djilas, who has paid for his independence with two terms in the jail where he was confined under Yugoslavia's old regime, has been heard

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around the world. Western Europe could conceivably be conquered and crushed by Soviet military force, but it will never succumb to communism from within, as seemed possible during the first years after the second world war.

Socialism in its milder Western form is in retreat, in some countries almost in rout. In 1959, all the larger nations of western Europe—Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy—were ruled by governments which could be classified as right of center. What is perhaps more important is that even in countries where socialists were participating in coalition governments, the old-fashioned capitalist methods of relying on the free market, indirect controls, and individual incentive have replaced socialist planning, rationing, and equalization.

Socialism is in eclipse because when it had its chance after the end of the war, it failed—economically, morally, and intellectually. It has failed economically because bureaucratic government regulation has compared most unfavorably with private initiative in producing dynamic, expanding economies. It has failed morally because the substitution of state for private ownership has conspicuously not increased public well-being, eliminated labor-management strife, or given the workers the lift that might be expected from the sense of working for themselves. But its most conspicuous failure has been in the market place of intellectual judgment and opinion. Thoughtful socialists in Great Britain and on the Continent are showing more and more confusion and disagreement about what they believe, why they believe it, and where their creed is taking them.

The intellectual decline of socialism was forcibly emphasized to me in a talk with Willy Bretscher, editor of one of the most highly esteemed newspapers in Europe, the Swiss *Neue Zürcher Zeitung.* "Twenty or thirty years ago," said Mr. Bretscher, "we liberals who believe in political liberty, in freedom, including freedom of private enterprise, for the individual, were on the defensive. Socialism was widely re-

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garded as the pre-ordained new form of society. The younger generation was going over to Marxist ideas. The Soviet Union was the object of much ignorant adulation. In Great Britain the socialist Labor Party had displaced the Liberal Party as the alternative to the Conservatives. And this was symbolic of a general trend.

"But in these last years the socialists have dried up in ideas. Since the death of Harold Laski there is no socialist theoretician who commands international prestige. It is the neo-liberals, men like Wilhelm Röpke, Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, who are on the intellectual offensive. There is now a new faith in the value of individual enterprise and economic liberty."[1]

I found much confirmation of Editor Bretscher's viewpoint during a trip to Europe in 1957. From talks with such prominent figures in the British Labor Party as Secretary Morgan Phillips and Labor MP's Douglas Jay and R. H. S. Crossman, I gained the impression that the Labor Party leadership expects to win the next election, which will probably be in 1959, but not on a program of full-blooded socialism. If one may use a figure of speech from baseball, the strategy seems to be to win on Conservative errors, not on socialist hits.

Nationalization of all means of production, distribution, and exchange is an item in the permanent program of the Labor Party and is the very Ark of the Covenant to the old-fashioned socialist spellbinder. But this proposal now lacks political appeal because of the unimpressive results of the nationalization of British mines and railways. So, as a substitute and over the protests of some of the old-line fundamentalists, the Labor Party Conference of 1957 endorsed a vaguely phrased proposal to invest public funds in the shares of private companies. The pamphlet which contains this proposal also includes these kind words, unusual from a Labor source, about the functioning of private industry: "Under increasingly professional managements large firms as a whole are serving the nation well. . . . We have, therefore, no intention of intervening in the management of any firm that is doing a good job."

Karl Marx, patron saint of socialism, is definitely in disfavor in most Laborite circles. Writes C. A. R. Crosland, author of *The Future of Socialism*, a widely accepted guidebook to the present thinking of the Labor Party: "In my view Marx has little or nothing to offer the contemporary socialist, either in respect of practical policy or of the current analysis of our society, or even of the right conceptual tools or framework. His prophecies have been almost without exception falsified, and his conceptual tools are now quite inappropriate."[2]

When I say that socialism has failed, I do not mean to suggest that there is no political future for parties which call themselves socialist, social democratic, or labor. Such parties have been in political ascendance in the Scandinavian countries for a long time. They take part in coalitions in some countries, such as Austria and the Netherlands, and furnish the principal opposition in others, such as Great Britain and Germany. Given the familiar swing of the political pendulum in free countries, it will be surprising if the British Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party do not some day become the dominant parties in their respective countries.

What has failed under the test of trial by practice is the heart of the socialist creed: the substitution of state for private ownership; the abolition of the wage system and of rent, interest, and profit; the elimination of the free market and of individual incentive; the introduction of a centrally planned economy; and the establishment of material equality for all. So complete has been the failure on these counts that some of these principles have been discarded in whole or in part even in communist countries where political terror can force the people to endure much.

Socialist theories have been put to the test of everyday experience in Great Britain. For six years, the Labor Party had a clear majority in Parliament—and the British Parliament, it has been said, can do everything except change a man into a woman. Parliament has not yet tried to change a man into a woman (although the House of Lords has now become a house of lords and ladies), but it has tried—and very hard, too—to make socialism work in practice. Its efforts have ended in miserable failure. The British people have carefully weighed the Labor Party's great socialist experiment in the balance and have found it badly wanting.

One of the old familiar arguments of apostles of socialism is that nationalization of industries would raise the morale of workers and employees by giving them a sense of ownership, of working for themselves, and would also raise their wages by wiping out the "unearned" profits of the capitalists. But nothing of the kind has followed the nationalization of British railways and coal mines. Strikes, slowdowns, and acrimonious disputes between labor and management are just as frequent in these nationalized industries as they are in privately owned firms.

Complaints about railway service are frequent and bitter, and the railways have been running steady deficits, the one in 1956 being about £54 million (about $150 million). Sir James Bowman, a former trade-union official who became chairman of the Coal Board (which operates the mines), told me the country loses one and one-half million tons of badly needed coal every year because of wildcat strikes and stoppages, especially in three areas, Scotland, Yorkshire, and South Wales. This, in spite of national ownership, comparatively high wages, social improvements, and an elaborate conciliation system. Victor Feather, deputy chairman of the Trade Union Council, executive organ of the strongly organized trade-union movement, said workers could not be expected to work harder merely because an industry is nationalized. "Not all the reasonable executives are in the state industries, and not all the unreasonable ones are in private firms," he added.

British experience has proved that a public board is not necessarily a better employer than a private firm, that labor-management relations do not automatically become harmonious if an industry is transferred to state ownership, that there is no pot of gold at the end of the nationalization rainbow. This is why, although some veterans of the Labor movement cling to nationalization as a panacea, the average British worker makes the impression that he is very indifferent to this issue.

Another socialist argument is the alleged advantage of long-range economic planning. But the record of the Labor administration in Britain is strewn with the wrecks of costly failures in this field, such as the large investment in peanut growing in an area of Africa unsuited to peanuts. One of the few high jinks in the normally staid British election of 1955 occurred when someone in the gallery showered a Labor candidate, identified with the ill-fated scheme, with peanuts during an election meeting.

The Labor Party in office left with many Britons the memory of a drab way of life, with all the absurdities and inconveniences of rationing, prolonged in Great Britain for no good reason after it had disappeared on the Continent, and many petty vexatious restrictions on the economic activities of the individual. For instance, a license from a bureaucratic authority was required before a man could repair his own house or build a garage; a chicken farmer was severely controlled with respect to where and how he could sell his eggs. Perhaps the normal tendency to change governments after a time, plus such Conservative errors as the Suez fiasco,[3] the failure to check the rising cost of living, and fear or inability to offer a convincing positive alternative to creeping social-

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ism, will enable the Labor Party to win the next election. But this will not be a victory for socialism as that term is commonly understood.

One of my most interesting talks in Europe in 1957 was with a socialist official in one of the smaller European countries, the son of the leader of his party. He was convinced that both socialism and capitalism had changed since the war. He made it a condition that he remain unidentified because, as he said, his views would not be popular with some of his party associates. Here is the gist of what he had to say:

"Both socialism and liberalism[4] have changed substantially since the end of the war. Most liberals now accept the need for various forms of social insurance, for what is sometimes called the welfare state. They are also more willing than they would have been in the past to let governments step in to stave off serious depression and mass unemployment.

"At the same time, socialists have also learned much. The idea of the proletariat coming out on the barricades and seizing power by force is as dead as Karl Marx. Nor is there any demand for wholesale nationalization and total planning. When the Nazis overran Western Europe they imposed total planning, with rationing; and the people didn't like it.

"Moreover, European socialists have been much impressed by two things, the continuing prosperity of the United States and the phenomenally rapid recovery of Germany, both achieved mainly by private initiative. Most of them are now prepared to admit that there is a useful function for private ownership and that all-out economic planning can mean, at worst, horrible tyranny, at best, a gray, dreary kind of life, with little consideration for individual tastes and preferences."

It is in Germany, the homeland of Marx and Engels, that the defeat of socialism is most obvious and striking. In 1957, the Social Democrats were beaten for the third straight time in a fair, free election, during the course of which their leaders did not even attempt to assert or defend Marxist principles.

Before the first world war, the German Social Democratic Party was the largest in the world. Germany and Austria were the strongholds of socialist theory, and the teachings of Marx and Engels were elaborated and expounded by a host of well-known scholars and political figures, including August Bebel, Wilhelm and Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Edouard Bernstein, Franz Mehring, Rudolf Hilferding. Today it would be hard to find a single economist of any note in free Germany who would take his stand on the principles of Marx.

If crisis, misery, and despair are signposts pointing toward socialism, Germany should have been headed in that direction at the end of the second world war. The cities and large towns were in shambles, the result of intense bombing. The country was divided between Western and Soviet zones of occupation along unnatural and unhistorical boundary lines that cut many economic arteries. German currency was so completely derelict that cigarettes were preferred to worthless paper marks.

The vengeful Morgenthau Plan, which proposed the economic impossibility of transforming thickly populated Germany into "an agricultural and pastoral country" by destroying its mines and industries, had won favor in high places. All German private assets in foreign lands were treated as war booty, to be confiscated without compensation. Millions of beggared expellees, some Germans, some people of German extraction, driven from homes where their ancestors had lived for generations, were streaming into West Germany from the eastern provinces annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union, from the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, from the countries of southeastern Europe. At that time, two conclusions might well have seemed warranted: Germany, as far ahead as one could foresee, would be able to keep its people alive only if it had help from the United States; only a system of rigorous state control, with rationing and priorities in food and raw materials, could guarantee the Germans even a low-subsistence livelihood.

This gloomy picture persisted during the first years of the occupation. The launching of a sound currency in 1948 was the first constructive step, but German recovery from the depths of war destruction may be more fairly dated from 1949, when a national government was set up in West Germany and the Germans began to gain more control over their own economic affairs[5] and shared in that reconstruction scheme for Europe known as the Marshall Plan.

In Europe, one often hears the expression "the German Miracle." And what happened in a few years was a double triumph, of national recovery and expansion and of the motivations and philosophy of free private enterprise, which overcame the most formidable obstacles. German cities have been rebuilt at the fastest construction pace in the world. Pinched, hungry faces and shabby clothes have disappeared in an atmosphere of ever broadening prosperity. And, amazingly, Germany has forged ahead of Great Britain and France in steel production.

An enormous variety of German exports, from Krupp giant trucks and turbines and the tough, serviceable *Volkswagen* (the sales leader among European cars) to glassware, musical instruments, cuckoo clocks, and toys, have been flooding the markets of the world. The exports of the Federal Republic have broken all records, even those from the time when Germany was united and included the territory lost to Poland and the Soviet Union. The standard of living is above prewar except in housing, which is still short, in spite of tremendously energetic building, because of war destruction. There is employment, and at steadily rising rates of real wages, not only for the natives of the Federal Republic, but also for able-bodied adults among more than twelve million refugees and expellees, a number which is still swelled every year by two or three hundred thousand fugitives from the socialism of the Soviet Zone.

The mark, at a 40 per cent discount on foreign markets during the first years after its introduction, is now one of the strongest currencies in Europe. Foreign capital, which would not have touched Germany with a ten-foot pole a few years ago, is now struggling to get in; the flight away from the pound and the franc to the mark was one of the financial highlights of 1957. Revived Germany has acquired a Midas touch that is almost embarrassing. Its reserves of gold and dollars, non-existent in 1948, passed an all-time high point of six billion dollars in 1957, three times those of Great Britain at that time.

Entire new industries, such as electric light bulbs and textile machinery, have sprung up in the Federal Republic to replace those which are located in the Soviet Zone. Far from being a social burden, the refugees from the East, humanely and intelligently assisted to begin new lives, have proved a national asset. Take the very typical case of Ernst Schneider, president of the Chamber of Commerce in Düsseldorf, the financial center of the booming Ruhr industrial area. The communist rulers of the Soviet Zone confiscated his cosmetics factory in Dresden. Arriving in West Germany with little but formulas, technical know-how, and a nucleus of engineers and skilled workers who did not enjoy living conditions in the East, Mr. Schneider scraped together some capital and started a plant in Düsseldorf. His plant has now expanded to a point where its output exceeds that of the factory in Dresden. In similar fashion, when the German-speaking people of the Sudetenland were driven from their homes after the war, they brought with them their established industries, glassblowing and the manufacture of musical instruments. Czech loss has been German gain.

Still more interesting and significant than Germany's recovery is the means by which this recovery was brought about. While political leadership has been in the hands of that amazingly vigorous octogenarian, Konrad Adenauer, the architect of the new Germany's economic policies has

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been chubby, dynamic, indefatigably energetic Ludwig Erhard. Sitting in his office in the Ministry of Economics in Bonn, chain-smoking the Cuban cigars to which he is addicted, Erhard summed up for me his interpretation of German recovery:

"The first aim was to restore competition and the incentive to work. So we made a clean sweep of price and wage controls, started by Hitler and continued by the occupation authorities. And, in spite of protests, import controls were relaxed as much as possible. Foreign goods, appearing on the market, were a spur to German manufacturers to produce more efficiently. They needed such a spur, because for a long time they had been cut off from foreign competition, first by the Nazi autarchy, then by the war.

"Freer trade meant more goods in shop windows. It strengthened our new currency because it showed the people they could buy something with their money. And I was sure from the beginning that, the more we bought abroad, the more we could and would sell abroad. To many it seemed a risky thing for a country in Germany's plight to bet on economic freedom. But we made the bet—and we won it."

This miracle of German recovery from war devastation and advancement far beyond prewar levels of industrial output and foreign trade has been wrought without compulsion and regimentation. No bureaucratic agency said to the hosts of destitute refugees: "You must live here. You must work there." The government used the funds available for aid to encourage self-help, to get the farmer started on the land, the merchant in his small shop, the businessman in his small factory. As Dr. Werner Middelmann, veteran official in the Ministry of Refugees, put it to me: "Our guiding slogans in this work have been: Strengthen the individual as much as possible. And change the welfare recipient as soon as possible into a man who is earning enough to pay taxes."

This example of a free economy leading to an ever higher standard of well-being was a harder blow to German socialism than Bismarck's repressive laws or Hitler's concentration camps. For the first time, German industrial workers, without compulsion or pressure, began to desert the Marxist cause in droves. (The majority of these workers voted socialist or communist before Hitler came into power.) When the votes were counted after the third—and biggest—national electoral victory of the Christian Democratic Union, the party of Adenauer and Erhard, it was found that in the Ruhr, with its heavy concentration of industrial workers, more than half the voters had cast CDU ballots, almost twice as many as the Social Democrats received.

The Social Democrats, the largest opposition party, at first tried to discredit Erhard's policy with old-fashioned Marxist slogans. The rich, they said, were getting richer, the poor, poorer. They called for austerity, rationing, priorities, controls—the unpalatable mess which the Labor Party was serving up to Britain in the late 1940's. But the growth of output under Germany's private-enterprise economy exceeded what the most optimistic planners thought was possible, and the benefits of this growth were felt by the workers as much as by any other group.

So the Social Democrats changed their tactics in 1957. They realized that they were only making themselves ridiculous by telling the German voters that they were worse off when the facts of everyday living spoke eloquently to the contrary. In the end, they were compelled to lower the red flag of Karl Marx from their masthead. Some two months before the election, their deputy leader, Wilhelm Mellies, told me in their Bonn headquarters that "socialization is no part of our program, if we come into power." They tried to represent themselves as better economic liberals than Erhard, more opposed to monopoly and controls. No more was heard of their earlier demand for nationalization of the coal, iron, and steel industries. But the change of tactics was of no avail. The third successive endorsement of the Adenauer-Erhard policies at the polls was the most emphatic.

In short, socialism has been beaten on its home grounds, not by force or suppression, but by a convincing demonstration that a free economy is best equipped to produce the most goods of the best quality for the most people. Erhard's new book, *Wohlstand für Alle (Prosperity for All)*, is outselling Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* and is both more up to date and considerably easier to understand. The failure of socialism as an efficient economic system is also evident in the countries of eastern Europe and Asia under communist rule, even though world-wide excitement over Soviet success in launching earth satellites has created the impression that communism is a road to success, a wave of the future.

The biggest Soviet successes, however, have been achieved not by applying but by abandoning distinctively communist principles. For the past quarter of a century, Soviet education has been a conservative's—even a reactionary's—dream, with strict classroom discipline, teaching by subjects, advancement on the basis of marks and examinations, a minimum of student choice with respect to studies. It is this kind of training that has produced the engineers, scientists, and technicians needed to direct the big and growing Soviet industrial plant.

Before he took over power, Lenin believed that communism would mean equal pay for all. After he had faced the responsibility of administering the country, however, he quickly reached the conclusion that it would be worth while to pay "bourgeois" experts more if they could make things run again. Stalin ridiculed equality of reward and instituted piecework payment throughout Soviet industry. (Karl Marx expressed the view that piecework was a diabolical invention of private capitalism.)

After scientific training and education and industrial expansion, the biggest Soviet success has been militarization. And here the story is the same, a ruthless scrapping of early

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communist ideals in order to build up an efficient fighting machine. At first there was a minimum of distinction between officers and men in the new Red Army. The very word "officer" was abolished; "Comrade Commander" was substituted. But under the stress of the second world war, the old privileges and signs of superior rank were restored, epaulets, clanking medals, the tremendous gulf between the living standards of the higher officers and the private soldiers. An old-time Tsarist officer would in many ways feel quite at home in the present-day Red Army.

Similar departures from pure communist theory have been made in the Soviet satellite nations. Poland and Yugoslavia have outdone the Soviets by releasing the peasants from the compulsory bondage of the collective farm. Both of these countries have been trying to get away from the paralyzing effects of overcentralized direction in industry, to find some method of adjusting prices to market demand. A communist editor in Yugoslavia with whom I talked described some aspects of his country's economy as "capitalism without capitalists." Khrushchev's recent sweeping decentralization of Soviet industry pursues the same aim: to give more local initiative. But that which gives capitalism its dynamic power is the element of individual freedom, and this, no communist regime can afford to grant.

One simple factual test, verifiable by any traveler, proves the failure of communism, the attempt to impose socialism by dictatorship, to satisfy the needs and requirements of ordinary men and women. Throughout the world, in Asia as well as in Europe, mass voluntary movement is always away from communism, never toward it.

The number of people who have fled from the communist-ruled Soviet Zone of Germany to the Federal Republic since the end of the war is between two and three million. Compared with this flood of migration, there has been only a very tiny trickle of communist sympathizers or persons dissatisfied on other grounds in the opposite direction. And the flow is constant; during a visit to Berlin in 1957, I found refugees from the Soviet Zone pouring into several large reception camps in Berlin and other border-crossing centers at the rate of about one thousand per day.

After the division of Korea, millions fled from the communist-ruled North to the Republic of Korea. And after the Korean conflict, more than half of the 171,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners in United Nations hands refused to return. The score on the other side, of those prisoners who preferred to remain under communism, was as follows: 323 South Koreans, 23 Americans, one Briton. Of the 23 Americans, a number have already sneaked home, sometimes at the risk of serving prison sentences, having had their fill of life in Red China.

It is the same picture in Hong Kong, bursting at the seams with fugitives from Red China, and in partitioned Vietnam, where hundreds of thousands have fled from the communist North to the anti-communist South. Whether or not Indians and other Asiatics are as deeply impressed by the alleged progress of Red China as some observers believe, the reaction of many Chinese who had to live under this "progress" can be summed up in three words: *We want out!* And from the communist-ruled countries of Europe, including Poland under Gomulka and Yugoslavia under Tito, people have been escaping to the West in an infinite variety of ways. They have been crawling into refrigerator cars, hijacking commercial airliners, seizing and taking off in jet planes, running locomotives across unguarded frontier rail points, jumping passenger ships in Western ports, taking their chance in stormy seas in little fishing boats, running the grim gauntlet of barbed-wire frontier entanglements and border guards who shoot to kill. Lenin said that the Russian army of 1917 voted for peace with its legs, by running away. That is how millions of people have voted against communism.

Perhaps the most vivid exhibit of the contrast between life under communism and life under free enterprise is seen in the sundered sections of Berlin, Germany's former capital. People of the same language, nationality, and education live in the two parts of the divided city, parts which suffered equally from Western air bombing and Soviet artillery fire in the last days of the war. But the differences between free West Berlin and communist-ruled East Berlin are numerous, dramatic, and impressive.

All over West Berlin, one finds reconstruction and new building—a new convention hall of striking design, a big center for the clothing industry, the newly opened Conrad Hilton hotel, to mention a few of the larger structures. There are still some bad patches of ruins—the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church remains a ghastly shell—but West Berlin looks more and more like a normal city, with shops full of goods, lively automobile traffic, and restaurants, cafés, theaters, and movies functioning as in prewar days.

Cross into the Soviet sector of Berlin, ironically labeled "democratic," and one finds the gayest and most elegant streets of the former Berlin—Unter den Linden, Friedrichstrasse, Wilhelmstrasse—drab and desolate beyond belief. Large stretches of ground along the Wilhelmstrasse look like cow pastures. With unconscious appropriateness, the former building of the Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda has been taken over as the headquarters of the National Front, the Quisling-like organization through which the Soviet Union rules the Zone, and flaunts shopworn communist propaganda slogans.

Almost all of the new building in East Berlin has been concentrated on the Stalinallee, a thoroughfare flanked by huge apartment houses, with stores displaying shoddy goods on the ground floors. Get away from the Stalinallee and East Berlin is a wasteland of depressing war ruins, old and rickety buses and streetcars, and a dearth, which one realizes on crossing back into bustling West Berlin, of automobiles.

What has happened in the new independent nations of

Asia teaches the same familiar lesson: that socialism, to put it mildly, is no economic panacea, no short cut to wealth. It is interesting to recall that Japan, the Oriental country that entered the industrial era most smoothly and successfully, followed capitalist models in the organization of its industry, trade, and finance, with a few modifications because of special national conditions. Indeed, at the time of Japan's economic Westernization, no other models were available.

Many of the leaders of Asian states which became independent after the second world war have imbibed more or less cloudy theories of socialism at Western universities. This is perhaps one reason why the progress of their countries is filled with so many bumps and jolts. The following random news items are illustrative, and they could be multiplied many times if considerations of space permitted:

1. In 1957, India was building four new steel mills. The one which was nearest completion belonged to Tata, a private firm. The other three, all government enterprises, were lagging far behind.

2. Dispatch from Rangoon in the New York *Times* of July 1, 1957, quoting a statement by Prime Minister Nu: "From practical experience, I no longer like to see the government's finger in all sorts of economic pies. If it is allowed to go on unchecked, then, because of lack of proper supervision and efficient management, state enterprises will sooner or later only line the pockets of thieves and pilferers."

3. Dispatch in the Manchester *Guardian* of September 19, 1957, from its correspondent in India, Taya Zinkin: "While the Government has been persistently falling behind in its plans for reasons good and bad, the private sector already—during the second year of the five year plan—is well on the way to fulfilling two thirds of its share."

There has been a theory, fashionable in Leftist circles, that free enterprise is a luxury which only a rich country can afford. This theory has been knocked into a cocked hat by all the lessons of postwar experience. Put on one side the spectacular upsurge of Germany, the swift economic advance of the United States and Canada—all predominantly the fruits of private enterprise. Put on the other side the bureaucratic red tape, the bumbling delays, the neglect of individual wants and needs where socialist methods have been tried. The logical conclusion might well be a paraphrase of a famous statement by Daniel Webster: "Liberty, private property, and prosperity, now and forever, one and inseparable."

## CHAPTER THREE

# *The Strange Death of Anglo-American Liberalism*

When I returned from Moscow, I considered myself a liberal. I had been brought up on Whig and Liberal interpretations of history; Green and Macaulay had been my mentors on English constitutional development. At that time, I was not familar with the masterpieces of conservative exposition, with Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, *The Federalist*, or the writings of John Adams and John C. Calhoun.

Liberal philosophy seemed to me the natural shield and expression of an ideal to which I had always attached the highest value: the right of the individual to enjoy the utmost freedom of action, thought, and expression, as long as he did not infringe on the rights or freedom of any other individual. What I sympathized with, and still sympathize with, was classical liberalism, as reflected in the works of Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Lord Acton, and John Stuart Mill.

Classical liberalism seemed to express the ideals of the good society: a state strictly limited in its functions; maximum freedom for the individual to go as far as his desire and ability would carry him; an aristocracy of talent, not of birth; protection for the individual against all forms of tyranny, including tyranny of the majority; a minimum of bureaucratic administration. During my twelve years in Russia, absorbed

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in study of Soviet communism in theory and practice, I did not realize how far this classical liberalism, which looked especially attractive from the perspective of Moscow, had lost ground in the very countries which had once been its strongholds, the United States and Great Britain.

What hoots of derision, for instance, would supposedly advanced thinkers bestow on Locke's insistence on man's natural right of "life, liberty and property" or his conception that security of property is "the great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths." Or how dreadfully old fashioned, in the view of these thinkers, would be Adam Smith's dictum that "every man is by nature first and principally recommended to his own care" or his view that when that "insidious and crafty animal vulgarly called the statesman or politician" has given external peace and internal order, his work is done.

From a background of Soviet observation, the classical liberal identification of free trade and free thought, of political liberty and economic liberty, including freedom of enterprise and security of property, did not seem absurd at all, but highly reasonable and convincing. Indeed, liberalism, the predominant philosophy of the nineteenth century in western Europe and North America, emerged as the heir of a long process of struggle, sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, against despotic monarchies and the bureaucratic, highly regulated economies which were the natural accompaniment of such monarchies.

An interesting illustration in this connection is the contrast between the early British colonies in New England and the adjacent French colony of Canada. The New England colonies were left pretty much alone, to sink or swim by their own efforts. Canada was fairly smothered by well-meant and minute regulations emanating from the royal government in Paris. New England throve on a diet of self-help and self-reliance. Canada stagnated as a result of too much paternal supervision from abroad. This is not the least important reason why, despite the administrative ability of Frontenac, the courage of Montcalm, and the achievements of French explorers and missionaries, France was ousted from a political role in North America.

Liberalism, with its special virtues—compromise, conciliation, moderation—characterized the peaceful revolution of 1688 in England, which ended the half-century of feud between Cavalier and Puritan and placed the unwritten British Constitution on the secure basis of general popular consent and approval. The sequel to the very unpeaceful French Revolution, with its violent oscillations between the rule of the Paris mob and the despotism of Napoleon, was the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, whose advice to his subjects was to enrich themselves.

Liberalism was in ascendance throughout Europe during the century between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of the first world war. There were occasional setbacks, but, apart from the political fortunes of the parties which called themselves "Liberal," the general trend was toward the realization of liberal principles: representative institutions; independent courts; freedom of movement of men, goods, and capital to a degree almost unimaginable at the present time; economic advance through private enterprise.

But if the eighteenth century, before the French Revolution, was an era of more or less enlightened despotism and the nineteenth century a period of liberalism, the twentieth century has so far proved to be an age of great wars, great revolutions, plebeian dictatorships, and the replacement of the liberal ideal of independent citizens with the art of manipulating the masses by means of extensive economic handouts to favored groups by those in power. Amid all these new developments, liberalism, in its proper classical sense, seems to have withered on the vine.

Every distinctively liberal principle has been trampled underfoot by totalitarian dictatorships, either of the communist or fascist brand. In that part of Europe which has remained outside the Iron Curtain, liberalism, in its classical sense, survives. Although European liberal parties are minority political groups, liberal ideas possess some influence because the leading Continental newspapers are generally edited in a liberal spirit. If I were a European, I should probably think of myself as a liberal.

But a strange fate has overtaken liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where it was once most powerful. The British Liberal Party, which gave Britain so many prime ministers before the first world war, has shrunk to a tiny remnant, able to elect about half a dozen members to Parliament and no longer in a position to hold the balance between the Laborites and Conservatives, even after a close election. This tiny remnant cannot find a clear, solid basis of agreement among its own members. Some look back, a little wistfully, to the days when liberalism was a doctrine of economic individualism, favoring private initiative and rejecting the idea that the state should be a grab bag into which every organized group in the population—business, labor, farmers—should reach for special favors. Other present-day British liberals are following the new gods of state economic planning. The result is that the British voter can scarcely be expected to know what he is voting for if he marks his ballot for a Liberal candidate. This is why, although many Britons are not enthusiastic over the alternatives presented by the Laborites and the Conservatives, the chances for a significant revival of the historic party of Gladstone and Asquith seem dim.

In the United States, the good ship *Liberalism* has suffered an even sadder fate. It has been boarded and captured by a pirate crew of state interventionists and near-socialists whose ideals are unrecognizably different from those of the historic founders of liberalism and who regard Karl Marx as more relevant to modern conditions than Adam Smith.

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Two illustrations serve to show how liberalism, in its twentieth-century American meaning, has departed from the original liberal philosophy. Economy and retrenchment in government spending were two constant watchwords of William E. Gladstone, the Grand Old Man of British liberalism in the last half of the nineteenth century. Gladstone was a sworn enemy of the personal income tax, which he tried to abolish altogether at one time and which he kept at a level that would seem incredibly low by modern standards. The modern American "liberal" is, in principle, a profligate spender of public funds for any and all purposes and sometimes merely for the sake of spending. If he is free from the cynicism of a Harry Hopkins, with his patented scheme for buying the votes of the people with their own money ("Tax, tax, tax, spend, spend, spend, elect, elect, elect."), he is usually a super-Keynesian, convinced that the cure for all social and economic difficulties is for the government, the supposed horn of plenty, to write a bigger check.

There has also been a noteworthy and significant shift in attitude toward the state since the founding of the American Republic. Immediately after the Revolution, it was the Federalists, the more conservative of the two principal parties, who favored a relatively strong central government, although a government well provided with checks and balances against the possibility of tyranny.

It was the Jeffersonian Republicans, the political progenitors of the Democratic Party, who stood strongly for checks on the competence of the central government. It was Jefferson, a Leftist in his time, who was committed to the idea that the government is best that governs least. As Jefferson wrote to James C. Cabell in 1816:

"The way to have good and safe government is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many, distributing to everyone exactly the functions he is competent to. . . . What has destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every government which has ever existed under the sun? The generalizing and concentrating all cares into one body, no matter whether of the autocrats of Russia or France, or of the aristocrats of a Venetian senate."[1]

Ever since the inauguration of the New Deal, the American Left has been extolling the virtues of strong central government, of the affirmative state. Conservatives, like the late Senator Robert A. Taft and former President Herbert Hoover, have been the voices warning against undue centralization and regimentation of the individual. One feels that Thomas Jefferson would today meet a very frosty reception if he appeared at a Jefferson Day banquet of the Democratic Party (a consistent advocate of bigger government spending) and uttered such sentiments as the following:

"We are now taught to believe that legerdemain tricks upon paper can produce as solid [a] wealth as hard labor in the earth. It is vain for common sense to urge that *nothing* can produce but *nothing*.

"We must make our election between economy and liberty or profusion and servitude.... Private fortunes are destroyed by public as well as by private extravagance.... And the fore horse of this frightful team is public debt. Taxation follows that, and in its train wretchedness and oppression."[2]

At the end of my stay in the Soviet Union, I considered the liberal philosophy to be the complete antithesis of communism. Liberalism stood for liberty, communism for dictatorship. Liberalism meant *habeas corpus*, communism *habeas cadaver*. Liberalism meant the right of anyone to speak his mind, right or wrong. Communism meant that every newspaper and magazine was a government house organ. Liberalism stood for government by consent, communism for government by coercion. Liberalism implied the rule of reason, communism the rule of infallible authority as set forth in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Liberalism in western Europe and North America had produced a free

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society, with the individual able to choose his own occupation and shift from job to job at will. Communism, as I had seen it in action, was a regimented society, with large groups of people "mobilized" for this or that kind of work and legal restrictions on quitting jobs. The penalties of failure under liberalism were loss of a job or lower pay. The ultimate sanctions under communism were the slave-labor camp and the firing squad.

There was no doubt in my mind about which creed represented the higher, more humane, and more efficient type of civilization, and at that time I considered myself a liberal. What began to shake my faith, not in the ideals of the historic founding fathers of liberalism, but in what passed for liberalism in the United States, was the marked reluctance in liberal circles to face the hard, brutal truth about the Soviet Union.

The sophistries and crooked reasoning and the ignoring of credible evidence to the point of downright obscurantism would have provoked the contempt of Locke's lucid mind and elicited a stream of eloquent rhetorical denunciation from John Stuart Mill. There is no space here to record the pro-Soviet follies of many liberals in the 1930's, follies that were repeated on a bigger scale, which affected more people and led to more disastrous results when Stalin, through no volition of his own, was drawn into the war against Nazi Germany.

Eugene Lyons has compiled an excellent list of these follies and those who participated in them.[3] Perhaps the most garish was the habit which developed among New York experts on Soviet political trials of solemnly signing their names to "Hooray for Murder" manifestoes, praising Stalin's slaughter of the old Communists during the thirties. A convincing test of the objectivity of the American "liberal" mind in regard to the Soviet Union would be to go through the files of a typical "liberal" magazine of the thirties and forties and measure how much space is given to such events as:

The liquidation of the kulaks as a class;
The famine of 1932–33;
The Soviet slave-labor system;
The deportations from eastern Poland and the Baltic States;
The Katyn Massacre.

Such partisan commitment to the policies of a foreign dictatorship, such complete departure from the objectivity and open-mindedness which were once considered characteristic of the liberal spirit suggest an infatuation that calls for examination. And examination indicates that many Americans who regarded themselves as liberals fell into such a panic over the economic depression of 1929–33 that they threw over basic liberal principles and positions and were willing to overlook or explain away any crime, however monstrous, committed by a regime that professed to stand for the abolition of capitalism and for a state-planned economy.

Granting the heartbreak and suffering caused by the depression, Americans during its worst phase remained better fed, better clothed, better housed, and better cared for than most people in Europe, almost all people in Asia, and, as I can testify from personal observation, incomparably better off than the overwhelming majority of the people of the Soviet Union, the supposed beneficiaries of advanced state planning. The number of Americans out of work was hardly larger than the number of Soviet citizens who perished in the famine of 1932–33, plus those consigned to slave-labor camps. No one with a choice between these two evils would have been likely to opt for the second.

My disappointing experience with the American liberal attitude on the Soviet issue prompted me to take a closer look at other characteristics of what passed for liberalism in America. This was easier because I gave up work as a foreign correspondent and took up permanent residence in the United States in 1940.

A close examination of what self-styled liberals really believe and advocate seemed all the more desirable because a confusion of tongues has descended on our age. Many words that are the regular stock in trade of political discussion have become almost meaningless without precise definition. The word "socialist" covers a wide variety of human types, from the soapbox would-be confiscator of all private wealth to the frocked cabinet minister in Sweden who favors a gradual and painless extension of state controls over the national economy. Conservatism also means different things to different persons, a point to which I shall return in Chapter Four. Even communism has assumed changing forms at various times and is sometimes praised and attacked for the wrong reasons.

But of all such political terms, "liberal" perhaps stands in greatest need of interpretation. For in the United States, almost anyone may be called or call himself a liberal, from the old-time fighter for clean city government against boss rule and corruption to the man or woman who is cheating the Communist Party of its dues by refusing to join it. What adds to the confusion is that the fundamental ideals of historic liberalism are often held in slight esteem, and this just in the circles which consider themselves liberal. Old-fashioned liberalism is deeply impregnated with distrust of arbitrary government and alertness to the rights of the individual as opposed to those of the state. But the modern revised version of American liberalism exalts the administrative state and sees happiness for the individual as the product of benevolent and omniscient bureaucracy.

The assertion of the absolute right of free expression for the individual, responsible only to his own mind and conscience, restrained only by laws against libel and sedition, is a familiar ringing note in the literature of historic liberalism. Listen to it in the rugged and sonorous prose of John Milton's *Areopagitica*:

"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. . . . Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.'"

Or consider John Stuart Mill's unconditional vindication, in his essay *On Liberty*, of the right of the individual, not only against the state, but also against the majority:

"If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."

Such affirmations of historic liberalism certainly support the freedom of the press against censorship. But when Kent Cooper, director of the Associated Press, proposed after the war that American foreign correspondents be granted the right "to report news without hindrance, with protection against being expelled," the only audible note of reservation came from the Left. *The Nation*, a typical organ of American liberalism, entered this caveat:

"The grant of such privileges implies the assurance of a sense of responsibility in the recipients. We could name plenty of American foreign correspondents who have such a sense of responsibility, but we could also name a number of others in whom it is weak, if not entirely lacking."

It is certainly strange liberal doctrine to suggest that freedom of reporting is a "privilege" of which the recipients must be "worthy." Of course it is desirable that newspaper reporting, both at home and abroad, be responsible in the sense of being accurate, balanced, and well informed, but who is qualified to hand down a decision concerning who is or is not "responsible"? Would such a decision not be likely merely to reflect the sympathies of the person who made it?

A government censor would most certainly be the worst possible candidate for this job, for the censor's interest is not objectivity or truth or "responsibility," but what will help or hurt the cause of the regime he serves. And I can testify from fairly long personal experience that it is rarely the stupid or ignorant journalist who gets into trouble with censorship. The thought-controllers who sit in censors' offices are afraid of newspapermen who know too much, not of those who know too little.

This willingness to hoist the white flag on such a typical liberal issue as freedom of the press is only one of several indications that American liberals have been forsaking traditional liberal principles and moving toward statism. Another such indication is the strong trend to favor government planning and control against private initiative and the functioning of the free market. This is contrary to the whole economic trend of liberalism, which grew in struggle against arbitrary government regulation of industry and commerce.

The liberal economic order has justified its stand with results. Take the decade before the outbreak of the second world war, one of the less prosperous decades in the history of modern capitalism. Where did one find higher standards of living and greater security for the individual against the arbitrary violence of the state? In predominantly free-enterprise countries like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and Switzerland? Or in lands where various forms of dictatorship sought to solve economic and social problems, in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Spain? To ask the question is to answer it.

Some modern American liberals fall into the habit of the medieval Schoolmen, who preferred the word of Aristotle to the observed facts of nature. If the plain lessons of experience contradict their dogmatic faith in the saving virtues of statism, so much the worse for the lessons of experience. During, and for a time after, the war, the newspaper *PM* was the organ of the statist, or totalitarian, "liberals." In 1945, *PM* published an editorial by a staff correspondent, who had recently returned from Europe, which said in effect that America's "fifth freedom" was—freedom to starve! And this from a man who had recently returned from Europe in the year 1945, when America was one of all too few countries where it could be confidently expected that no one would go hungry or cold, to say nothing of starving, during the winter.

It would be hard to imagine anything more absurd. Equally absurd was the intimation that America, at any time, has been a symbol of starvation. One need only look at the immigration and emigration statistics during the time when freedom of movement across national frontiers was a generally accepted right. Since immigration is the sincerest form of flattery, it may be assumed that there would have been no mass movement of voluntary migrants into a country where starvation was a likely prospect.

In its infatuation with schemes for bureaucratic assurance of the good life, American liberal thinking has for decades overlooked two convincing reasons why a predominantly individualistic economic system has always gone hand in hand with maintenance of personal and political liberties.

First, an acquisitive order in which an increasing share of income and property is the incentive to more efficient work is the only proved feasible alternative to some modern edition of the serf state, such as existed under feudalism. It is no accident that the modern revolutionary regimes which destroyed or drastically curbed the rights of private property invariably resorted to forced labor in some form. One of the most important aspects of the transition from medieval to modern civilization was the advance from status to contract in human economic relations. What has taken place in systems which repudiate private ownership of means of production is a reversion from contract to status, a determination, not by individual choice and capacity, but by state fiat, of who is to perform this or that kind of labor.

Second, the diffusion of the power of making economic decisions in many hands, which is the consequence of the private-property system, is the best insurance against the emergence of a totalitarian state. Real political liberty is not likely to survive a system in which all economic power is vested in state agencies.

The ability of the consumer, under a free economic system, to influence the course of production, to reward efficient and discourage inefficient production and service by giving or withholding his buying power, is one of the most important practical rights of the average citizen and one that is most conducive to a high and rising standard of living. This right disappears if some high planning authority is able to decide how much of everything, from furniture to leafy vegetables, everyone is supposed to have.

The American constitutional system of checks and balances has vindicated itself in practice. It is not so widely recognized that our economic system is, and by right ought to be, one of checks and balances. It is fashionable to point the finger of scorn at special interests, and it is easy to identify specific abuses with big business, big trade-unionism, and a highly organized farm bloc. But an economy in which business, labor, agriculture, and the consumer all have a say is preferable to one in which everything is run from a single controlling center.

If liberalism in the United States had not become detached from its historic moorings, it could have undertaken the useful service of working out blueprints to promote the functioning of a check-and-balance economy with a maximum of fairness and a minimum of friction. But American liberals have usually preferred to go along the dangerous road that may lead to a new serfdom by advocating ever increasing state spending, controls, and bureaucracy as the cure for all social ills. How far American liberals have departed from the "retrenchment," which was never far from the thoughts of William E. Gladstone, outstanding figure in British political liberalism in the nineteenth century, may be measured by citing the opening paragraphs of a news report on the program of an organization that calls itself the Liberal Party of New York:

"The Liberal Party of New York proposed a twenty-one point state legislative program yesterday as an atomic-age blueprint to 'show the way to the fuller and deeper life.'

"The Liberals went far beyond the spending and social welfare proposals of the Democratic Administration of Governor Harriman. They outlined in 21,000 words a vast expansion of state spending and activity to meet 'the urgency of the times.'

" 'We cannot afford economics as usual and politics as usual,' the Party said.

"The program urged the creation of agencies to aid small business, promote industrial usage of atomic power and protect consumers. It called for improvements in existing social legislation and heavy spending on education and housing."[4]

The term "liberal" once stood for more than a particular attitude toward politics and economics. It implied a mind that was open and inquiring, humane and tolerant, wide in its range of tastes and ideas, and willing to examine any idea, old or new, on the basis of its merits. Modern American liberalism has long abandoned this heritage. Its spokesmen, with some honorable exceptions, are apt to be shrill and strident, one sided and intolerant. They are quick to impute unworthy motives to those with whom they disagree. They are masters of the defamatory cliché, of the art of substituting abuse, invective, and insinuation for rational argument. One need only note how often the word "fascist" has been used in pseudo-liberal circles in attempts to discredit anyone whose views are those of a conservative or an old-fashioned liberal.

The experience of my book, *America's Second Crusade*, at the hands of liberal reviewers in liberal publications is a good case history in the decline from former liberal moral and cultural ideals. This book was admittedly controversial. It was a hard-hitting criticism of the foreign policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt, backed, as I believed, by adequate documentary and other evidence. I was quite prepared for equally hard-hitting criticism. What I had not expected was the widespread resort to slander and gross and palpable misrepresentation of the viewpoint set forth in my book. The tone of one review is reflected in the following comment: "Mr. Chamberlin even quotes unabashedly from some of Lindbergh's most disgraceful speeches." It was the reviewer's privilege to consider Lindbergh's speeches disgraceful, but, as a historian of America's involvement in the war and its consequences, I would have been remiss in my duty if I had not quoted Lindbergh, along with some of the prominent advocates of intervention.

An editorial devoted to the book in a New York newspaper which prides itself on advanced liberalism hit some high notes of hysterical misrepresentation. In the best totalitarian style, the editor of this newspaper, a former communist, failed to print or even acknowledge a letter of correction which I sent him. The character of the editorial, which showed that the editor, in abandoning communism, had not abandoned the communist principle of being as unfair as possible in controversy, may be judged from these excerpts from my unacknowledged and unpublished letter of rebuttal:

"There is not the slightest suggestion in the book that 'we should have joined up with the Nazis and the Japanese.' It was the advocates of all-out trust in Stalin, not the opponents of American involvement in the war, who wanted to 'join up' with a totalitarian regime.

"The intimation that I am a 'totalitarian conservative' who 'invariably justified or apologized for many things in fascist countries which he found execrable and unjustified in Russia,' is an absurd slander. I was one of the first American writers who pointed out the many common traits between

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communism and fascism. Chapter II of *America's Second Crusade* lists ten 'deadly parallels' between communism and fascism."

Still more defamatory, if this is possible, was a review in a literary weekly which bore the headline "That Dictator Roosevelt Again." There was not a single passage in my book which referred to Roosevelt as a dictator. The reviewer also accused me of "ladling out the same dish" as Dr. Goebbels, evidently ignorant or oblivious of my record as a consistent anti-fascist. Obviously, Goebbels, an ingenious propagandist, sometimes used for his own purposes arguments of American anti-interventionists, but this did not make the latter sympathetic with Hitler or Goebbels. The absurdity of this attempt to insinuate guilt by association is obvious if one employs a syllogism: Senator Taft criticizes Truman and Acheson; the Communists denounce Truman and Acheson; therefore Senator Taft is a Communist. This method of dealing, not only with *America's Second Crusade*, but also with the works of Charles A. Beard and others who were critical of Roosevelt's foreign policy, indicates that the honorable old liberal tradition of the appeal to reason has been replaced by an ugly new tradition: the appeal to the smear.

It has been the creditable role of liberalism in the past to tell as much unpopular truth as possible during a war, to serve as an asylum of reason and common sense, and thereby to prepare the ground for a peace of reconciliation. But the recognized organs of American liberalism conspicuously failed to perform these functions under the challenge of the second world war. One had to look anywhere except in professedly liberal publications for clear-sighted facing up to the realities and implications of the Polish, Baltic, and Yugoslav tragedies, for recognition of other situations which were developing in complete contradiction to the Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms.

After the war, some rugged, hard-bitten generals in the occupied enemy countries, men who certainly could not plausibly be called "soft" toward the defeated, were moved to take remedial measures when they realized that famine and disease might sweep away millions of noncombatants. But many professed liberals would be content with nothing short of the last pound of flesh. One well-known commentator, with a high reputation in liberal circles, almost succumbed to a fit of apoplectic indignation when General MacArthur pointed to such obvious truths as Japan's need for foreign trade and for a steel industry if her ninety million people, crowded into an area smaller than California, were to stand a chance of economic survival.

The Potsdam Agreement should have been a natural target for liberal attack. This sanctioned the arbitrary annexation of large territories without regard for the wishes of the inhabitants. Its provisions, if they had not been fortunately revised and finally scrapped, would have made for the economic strangulation of central Europe. It sanctioned the driving from their homes of some fifteen million beggared and destitute refugees. By any standard of morals, economics, international good faith, and common humanity, it was infinitely worse than the Treaty of Versailles, object of so much liberal criticism after the first world war.

But for a fair appraisal of the implications of Potsdam, one must again look anywhere except in liberal publications. These swallowed the curious fallacy that it was possible simultaneously to promote democratic regimes in postwar Germany and Japan and to destroy the bases of German and Japanese national livelihood. Self-styled liberals can take little credit for the gradual revision of American policy toward Germany and Japan in the direction of humanity, economic common sense, and soundly conceived national interest.

So, on clinical analysis, what passes for liberalism in the United States seems to be in a pretty sick condition. Some of its most striking failures have been in the moral field. There

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has been a loss of faith in such universal values as justice, humanity, and liberty. All too often the modern liberal lightly accepts the old fallacy that the end justifies the means—in the face of overwhelming evidence that in the long run, the means shape and determine the end.

Only on this basis can one understand how many liberals, at least until the cold war warmed up considerably, systematically applied a double standard of morals. Some of the very individuals who were rightly loud in denunciation of Nazi book-burnings proved wrongly willing to take part in campaigns designed to suppress or discredit candid and uninhibited books about the Soviet Union.[5] The voices that once denounced appeasement of Hitler as cowardly, immoral, and futile are not seldom heard arguing that appeasement of Stalin and his successors is realistic statesmanship and the only alternative to world catastrophe.

Modern liberalism has also shown itself to be deficient in the sense of relativity. The lack of this sense leads to much faulty reasoning, to many false and unsound analogies. An occasional inaccuracy in a freely edited newspaper is cited as proof that there is really no difference between a free and a totalitarian press, where state-directed propaganda inaccuracy is unlimited and is not subject to contradiction or correction. A 5 per cent failure in democratic processes and civil liberties in a free country is equated with 100 per cent blackout of these processes and liberties under a dictatorship.

Historically, liberalism has been associated with the struggle of the individual to emancipate himself from state dictation. But one of the trade-marks of what now passes for liberalism is support for laws and judicial rulings that override deep-rooted local sentiments and destroy the right of the individual to dispose of his property as he may see fit.

Historically, liberalism was the climactic phase in the emancipation of the individual from tyrants and from the pressure of a static social order. But what is now called liberalism would put the individual in a new straitjacket of state aid and state control, of state handouts and state confiscatory taxation. It would completely nullify that fine picture of the redoubtably self-reliant, self-sufficient American whom de Tocqueville found in the early life of the American Republic:

"If the opinion which the citizen entertains of himself is exaggerated, it is at least salutary; he unhesitatingly confides in his own powers, which appear to him to be all-sufficient. When a private individual meditates an undertaking, however directly it may be connected with the welfare of society, he never thinks of soliciting the co-operation of the Government, but he publishes his plan, offers to execute it himself, courts the assistance of other individuals, and struggles manfully against all obstacles. Undoubtedly he is often less successful than the state might have been in his position; *but in the end the sum of these private undertakings far exceeds all that the Government could have done.*"[6]

No one, it seems to me, who believes that the twin purposes of government are to maintain liberty under law and to assure the individual (as long as he harms no other individual) the maximum freedom of personal and economic development could call himself a liberal in the United States today without inviting the gravest misunderstanding of what he really believes.

### CHAPTER FOUR

# *Conservatism: Shield of Liberty*

At first sight, conservatism in the twentieth century might seem a hopelessly outmoded faith. Many of the institutions with which conservative regimes in the past have often been associated—the power of the throne, the influence and prestige of a hereditary aristocracy or an established church—survive, if at all, in much weakened form and chiefly as material for pageantry. These particular pillars of conservatism, of course, played no role in the American Republic. Moreover, conservatism carries the suggestion of a static economic and social order, which seems irrelevant in an age when the dizzy speed of scientific and mechanical progress, so vividly portrayed by Henry Adams in *The Virgin and the Dynamo*, has reached supersonic proportions.

On closer examination, however, conservatism, properly understood and defined, seems to possess values especially needed in this age of what José Ortega y Gasset has called the revolt of the masses, when the equality of men threatens the quality of man. Contrary to many prepossessions, conservatism today furnishes the best and safest shield of liberty and individualism; old truths of conservative thought have acquired new confirmation in a period of war and violent revolution.

Many myths dear to the hearts of liberals and progressives have been shriveled in the searing crucible of experience. Who can be confident of the inherent goodness and infinite perfectibility of man in a time that has seen millions of human beings in areas under Nazi rule and in the Soviet Union deliberately exterminated in furtherance of crazy schemes of racial dogma and social and economic reorganization? Who can prescribe material prosperity as the sure cure for social evils when record rates of crime and juvenile delinquency in the United States have gone hand in hand with full employment and high wages?

Who, in the light of the proved and visible weaknesses of American public education, especially at the intermediate level, can feel sure that all children are equally educable or that systems of education which leave children at an early age with a minimum of direction and discipline will lead to favorable results? Who can feel convinced that the new is necessarily an improvement on the old in a century that is still looking for the peer, in creative genius, of a score of composers and a score of novelists of the nineteenth century, where progress has been clear and unmistakable only in the accumulative field of science?

Is there any longer, even among socialist thinkers and sympathizers, the serene faith of the pioneers in the socialist and labor movements that a shift from private to public ownership of means of production is guaranteed to produce a new heaven and a new earth? On these and many other counts, conservative thought has something to offer to twentieth-century man, dispelling his illusions, exposing the apparent short cuts that lead only into blind alleys, emphasizing the lessons of history, showing that the truly good society is never the creation of theoreticians, however brilliant, but is instead a slow organic process in which experience, feeling, and intuition, along with pure reason, have a role to play.

The conservative views with a wary and skeptical eye Utopian blueprints for the reformation of humanity, the elimination or sublimation of national patriotism, the elimination of war by contracting with a crafty and unscrupulous enemy that each cast away his weapons. And is this age not one of twilight for Utopias, when upsurges of revolutionary zeal and enthusiasm have led, with unvarying regularity, to the permanent domination of cliques of hard-faced men, when international law has failed to prevent the most monstrous crimes, when the attempt to promote peace with justice through the United Nations has proved an impotent fallacy, when international agreements among the great powers have been broken far more often than they have been observed?

Of course conservatism, like every other political term, requires careful definition. There is a brand of authoritarian conservatism, best voiced, perhaps, by the French *émigré* Joseph de Maistre, that has little relevance in a modern world of universal suffrage and growing urbanization and industrialization. To adopt an ostrich-like attitude and refuse to face the facts of modern life is not the attitude of a conservative but that of a reactionary or a nostalgic visionary.

In the United States, where the study of political theory has been somewhat neglected, there is a crackpot fringe of pseudo-conservatism, deeply infected with religious and racial bigotry. The literature of this fringe and occasional letters which I receive from people who belong to it often recall the remark of a fellow-writer during the second world war: "Some correspondents don't realize that, just because they may agree with something I have written, I don't necessarily agree with them."

The intellectual father of authentic conservatism is the great British political thinker, statesman, and orator, Edmund Burke.[1] My personal evolution from sympathy with Marxism and communism through a phase in which I would have described myself as a liberal to my present conviction that I am, philosophically, a conservative was promoted by a growing familiarity with the works of Burke, with *The Federalist,* and with the writings and ideas of such intellectual conservatives as John Adams, Alexis de Tocqueville, John C. Calhoun, and the Swiss humanist scholar and publicist Jakob Burckhardt. I found Burke's outstanding work in political science, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, much more impressive because of my Soviet experience, for there are a number of strong traits of ideological kinship between the French Jacobins and the Soviet communists.[2] Many of the weapons in Burke's armory may be aimed at the latter as well as at the former.

Among the points of similarity are fanatical faith in the saving grace of revolution; identification of the will of a single party with the will and interests of the people, with the consequent right to suppress all other parties; and conviction that a new type of man can be molded by state indoctrination. In using the term "democracy," Lenin could have understood Robespierre or Robespierre, Lenin, whereas both would have been incomprehensible to the citizen of a free country accustomed to representative institutions.

Lenin spoke of "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," and a Marxist phrase, "the dictatorship of the proletariat," has been a key slogan of communist dictatorship everywhere and is identified with a higher form of democracy in communist propaganda. Robespierre proclaimed: "The Government of the Revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny."[3]

"Democratic dictatorship," "despotism of liberty." To anyone brought up in the Western traditions of freedom, these phrases have a muddled, self-contradictory ring, but they are full of meaning to the leaders of great revolutionary upheavals. In the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin sanctioned a political police more cruel and ruthless in its methods than the notorious Ochrana of the Tsars and other practices which transformed the "dictatorship of the proletariat" into a dictatorship over the proletariat and, for that matter, over the rank and file of the Communist Party.

Burke's closely reasoned arguments, often lit up by the fire and passion of his eloquence, against French revolutionary Utopianism are most timely and pertinent at a time when the ordered freedom of the West faces the challenge of a still more far-reaching Utopian revolution than the French. Against the conception of creating an entirely new and ideal society overnight by proclaiming high-sounding "Rights of Man" and working out a doctrinaire constitution with little regard for practical realities, Burke pleads the superiority of a system of government and society with deep roots in the past, tested by experience. He conceives society as "a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born."

Against abstract propositions of sweeping "rights" and "liberties," Burke urged the necessity, in any society, of providing for order, without which individual rights cannot be implemented and true liberty cannot exist. He presents this case, with his usual clarity and brilliance, as follows:

"Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. . . . This can only be done by a power out of themselves: and not, in the exercise of its function, subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue. In this sense the restraints on men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights. . . . This it is which makes the constitution of a state and the due distribution of its power a matter of the most delicate and complicated skill."

And in a prophetic moment, for the *Reflections on the Revolution in France* was written before the extreme phase of terrorism had been reached, Burke sounded a warning that was to be realized when, in Taine's phrase, the revolutionary crocodile began to devour its own young. Speaking of "this barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings," he said of the ideologues of the French Revolution: "In the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the gallows."

Burke's reputation has suffered unjustly because of a rather lazy intellectual conviction that the French Revolution, after all, worked out for the best. So it is easy to think of Burke as a reactionary, excessively preoccupied with the trappings and pageantry of a monarchy and aristocracy doomed to perish. This, I think, overlooks the real threat to national independence and ordered liberty which French Jacobinism presented. To quote one of the most acute modern students of this lineal progenitor of Soviet communism:

"Inside the [Jacobin] clubs there was going on an unceasing process of self-cleansing and purification, entailing denunciations, confessions, excommunications and expulsions. The Dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety was thus no mere tyranny of a handful of men clinging to power and in possession of all the means of coercion, no mere police system in a beleaguered fortress. It rested on closely knit and highly disciplined cells and nuclei in every town and village, from the central artery of Paris to the smallest hamlet in the mountains."[4]

The French were luckier than the Russians. They got rid of Robespierre before he had killed a small fraction of the number of people who perished at the hands of Lenin and Stalin. But Jacobinism, the belief in the right of a revolutionary elite to impose its will, as that of the people, by every means, including unlimited terror, did not perish with its authors. It remained a disturbing element in French politics and French political thought. It predisposed considerable numbers of "advanced" French workers and intellectuals to accept the very similar doctrine of communism.

Burke was far from being a champion of tyranny and reaction. One sentence in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* would be heartily endorsed by every believer in the value of individual liberty: "Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing on others, he has a right to do for himself."

Burke was consistently an opponent of the arbitrary and all-powerful state. He opposed coercion of the American colonists because to him, they were standing for the rights of citizens, as established under British law and tradition. If he opposed and criticized the French Revolution, it is because he foresaw its course toward totalitarian tyranny. In his suspicion of the all-powerful, all-providing, omnicompetent state, he uttered sentiments with which classical liberals would have thoroughly agreed: "To provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do it. . . . It is in the power of government to prevent much evil; it can do very little positive good in this, or perhaps in anything else."[5]

This same suspicion of arbitrary power, whether it be vested in a monarch, a legislative assembly, or a mob, is reflected in the following implicit assertion of the existence of individual rights which no lawmakers may ignore: "It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society than the position that any body of men may make what laws they please."

Burke's attitude toward democracy is ably explained in the Introduction to a selective abridgment of his works:

"Western constitutional democracy did not exist in Burke's time. What he opposed was Jacobin democracy, and he fought against it in England (long before it acquired its name

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in France) because he foresaw, and correctly, that its principles would not produce liberty, but a totalitarian mass state of despotism ruling over an equality in servitude. He was the implacable enemy of the kind of politics exemplified by Paine and Robespierre, but was an expounder—indeed, the foremost expounder—of the politics that sustain constitutional government, progressive inclusion of all politically educated persons in the life of the state, maintenance and enlargement of civil liberty, scrupulous respect for the rights and dignities of all human beings, and prudent exercise of public power on behalf of the general welfare."[6]

If concern for the rights of the individual seems surprising in such an apostle of conservative thought as Burke, it is only because conservatism has not been well understood. Confusion has been intensified because, from ignorance or malice, Left Wing and communist commentators have tried to make an amalgam of conservatism and fascism. But fascism, whether in its German or Italian form, has all the distinctive features of a revolutionary movement: the plebeian leadership; the appeal to the mob; the contempt for legality; the disregard, in many cases, for the rights of property; the insistence on creating an entirely new order of things. The similarities between fascism and Soviet communism are strong, and they have tended to grow stronger as both systems have broken away from their specific origins and become going concerns, power machines.

It is profoundly inaccurate to identify conservatism, with its sense for tradition, measure and balance, religion, and natural law, with an essentially nihilistic and revolutionary doctrine like fascism, especially the German Nazi manifestation of fascism. In this connection, it is significant that the majority of the men who gave their lives in the attempt to destroy Hitler and his tyranny in 1944 were conservatives.

John Adams, second president of the United States and the most vigorous and systematic among the political thinkers who helped to shape the American Constitution, is closely akin to Burke intellectually, although the two men developed in vastly different environments: Adams in the Puritan town-meeting atmosphere of New England, Burke against the background of a social order in which the hereditary aristocracy was powerful and the Parliament was elected along highly unreformed lines. Burke was concerned with the vindication and conservation of a monarchy supported by an aristocracy, while Adams worked on the problems involved in creating a stable republic (he would never have tolerated the word "democracy") to replace the overthrown British colonial rule. So it is not surprising that Adams, who had to construct, in some respects showed more originality in matters of political science than Burke, whose mission was to conserve.

Adams, with his stern Calvinist background, starts from the proposition that human nature is fallible, even downright wicked—an idea more congenial to conservative than to liberal thought. To put his case in his own words:

"Though we allow benevolence and generous affections to exist in the human breast, yet every moral theorist will admit the selfish passions in the generality of men to be the strongest. . . . Self-interest, private avidity, ambition and avarice will exist in every state of society and under every form of government. . . .

"To expect self-denial from men, when they have a majority in their favor and consequently power to gratify themselves, is to disbelieve all history and universal experience; it is to disbelieve Revelation and the Word of God, which informs us the heart is deceitful in all things and desperately wicked."[7]

How is a free, orderly commonwealth to be maintained by men who are, in the main, selfish and wicked at heart? Adams, in one of his ablest pieces of political writing, *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*, rejects "simple unchecked government," whether

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by a monarch, by an aristocracy, or by the mass of the people, as equally intolerant, bloody, cruel, oppressive, and tyrannical. He reaches the conclusion that the only sound and lasting government is one so balanced that ambition will check ambition and power will check power. As a balance of power has so far proved as effective as any other device for keeping peace between nations, so the most tolerable form of government, in the opinion of Adams, is one based on a carefully adjusted balance of power between social groups and between various governmental agencies. Property, he believes, must be secured, or liberty cannot exist—a fundamental tenet of conservatism. His prescription for the type of government best calculated to assure liberty, property, order, and stability is the following:

"The great art of lawgiving consists in balancing the poor against the rich in the legislature and in constituting the legislative a perfect balance against the executive power at the same time that no individual or party can become its rival. The essence of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries. The executive and legislative powers are natural rivals; and if each has not an effective control over the other, the weaker will ever be the lamb in the paws of the wolf. The nation which will not adopt an equilibrium of power must adopt a despotism. There is no other alternative. Rivalries must be controlled, or they will throw all things into confusion; and there is nothing but despotism or a balance of power which can control them."[8]

It is noteworthy that Adams, with his New England common sense and his austere view of the nature of man, has no truck with Rousseau's sentimental idea of the "general will" of the people, an idea that was to find an ironic expression in the reign of the guillotine under Robespierre. To Adams, economic and social rivalries and administrative jealousies are not to be brushed aside by theorizing; they must be faced and adjusted, as much as possible, by the method he advocates: carefully balancing one interest against another.

The practical fruit of Adams' theory is the Constitution of the United States, which Russell Kirk justly characterizes as "the most successful conservative device in the history of the world."[9] Indeed, Adams was as averse to the Jacobin tide, which finally prevailed in the course of the French Revolution, as Burke. Speaking of his difference of opinion with Thomas Jefferson, Adams wrote to the well-known surgeon Benjamin Rush: 'He thought it wise and good and that it would end in the establishment of a free republic. I saw through it, to the end of it, before it broke out, and was sure it could end only in a restoration of the Bourbons, or a military despotism, after deluging France and Europe in blood."

Like Burke, Adams was profoundly skeptical of the teachings of Rousseau, and he characterized the French Encyclopedists as "totally destitute of common sense." In his familiar caustic style, tart as a New England apple, he points up the gulf between theory and practice: "Helvetius and Rousseau preached to the French nation *liberty*, till they made them the most mechanical slaves; *equality*, till they destroyed all equity; *humanity*, till they became weasels and African panthers; and *fraternity*, till they cut one another's throats like Roman gladiators."[10]

Although he was a leader of the American Revolution and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, with its affirmation, as a self-evident truth, that all men are created equal, Adams, always a realist, was convinced of the inherent inequality of men, in birth and wealth, in character and capacity. A letter to John Taylor of Caroline contains one of the clearest and most forceful affirmations of the double truth that while men are, or should be, equal in rights before the law, they are unequal and diverse in many other respects:

"That all men are born to equal rights is true. Every being has a right to his own, as clear, as moral, as sacred as any other being has. This is as indubitable as a moral government in the universe. But to teach that all men are born with equal powers and faculties, to equal influence in society, to equal property and advantages through life, is as gross a fraud, as glaring an imposition on the credulity of the people as ever was practised by monks, by Druids, by Brahmins, by priests of the immortal Lama or by the self-styled philosophers of the French Revolution. For honor's sake, Mr. Taylor, for truth and virtue's sake, let American philosophers and politicians despise it."[11]

A logical outgrowth of this belief in the inherent inequality of man is belief in an aristocracy, not of birth and privilege, but of merit and ability, to supply the element of leadership that is essential in any state. Adams often returns to this subject in his writings and letters.

This characteristically conservative belief in the inequality of man has found striking confirmation in our own time. The communist revolution in Russia set as its professed goal the most far-reaching egalitarianism. Private property was destroyed and denied on a scale unprecedented even in the French Revolution. Lenin voiced the prediction: "All society will be one office and one factory, with equality of labor and equality of pay."

During the first years of the Soviet regime, every conceivable device to insure equality was employed. Workers were moved into "bourgeois" apartments. Money was for a time almost abolished, being replaced by ration cards. The members of the ruling Communist Party were under a self-denying ordinance to receive no more than the wages of skilled workers, regardless of the importance of their positions. Manual workers and children of manual workers were systematically given preference in admission to universities, regardless of their qualifications.

One by one, these artificial guarantees of equalization disappeared. Power proved as important a source of material inequality in the new order as wealth had been in the old. Differences in pay between a professor and an unskilled worker, between an officer and a private in the army, are much greater in the Soviet Union than in the United States.

Now, the communist in a high post gets the full salary attached to the job, which is many times what the communist at the work bench or in the collective farm gets. Educational preferment goes to the brightest, regardless of class origin, although being born of a family high up in the bureaucratic hierarchy is not a handicap to advancement.

A tremendous wrecking operation was carried out in Russia in the name of equality and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." But, especially after the Soviet Government set its course toward the rapid creation of a modern industrial society, it proved as impossible to implement equality as it would have been to make water run uphill. Soviet citizens still cannot enrich themselves by owning factories, mines, stores, or other business enterprises. They cannot buy non-existent stocks, and they invite repudiation if they purchase state bonds. But within the limits of a wage and salary system, the variations are at least as striking as in any so-called capitalist country and are much less nullified by confiscatory income taxes.

"Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!" became the intoxicating slogan of the French Revolution. On the sober morning after the revolutionary intoxication, serious political thinkers began to discover and point out that the first two parts of this slogan are fundamentally incompatible. No one did this more ably and cogently than John C. Calhoun, who ranks with John Adams as one of America's two outstanding conservative theorists. The inevitability of inequality if men of differing capacities are free to develop their energies without let or hindrance is stated by Calhoun in the following terms:

"Now, as individuals differ greatly from each other, in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habits of industry and economy, physical power, position and opportunity,—the necessary effect of leaving all free to exert themselves to better their condition, must be a corresponding inequality between those who may possess these qualities and

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advantages in a high degree, and those who may be deficient in them. The only means by which this result can be prevented are, either to impose such restrictions on the exertions of those who may possess them in a high degree, as will place them on a level with those who do not; or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions. But to impose such restrictions on them would be destructive of liberty,—while, to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions, would be to destroy the desire of bettering their condition. It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. *To force the front rank back to the rear, or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of the government would put an end to the impulse, and effectually arrest the march of progress.*"[12]

The progressive income tax and the welfare state were unknown in Calhoun's time, but if the stern and fiery tribune of the South could return and see the effects of these modern institutions, one suspects that he would only be confirmed in the opinion expressed in the foregoing passage. Other nineteenth-century conservatives, notably Lecky and Maine, like Calhoun, have argued the proposition that liberty and equality are not complementary but mutually exclusive.

Actually, the only equality that large numbers of people have ever enjoyed is equality of misery, under conditions of war, revolution, barbarian invasion, or natural catastrophe. Substantial material equality has prevailed over long periods of time only in monastic orders or in small communities, usually of an agricultural nature, held together by some religious or idealistic conception, like certain pacifist sectarian groups or the pioneer farm colonies in Israel.

If Calhoun was not alone in seeing that people would not remain equal in material possessions as long as they were free, he is the author of what is perhaps the most original American contribution to political thought, the idea of the concurrent majority. According to Calhoun, there exists, or should exist, along with the simple numerical majority established by the result of an election, a concurrent majority composed of the nation's regional and economic interests. Each of these interests, in Calhoun's opinion, should have the negative power of preventing or arresting the action of the government by veto, interposition, or nullification. Legislation should be enacted only if it has been approved, not only by the numerical majority, but by all the interests affected.

It may be objected that Calhoun's theory, literally applied, would have the effect of Poland's *liberum veto*, where one deputy could hold up the proceedings of the Diet. This could lead to paralysis of the legislative function. Yet there is a true instinct in Calhoun's theory, a warning that the law-making power should not be pressed too far. Even when it is technically possible, it is not always wise or expedient to pass what may be called crusading or moralizing legislation against the sincere, even if mistaken, convictions of a substantial minority of people who cannot fairly be considered common criminals. There are examples in American history which point to the unwisdom of this sort of thing.

In the decade before the Civil War, it was the law of the land, backed up by rulings of the Supreme Court, that fugitive slaves should be returned to their owners. But this particular law was so offensive to the sentiments of many people in the Northern states that it was seldom enforced. Prohibition was not just a legislative enactment; it was incorporated into the Constitution as an Amendment. But there were too many people who did not regard drinking as a felony. The attempt to decree a certain conception of personal morality by legislative fiat was a fiasco and had to be abandoned after leading to a vast amount of criminality in connection with illegal traffic in liquor and bringing the very conception of law into

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general disrespect. There are certainly impressive "Go Slow" warnings in connection with the Supreme Court decision outlawing the maintenance of racially separate school systems. Education has always been considered a function of the several states, but the people of the states affected were given no voice in a change which was certain to affect profoundly their social customs and habits.

There are certain rights, guarantees, and liberties, assured by the Constitution, to which every United States citizen is entitled. It is debatable whether attendance at an "integrated" school is one of these rights, although the enjoyment of equal, if separate, educational facilities certainly is. The right of white parents in the South to have a voice in the kind of schools in which they wish their children to be educated cannot be lightly set aside. Perhaps the best that can be hoped is that some kind of compromise which will abate and not aggravate racial friction can be worked out for a situation that would not have arisen if the Supreme Court had upheld the well-established tradition that education is a field left to the jurisdiction of the states.

Two other thinkers who made valuable contributions to the philosophy of conservatism are Alexis de Tocqueville and Jakob Burckhardt. De Tocqueville, whose impressions of America in the first half of the nineteenth century are not only a classic of contemporary analysis but a prophetic vision of some trends in America that are more marked in the twentieth century than they were in the nineteenth, was probably the finest political mind of his age. His factual knowledge was vast, his intuitions keen and sure, his style brilliant and imaginative.

De Tocqueville took a stand about equally far removed from the reactionary dreamers who wanted to put everything back as it was before the French Revolution and the "advanced" thinkers who, in the name of democracy and social-

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ism, would crush individual liberty in pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of equality. Although generally favorable and sometimes enthusiastic in his reaction to the young American Republic, he sensed danger in the egalitarian aspects of American democracy. "Americans," he wrote, "are so enamored of equality they would rather be equal in slavery than unequal in freedom." Yet in another famous passage, he contrasts Anglo-American "freedom" with Russian "slavery," indicating that all conceptions are relative.

De Tocqueville is one of the most eloquent and convincing advocates of the proposition that tyranny, which before the French Revolution was usually exercised by absolute rulers or small aristocratic groups, could be just as terrible, perhaps more terrible, if exercised by a mob-minded majority manipulated by some plebeian demagogue. Like all great conservatives, he was suspicious of abstractions and skeptical of the universal truth of general ideas.

Put to the test of positive action by the French Revolution of 1848, de Tocqueville's ideal was, in his own words, "to protect the ancient laws of society against the innovators" and "to cause the evident will of the French people to triumph over the passions and desires of the Paris workman," "to conquer demagogism by democracy."[13] By this somewhat ambiguous word "democracy," de Tocqueville understood ordered freedom with the restraints of the moral law, not the Jacobin type of "democracy," which really amounted to imposing the will of the Paris mob, stirred up and manipulated by Jacobin agitators, on the majority of the French people.

Burckhardt called himself a liberal but not a democrat. He was, of course, using both words in a special sense. He was a liberal in that he attached a high value to individual liberty under law. He was opposed to democracy in its French Jacobin significance.[14] Although he is mainly known as a historian of the culture and art of the Renaissance and other

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periods, this man of the nineteenth century voiced some remarkable forebodings which were to be realized in the communist and fascist states of the twentieth:

"The world approaches two alternatives, either full democracy or an absolute lawless despotism. The latter will no longer be run by dynasties, for these are too softhearted, but by a military command disguised as republicanism. . . . A real power is building up, which will make damned short work of suffrage, popular sovereignty, material welfare, industry, etc. . . . In the delightful twentieth century authoritarianism will raise its head again, and a terrifying head it will be."[15]

Here is the sheltered nineteenth century venturing to take a peep ahead and getting a horrifying glimpse of the shape of things to come in the totalitarian twentieth.

Conservatism is the best safeguard of liberty today. The danger of dictatorship of the old-fashioned conservative type is almost extinct, except in a few economically backward and politically unimportant countries. The peril to liberty today comes from the Left, from Soviet and Chinese communism, with their incessant propaganda and subversion, especially dangerous in newly independent countries where poverty is great and literacy is low, and from carrying the welfare-state philosophy to a point where incentives are destroyed and economic collapse becomes a serious prospect.

It is in the writings of the great conservative thinkers in politics and economics that one finds the most convincing refutation of the Utopian sophistries of Rousseau-Robespierre and Marx-Lenin. Western socialist parties have rejected communism, and some individual socialists have an honorable record of combating communism, but there is so much similarity between the long-range economic objectives of socialism and communism that socialist opposition to communism sometimes speaks with a rather quavering voice. It is in socialist parties that the trends toward appeasement of the Soviet Union, toward getting a conference with the Kremlin at almost any price, toward trusting the Soviet rulers, despite their remarkably consistent record of perfidy, are strongest.

It is the conscious conservative, with his respect for religion and patriotism, his ingrained suspicion of revolutionary short cuts, his feeling for history and his consciousness of the lessons of the past, his root-and-branch rejection of economic collectivism and of the robot type of "mass-man" that economic collectivism may be expected to produce, who is firmest in his opposition to the greatest contemporary threat to liberty—communism. He could be trusted to die fighting against a communist take-over, while the average socialist, or modern-style liberal, would be more likely to sigh—and submit.

A most formidable enemy of liberty in modern times is the leviathan state, constantly enlarging the scope of its functions and just as surely contracting the freedom of the individual citizen. There was a time when conservatism might have been identified with the strong state, but this is not true today. Conservatism has always been identified with belief in the morality and utility of private ownership of property, and conservatives are in the forefront of the struggle against pillaging the thrifty for the benefit of the thriftless; against confiscatory taxation for purposes of social and economic leveling, against harassment, by administrative fiat, of the individual who is trying to conduct his own affairs honestly; against the passing of legislation that denies the individual's right to chose his tenants and neighbors; against all the other usurpations and excesses of the leviathan state. Conservatism has taken up the struggle for positions which liberalism, in its declining and confused modern phase, has abandoned. Most conservatives today would respect the ideas of John Locke and Adam Smith, along with those of Burke and other thinkers more definitely identified with the conservative tradition. It is a safe assumption that Locke and Smith influenced Robert A. Taft more than Franklin D. Roosevelt.

So the end station on my retreat from Moscow was a commitment to the general principles of conservatism, as defined and outlined in this chapter. I could not be attracted to socialism because, even if should be feasible to reach the ultimate socialist goal of sweeping nationalization and state control of the national economy without the degrading brutality and violence which attended the establishment of communism in Russia, the goal did not impress me as desirable in itself. One of my clearest and strongest reactions to what I saw and experienced in the Soviet Union was a passionate, negative revulsion against state management of economic affairs.

Liberalism would have offered more attraction if it had remained true to its nineteenth century principles. But in England, liberalism had become confused to the point of being incomprehensible; in America, it had sold its intellectual birthright for a mess of statist pottage.

There remained only conservatism as a political faith, and as I became more familiar with the classics of conservative thought, I also became increasingly convinced that this was my faith. The conservative outlook on the nature of man, on the most hopeful means of reconciling liberty with order, on the proper balance between government and citizen, and on moral and aesthetic standards seemed highly congenial in a century that has experienced two great revolts against civilization itself, one of them still very much alive. It is under the conservative banner that all who believe that the state was made for the individual, not the individual for the state, may most hopefully rally.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# *"Conceived in Liberty": The American Idea*

EIGHTEEN decades ago, a short span in the life of a nation, the representatives of the American people, in arms against the British Crown, proclaimed on a new continent a new philosophy of government. After the military struggle for independence, this philosophy was set forth in detail, and with rare insight and erudition, in *The Federalist* and was finally embodied in the Constitution of the United States.

There could be no better or more appropriate way to celebrate Independence Day than to acquire a firm grasp of the principles on which the American Republic was founded by reading excerpts from *The Federalist* and from other writings of the Founding Fathers. Our educational institutions, by and large, have not coped adequately with the task of communicating these principles to their students. I know from personal experience that it is possible to go through a first-rate preparatory school and an excellent college without being impressed by the sheer thrill of political and intellectual adventure associated with the launching of the United States as an independent nation.

For it was an adventure, about the outcome of which there were many prophets of gloom and doom on the other side of the Atlantic and some in the newly emancipated colonies. Here were thirteen sparsely populated states, many of them more distant from each other than New York now is from London or Tokyo in terms of communication, different in the circumstances of their settlement, federating themselves into a new nation without the institutions which most Europeans then regarded as essential to stability—without a monarchy, a hereditary aristocracy, or an established church.

It was easy to imagine a relapse into anarchy, followed by the emergence of a "strong man" as dictator. But apart from the tragic schism of the Civil War (and the future of slavery and the right of a state to secede were two issues which the Constitution left unsolved), the United States has enjoyed almost two centuries of ordered freedom, unmarred by plots, internal sedition, and successful or unsuccessful *coups d'état.* Amid the crash of empires and monarchies and dictatorships, America's free institutions have stood the test of time, economic change, and war.

The ideal of self-government, first proclaimed for the three million Americans of 1776, scattered along the Atlantic fringe of the continent, still works for the more than 175 million Americans who have filled up the vast country. The debt which Americans today owe to the men who shaped the institutions of the young Republic, to Washington and Franklin, Hamilton and Jefferson, Adams and Madison, is beyond estimation. These men sometimes differed among themselves, but when they differed, it was usually because they were inclined to emphasize differing aspects of a true political proposition.

The product of their collective wisdom, the United States Constitution, is a mechanism of extraordinarily delicate balance. As far as human wisdom could foresee dangers and provide safeguards, the individual is secured against oppression by the central government, the states are left in possession of all the functions which are not clearly the proper concern of the federal government, and the powers and limitations of the three branches of the federal government are so defined that no one can dominate the other two and become all powerful. No form of government in history was so carefully devised to avoid the dangers of concentrated state authority and so favorable to letting the citizen go as far and as fast as his individual capacity would carry him, without state coddling, state regulation, and state domination, which always go hand in hand. The Founding Fathers were mindful of the admonition of John Adams:

"The institutions now made in America will not wholly wear out for thousands of years. It is of the last importance, then, that they should begin right. If they set out wrong, they will never be able to return, unless it be by accident, to the right path."[1]

The American Republic, in the inspired phrase of Abraham Lincoln, was conceived in liberty. But liberty is easy to invoke, to abuse, and to lose. There have been many disillusioning examples of a self-proclaimed tribune of the people's freedom turning into a tyrant as opportunity presented itself. Alexander Hamilton incisively made this point in the first of the memorable series of essays on the proposed Constitution known as *The Federalist*. "Of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying obsequious court to the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants."

The leaders of the American Revolution were not content to use liberty as a rallying cry against a distant monarch and a Parliament in which the colonists were not represented. It was their high concern to surround free institutions with so many safeguards that liberty would be handed down as a heritage to generations of Americans still unborn.

It is noteworthy that Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and many of their colleagues were men of exceptional learning. As one can see in reading *The Federalist*, its authors were steeped in the Greek and Latin classics, in the history of medieval and modern Europe, in British and French constitutional theory and practice. At the same time, they were not cloistered scholars but men of action. As a result of this rare combination of knowledge of the past and experience of the present, they possessed a panoramic view of the causes that had led to the rise and fall of foreign states, together with a clear, practical knowledge of the America of their own time. They started from the proposition that there are certain inalienable natural rights which belong to every man, under God, and which no government may lawfully deny. This is perhaps the deepest taproot of American liberty. It finds expression in the Declaration of Independence, with its affirmation of the "unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

The spirit of this belief in natural rights is admirably conveyed in the first paragraph of the Virginia Bill of Rights, which antedated the Declaration of Independence by a few weeks and which contains many of the guarantees of personal and individual liberty that were later incorporated into the first ten amendments to the Constitution:

"All men are by nature equally free, and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity: namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."

What did the Founding Fathers regard as the greatest threat to the free institutions under which natural rights to freedom of political activity and expression, free exercise of religious faith, and the lawful acquisition and possession of property would be respected? Excessive concentration of state power, whether in the hands of a mob, a monarch, a military dictator, or an oligarchy. Madison emphasized this point with striking lucidity in Number 47 of *The Federalist*: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many,

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and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."

It is just this accumulation, or concentration of all powers in the same hands, that has made for the destruction of individual rights in totalitarian states, whether of the communist or fascist type.

From this conviction that even the best of men cannot be safely trusted with too much power stems the Constitutional fabric of the United States, with the three independent, coequal branches of government, each invested with specific functions, each forbidden to trespass on the spheres of the other two. Hence the many guarantees against administrative tyranny, even if sanctioned by majority vote, which are imbedded in the Constitution. Should a majority of Congress, no matter how large, assume the right to deprive an individual, however insignificant or unpopular, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it would cease to be a legitimate legislature and become a lynching mob.

An excellent and concise statement of the general view of the early leaders of the Republic that centralized governmental power is a dangerous engine which requires many brakes and controls may be found in John Adams' *Defence of the Constitutions*: "Power is always abused when unlimited and unbalanced." The whole art of maintaining stable government under free institutions is envisaged by Adams as the establishment of an effective equilibrium, with one form of power checking another and no possibility of government developing into a monster that would dominate and engulf its helpless subjects and mold them into robots for its purposes.

In these roots of American liberty, one can see the quality of individual self-reliance on which America's subsequent growth and well-being were based. The most brilliant and thoughtful of the many European observers of America was Alexis de Tocqueville, upon whom the trait of self-reliance made a strong impression.

The American character has changed somewhat since de Tocqueville's time; there is no longer the same sturdy rejection of government handouts. But the effect of the ideas which were prevalent at the time of the Revolution and which are clearly reflected in the Constitution on America's national development was very great. These ideas shaped a long line of "self-reliant individuals" who "rely upon their own exertions." The immense material development of the American Republic is only the outer reflection of the truth of an idea: that the general good is best served when every man is permitted and encouraged to seek his own fortune with a minimum of state aid—and state interference.

The coherent body of ideas that finds expression in *The Federalist* and other writings of the period is not only of high historical importance but also possesses the utmost reality and vitality for our own time. For the noble ideal of liberty, the ideal most stressed in the literature of the American Revolution, has been horribly perverted by fanatics and cynically misused by tyrants.

Madame Roland's famous cry, "O Liberty, What crimes are committed in thy name!" was not limited in its accusing despair to her own time, for the ideological origins of Soviet communism are not entirely in the works of Marx and Engels. Robespierre and the French Jacobins, nourished intellectually on Rousseau and some collectivist writers of the eighteenth century, such as Mably and Morelly, came to think of themselves as a virtuous elite, morally entitled to persuade the people—with the aid of the guillotine and for the people's own good, of course—to hold and express unanimous opinion which would invariably coincide with those of the virtuous elite. This is the Model T version of modern communism, and fascism has borrowed something in theory and a good deal in practice from communism.

Against all Utopian abstract conceptions, such as Rousseau's "general will," which could be interpreted to justify an absolute concentration of governmental power, the Founding Fathers set their faces like flint. From study and personal experience, they knew what liberty is and what it is not. They knew that a mob or an unopposed political party can be as cruel and destructive of freedom as a tyrannical monarch or a military dictator. Far from deifying the state, the men who framed the Constitution regarded government as a necessary but dangerous instrument which required many precautions against abuse. Although they were accustomed, especially in New England, to the grass-roots democracy of the town meeting, they drew a careful distinction between the terms "democracy" and "republic." Madison writes, in Number 14 of *The Federalist*: "In a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region."

It is evident from the tone of *The Federalist* and other political writings of the time that the Founding Fathers were not devotees of unlimited majority rule or of overstrong government. They recognized that minorities and individuals have rights, such as life, liberty, and property, which no majority may rightfully take away. It is significant, in this time when the so-called affirmative state has so many advocates, that the Constitution devotes at least as much attention to telling the executive and legislative branches what they may not do as to outlining their functions. And its prohibitions are phrased in plain, unambiguous, uncompromising language: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." It is interesting to compare these unmistakable injunctions with the resolutions of the United Nations on these subjects—long winded and full of escape clauses, weasel words, and loopholes for evasion.

In the literature of the American Revolution, there is no attempt to set so-called human rights against and above property rights. On the contrary, it is recognized that the right honestly to acquire, inherit, and own property is one of the basic human rights. Many of the counts in the indictment of George III presented in the Declaration of Independence are for violations of property rights, notably the following:

"He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance. . . . He has combined with others . . . For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent."

And John Adams wrote, with characteristic vigor:

"The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of God and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence."[2]

So the distinctive idea of America is liberty, elaborated and defined, in matters of government: belief in natural law and inherent, inalienable human rights which no government may rightfully withhold or abridge; a hostile attitude toward tyranny, whether of monarch or mob, including tyranny of the majority. To the extent that these basic ideas have been preserved and respected, America has prospered and become great. It is where they have been most eroded and whittled away that some of the clearest danger signals in our national life are flying.

Some of these danger signals were visible (as early as the 1830's) to the most profound and clear-sighted foreign observer of the young American Republic, Alexis de Tocqueville. His major work, *Democracy in America*, is a masterpiece in many ways. It is a penetrating study of political institutions and psychological traits in the time of President Andrew Jackson. It contains almost uncannily accurate predictions of the future of America and of the Western world. It is a searching and impartial study of the positive and negative sides of the leveling democracy that was becoming a more prominent feature of American life. And it is written in a style that is always lucid and readable and often brilliant.

As an observer of American life, de Tocqueville steers a middle course between sentimental gush and the squeamish repulsion which some genteel foreigners, like Mrs. Trollope, felt for the free-and-easy frontier manners—the generous expectoration of tobacco juice and the habit of addressing all and sundry as "Colonel" or "Captain." He refers repeatedly to the individualism of the American character: "The citizen of the United States is taught from his earliest infancy to rely upon his own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he looks upon social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he only claims its assistance when he is quite unable to shift without it."[3]

De Tocqueville, who might be described as a liberal conservative or a conservative liberal, approved this aspect of American life, which he recognized as something different from what he was familiar with in Europe. He also notes that there is no equivalent in America for the impoverished and dependent European peasant. And, although he finds education spread thinly, there are no pools of total illiteracy and stagnation. Again and again he praises the vitality of the local initiative, which builds excellent schools and churches and keeps the roads in good repair without any subsidies or meddling interference from a centralized bureaucracy. He pays to the America of that time compliments which are more impressive because he does not spare criticism on other points:

"The European generally submits to a public officer because he represents superior force, but to an American he represents a right. In America it may be said that no one renders obedience to man, but to justice and to law. . . . All commodities and ideas circulate throughout the Union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people. Nothing checks the spirit of enterprise. . . . The Union is as happy and free as a small people, and as glorious and strong as a great nation."[4]

De Tocqueville is not blind to the fact that there are defects, as well as virtues, in the new, growing, increasingly democratic republic of the West. He notes a considerable downgrading of intelligence in high places since the formative years. This is not altogether unrelated to the upsurge of Jacksonian frontier democracy, which pushed into the background, politically, the New England and Virginia intellectual elite of the earlier period and brought to the top many individuals whose education had come principally from the college of hard knocks. He sets down an arresting sketch of the restless materialism which caused many Americans to die while still pursuing the illusion of happiness to be gained through incessant grasping after new worldly goods:

"A native of the United States clings to this world's goods as if he were certain never to die; and he is so hasty in grasping at all within his reach that one would suppose he was constantly afraid of not living long enough to enjoy them. He clutches everything, he holds nothing fast, but soon loosens his grasp to pursue fresh gratifications.

"In the United States a man builds a house to spend his later years in it, and he sells it before the roof is on; he plants a garden, and lets it just as the trees are coming into bearing; he brings a field into tillage and leaves other men to gather the crops; he embraces a profession, and gives it up; he settles in a place, which he soon afterward leaves, to carry his changeable longings elsewhere. . . . Death at length overtakes him, but it is before he is weary of his bootless chase of that complete felicity which is forever on the wing."[5]

A source of fascination in reading de Tocqueville is his almost clairvoyant vision of the future. Some of his observations fit America, and the world, in the middle of the twentieth century even better than in his own time. There was no income tax in the America which de Tocqueville visited, but he foresaw the shape of things to come:

"Universal suffrage invests the poor with the government of society. . . . Wherever the poor direct public affairs and dispose of the natural resources it appears certain that, as they profit by the expenditure of the state, they are apt to augment that expenditure. . . . I have no hesitation in predicting that, if the people of the United States is ever involved in serious difficulties, its taxation will speedily be increased to the rate of that which prevails in the greater part of the aristocracies and monarchies of Europe."[6]

There is this famous forecast of the era when the American-Russian cold war would dominate world politics:

"There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward the same end, although they started from different points; I allude to the Russians and the Americans. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits . . . but these are still in the act of growth. . . . The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens. The Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."[7]

De Tocqueville was alarmed, not by "excessive liberty" in the United States, but by inadequate safeguards against tyranny. For, like other nineteenth-century thinkers who prized liberty highly but were democrats only with reservations—like Burckhardt, Acton, Mill—he recognized that there was danger in the tyranny of the majority. He sensed that the dikes which the framers of the Constitution had erected against just this kind of tyranny were in danger of being swept away by the tidal wave of democracy in the raw. He also sensed that the sun of the absolute monarch and the privileged aristocrat was setting, but he saw new perils to liberty on the horizon of the future. With remarkable perspicacity, he foresaw two developments which became realities a century later: the totalitarian tyranny of communism and fascism and the paternalistic welfare state. As regards the former, he notes the likelihood that, as a result of the disappearance of legitimate authority, "those hideous eras of Roman oppression, when the manners of the people were corrupted, their traditions obliterated, their habits destroyed, their opinions shaken and freedom, expelled from the laws, could find no refuge in the land" might recur.[8] Certainly the crimes of a Stalin, a Hitler, a Mao Tse-tung far exceed anything that could be laid to the charge of a legitimate ruler in the era of royal absolutism.

Still more clairvoyant is de Tocqueville's vision of a paternalistic state that would not practice the bloody oppression of dictators but would reduce nations to "nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd," that would undertake "to spare its subjects all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living."[9] In other words, *1984* without the horrors.

The American Republic, in the words of Lincoln, was conceived in liberty, one of the most complex, as it is one of the most precious, of all human conceptions. It can be horribly abused by demagogic tyrants, and it flourishes best in the kind of equilibrium between government and citizen, individual and society, and majority and minority which the Founding Fathers wrote into the Constitution. Since the dangers to true liberty vary from generation to generation, it cannot be maintained without constant vigilance and struggle.

"Democracy" was another word inscribed on the banner of the new republic. Like the Roman god Janus, democracy has two faces, one auspicious, the other unfavorable to the highest forms of human development. The favorable aspect of democracy, which has brought incalculable benefit to the United States, is equality of opportunity, the implied right of every man, on his merit, to reach the highest post in government service, in industry and commerce, or in the arts, sciences, and professions. This has released for constructive service a vast fund of natural ability and energy which would have remained submerged or perhaps applied to revolutionary destructive ends under an old-fashioned monarchy with a stratified class system.

The other face of democracy is artificial leveling, based on the assumptions that human beings are equal in intellectual capacity and industry; that it is up to the state to redress, in one way or another, the failures of the individual; that it is "undemocratic" to give special treatment to markedly bright children; that the most irreclaimable hoodlum has a right to education up to the age of sixteen, regardless of the effect on other pupils and teachers.

The first aspect of democracy, equality of opportunity, which is the only one the Founding Fathers would have accepted, has yielded immense benefits to the American people. The second, egalitarian, leveling aspect of democracy has done America much harm, especially in its educational and taxation systems. This is but one of many illustrations of the fact that where America has remained most loyal to the principles of the Constitution, it has achieved its greatest successes. Its greatest failures have occurred when these ideals have been forgotten and when the characteristic early American conception, individual liberty plus individual responsibility, has been replaced by faith in the omnipotent, omniscient, omnicompetent state.

Our Constitution has now been in operation for more than 170 years. What does the balance sheet of the Republic, in this perspective of time, look like? What is most conspicuously right and what is most conspicuously wrong with America in the second half of the twentieth century? Answers to these questions will be offered in the next two chapters.

## CHAPTER SIX

# *What's Right with America*

Said "Uncle Joe" Cannon, speaker of the House of Representatives and one of the unregenerate Old Guard Republicans who flourished about the turn of the century: "America is one hell of a success." Many "eggheads" would enter dissenting opinions. Henry James found life in England before the first world war much more attractive, and there have always been little colonies of less intellectually famous American expatriates in European cities. Henry Adams, although he never resorted to emigration, found much that was vulgar and distasteful in the American scene after the Civil War.

The vote of the common man on the issue of whether American life is, relative to what one can expect to enjoy in other countries, desirable is overwhelmingly on the side of Speaker Cannon. Immigration is the sincerest form of flattery, and of such flattery, the United States has received its full measure from all parts of the world. All Americans are descendants of immigrants, as Franklin D. Roosevelt once mischievously reminded a meeting of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Successive surges of migration, of Germans and Irish, of Scandinavians and Italians, of Jews and Slavs, speeded up the development of America's farms and factories and altered her kaleidoscopic nationality pattern. This large-scale migration was not without its periods of storm and stress, but the occasional outbursts of feeling against newcomer groups were quickly overshadowed by the speed and thoroughness with which these groups were absorbed and assimilated. "Americanization" was a quick solvent for people of many European countries who arrived at Ellis Island with little or no knowledge of English and often with a good deal of suspicion and dislike for each other.

There was no repetition in the United States of the dissatisfied minority sentiment that undermined the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Americanization was successful because it was voluntary. Members of ethnic groups that had been fiercely resistant or at best sullenly acquiescent when it was a question of accepting citizenship in larger European empires vied with each other in taking out American naturalization papers. As these people became Americanized, the use of native European languages began to recede, and the foreign-language press declined in circulation and influence, not because of repressive measures, but because second-generation Americans went through the melting pot of public schools and, as a general rule, wanted to forget the old ties with Europe.

The flow of migrants to the United States was slowed down by immigration legislation in the 1920's, but the yearly quotas, with few exceptions, have always been quickly filled. America is still the favored destination of the DP's, uprooted refugees, who were one of the tragic legacies of the second world war. Likewise the United States is highly regarded by its immediate neighbors to the south and to the north. The term "wetback," sometimes used for Mexicans in the Southwest, owes its origin to Mexicans who swam the Rio Grande in order to avoid immigration regulations. No cases of Canadians swimming the St. Lawrence for this purpose have been reported, but the flow of many of the better educated and ambitious young Canadians to the apparently better opportunities south of the border continues and causes some concern to Canadians anxious to see their best young men stay at home.

The immigration test, which proves that America is a pretty good country from the standpoint of the man who expects to work for a living, indicates precisely the reverse for communist countries, as a visit to refugee camps in Berlin and refugee shacks in Hong Kong would prove. It is fashionable in some quarters to become pessimistic over the results of the competition for men's minds between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the direction of immigration, and voluntary emigration, is a pretty convincing barometer of opinion and is overwhelmingly in favor of the United States and against the Soviet Union.

Some ill-wishers try to disparage American agricultural and industrial achievements by attributing them to the natural wealth of the country. This effort to reduce national well-being to wealth in natural resources is one of the favored myths of the twentieth century, but a myth it is, nevertheless. Some of the most prosperous countries in Europe, notably Switzerland and Denmark, are extremely poor in natural resources, and some of the poorest like Romania, are well provided with sources of natural wealth which they have never been able to develop very effectively for the general welfare.

There is no reason, in terms of poverty of natural resources, why the majority of the peoples of Russia and the later Soviet Union should always have been poorly fed, poorly clothed, and poorly housed. The Soviet Union contains almost every important raw material except rubber. Its many climatic zones make possible the production of a wide variety of crops, from rye and flax in the chilly northland to grapes and cotton in central Asia and fruits in the Caucasus and the Crimea. What has been lacking, both under the Tsars and under the Soviets, has been adequate opportunity for the individual to enrich himself and, in doing so, to benefit his fellows. To this must be added, as regards the low living standard in the Soviet

Union, the ability of a government which controls the entire political and economic life of the country to put the people on a subsistence ration in order to extract from their labor the means for projects of industrial and military aggrandizement.

Brazil is larger than the United States and may be shown to be wealthier if an adequate inventory of its natural resources can ever be made. Had English colonists first come to Brazil and the Portuguese to North America, the present comparative outputs of the two countries might be reversed. Examples could be multiplied to show that it is not the possession of physical resources within a country but their energetic and purposeful development that makes for national wealth. And if the resources are lacking, a country which builds up specialized, first-quality industries and services, like Switzerland, or high-grade agricultural products, like Denmark, experiences no difficulty in buying what it needs in world markets.

It is easy to find flaws in the story of the development of the American West after the Civil War, to point to cases of injustice, hardship, fraud, and corruption. But when all this is granted, is there a comparable example in history of such swift peopling of what had been a wilderness, inhabited only by nomadic Indians, and of substituting for this wilderness such material aspects of civilization as great cities, prosperous farms and ranches, transportation by air, rail, and highway, giant dams, vast irrigation systems?

The United States, with 6 per cent of the world's population, accounts for 50 per cent of the world's production; it is first in the output of oil, steel, electric energy, copper, cotton, timber, and a long list of other products; it has four-fifths of the world's automobiles and one-half of the world's telephones. These results were not achieved by a people sitting around and waiting for breadfruit to drop into their mouths. The American industrial miracle is a product of intelligently directed hard work, enhanced by scientific research and the constant application of the most modern machinery.

Pessimists about the prospects of long-range economic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union should consider the following indisputable facts. It takes about one-half the population of the Soviet Union to feed (and on a pretty bare subsistence level) the people of the Soviet Union. The proportion of Americans employed in agriculture is about one in eight, and these American farmers have proved to be able not only to feed the rest of the American people on a much higher level but to pile up mountains of unsold surpluses.

Khrushchev's boastful prediction that in the near future the Soviet per capita output of meat and dairy products will exceed America's is about as likely to be realized as a tide of migrants from America, Great Britain, Germany, and other Western countries seeking admission to the Soviet Union. The challenge which an American professor hurled at Left Wing Labor intellectual Harold Laski is still valid. "Isn't it a good thing, Mr. Laski," said the professor, one of the few outspoken conservatives in the American academic world, "that there is one healthy capitalist economy, our own, to subsidize the socialist and semi-socialist economies in Europe?" Laski, a quick and able debater, had no effective response to this question.

There is more to the American story than a record of productive material achievement, although it is just this kind of achievement that makes a wide appeal to the old nations of Europe, to communist countries which have long made a god of industrialization, and to the former colonial countries, almost all of which are committed to ambitious plans of economic development.

I had a rather sheltered middle-class background and education, while my wife came to America with a poor immigrant family and went through a hard struggle to get a college education and a position in the New York teaching system. She is more enthusiastic in her over-all appraisal of

America than I am, and she gives these reasons for her attitude: "First, there was the opportunity, which would not have existed in Europe at that time, for a child of a poor family to get free education through college. Second, I still remember how many native Americans went out of their way to be kind and helpful to a struggling foreigner."

Very often, and usually for similar reasons, it is the man or woman who comes to the United States from a background of eastern or southern Europe or the Near East who becomes the most enthusiastic American patriot. Quite symbolic is the case of the Italian who made a small fortune and unexpectedly left a large bequest to the Boston Public Library because there, in his days as a poor, newly arrived immigrant, he had enjoyed the chance, without charge, to read the newspapers and books that made him more familiar with the English language.

It is dangerous to generalize about any people. One can find in any country people who are good and bad, clever and stupid, agreeable and disagreeable. But by and large, Americans are a kind and generous people. One hears a good deal about how much Americans are supposedly disliked abroad. Ever since Mark Twain's *Innocents Abroad*, and perhaps earlier, there has been a bumptiousness about some American tourists that grates on the nerves of Europeans, who have suffered and lost more from wars. Apart from this, even if all Americans abroad were well versed in European history, culture, and languages and irreproachable in matters of tact and manners, there would inevitably be some envy, in countries that have lost their position as great powers, for a nation which, without in any way consciously willing such a development, has advanced so rapidly in relative power and wealth. Yet it is my impression that the image, created by some reports, of Europeans gritting their teeth in suppressed hatred when they see an American is a gross exaggeration, if not entirely fictitious.

I have been in Europe for some time almost every year since the end of the war. Being, unfortunately, a poor linguist, I could hardly be mistaken for anything but an American. Yet in travels that took me from Finland to Italy, from Britain to Yugoslavia, I cannot recall a single case of hostility, incivility, or even marked coolness toward me as an American, and several experiences pointed in the opposite direction.

France is supposed to be a seething hotbed of anti-Americanism, but my wife and I still remember the French couple on the train from the Belgian frontier to Paris in 1946 who insisted on lending francs to us, complete strangers, so that, as they put it, "you won't be cheated by the official rate of exchange and can look around for the black market." A delightful illustration of the anarchism that is deeply ingrained in every Frenchman! A few years later, I was struggling off a crowded train at Nice, with more baggage than I could comfortably handle. Some of my French fellow-passengers were as helpful as Kansans might have been in Topeka.

More recently, during visits in communist-ruled Yugoslavia and Poland, I did not find people shrinking away in disdain and disgust when they learned, in park-bench or street-corner conversation, that I was an American. Quite the contrary. They knew, even if their governments did not remind them of the fact, that American food and clothing parcels, public and private aid, had spared them from some of the worst rigors of communism. I carried away the impression that Moscow's unmistakable dislike of America did not make an American unpopular in Belgrade or Warsaw. Again, quite the contrary.

An American university professor and his wife, both natives of Austria, had a similar impression of Italy. They had stopped their car to pick up an Italian family stranded on the roadside in the rain. The professor and his wife were speaking German and were driving a car of European make, but before long, one of their Italian passengers remarked: "You must be Americans. No Europeans would have picked up strangers as you did."

Now and then the naïve talk or loud behavior of a few American tourists may excite amusement or irritation, but the evidence for any widespread and burning dislike of Americans in general seems to be lacking. Even when feeling about American policy in the Suez crisis ran high in Great Britain, there was general testimony that individual American visitors were treated as courteously and considerately as usual.

Americanization is no longer a word that applies to Europeans seeking a new home in the United States. It can also refer to many changes in the traditional life and culture of Europe. The automobile, the snack bar, jazz, Hollywood films, and even the much ridiculed "Coke" have been taking Europe by storm.

Personally, I regret this change as much as any old-fashioned European. From childhood, I have regarded jazz as an abominable perversion of the noble art of music. It always makes me happy to get into some beautiful resort, like Zermatt or Wengen, where no car can penetrate. It saddens me to read of young people in countries with great cultural and musical traditions, like Germany and France, stampeding a concert by some American "hot trumpeter," placing themselves on a level with the American teen-agers who have developed a collective crush on the notorious Elvis Presley.

Individual taste and preference have little effect on the trend of an age. Much of what passes for anti-Americanism in Europe would probably be felt even if Columbus had never discovered America. It is the reaction of Europeans who do not like the age of mass-man and the reduction of entertainment to the lowest mental common denominator, who find the twentieth century too crowded, too noisy, and too vulgar for their taste. They make America the scapegoat for Americanizing trends which are continually gaining ground in Europe, and, quite irrespective of politics, on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Nor is the educated European always repelled by what he finds in America. A gifted young German woman graduate student from a famous academic family returned to Germany after spending several years at a well-known eastern American university, full of enthusiasm for her experience in this country and inclined to draw unfavorable comparisons between the historic university in her native city and the American institution with which she had become familiar. Her reaction, as far as I can judge, has been shared by many Germans and other foreigners who have visited this country on cultural exchange programs.

Indeed, many of the standard European criticisms of America are stale and out of date and are often voiced by Europeans with little first-hand knowledge of this country. Consider this familiar reproach: that Americans are interested only in money. It seems doubtful whether the American businessman is any more interested in profits and dividends than his European counterpart. There is truth, as well as humor, in Sinclair Lewis' picture of Babbitt, the middle western Rotarian, overawed by a British visitor who is known as Sir Gerald and then discovering, by accidental intimate contact, that they are brothers under the skin and that Sir Gerald is just as ill at ease in discussing primitives and aesthetic poetry as Babbitt himself would be.

If Americans are no more inclined to make fortunes than Europeans, they are far readier to give these fortunes away, once they are made. There is nothing on the other side of the Atlantic remotely comparable with the Ford, Rockefeller, and other big foundations. And if these foundations are in large measure a result of confiscatory income tax rates in the higher brackets, the generosity of the average American is proved by the response to an extraordinary variety of solicitations on behalf of philanthropic projects, to say nothing of the support vouchsafed to religious, educational, and civic institutions and projects. The extent of this support is all the more remarkable in view of the deep inroads which federal, state, municipal, and other tax collectors make on the financial reserves of middle-income groups. The old American spirit of voluntary work for public and social good, very little developed in the more family-centered nations of Europe, is still very much alive.

European jeers at supposed American cultural backwardness also seem overdone. In this field, Europe does enjoy the advantage of the accumulated heritage of classical, medieval, and modern civilization, and it is easy to call a roll of European cities that have experienced and seen more historical drama than many American states. But despite some discouraging symptoms, there is a good deal of evidence of an ever growing and widening American interest in the arts. Symphony orchestras have proliferated. Sales of records of great music and of paper-bound classics have zoomed. Today there may well be a dozen young Americans with hopes of becoming conductors, singers, musicians, or actors to one who would have cherished such ambitions fifty years ago.

Voluntary activity, which is such a strong element in American life, leads to a multitude of clubs and associations for all sorts of purposes, men's clubs, women's clubs, mixed clubs, gatherings for every conceivable purpose, from studying America's foreign-aid program to playing canasta. Last, but by no means least, are the inimitable American fraternal organizations. If the typical American is not an Eagle, a Moose, an Elk, a Lion, or a Bison, he is an Odd Fellow.

The antics of these fraternal groups supply good clean fun for satirical novelists like Sinclair Lewis and exuberant iconoclasts like H. L. Mencken. I have a waggish friend who was fascinated by the sonorous titles and colorful regalia of a group that calls itself the Nobles of the Ancient Arabic Or-

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der of the Mystic Shrine. In a playful moment, he wrote a mock serious letter to the head of this Order, taking him to task as a fraud and impostor because not a single name of the "Nobles" under his command could be found in the *Almanach de Gotha.*

There is harmless good fellowship in these groups of Babbitts, male and female, and they are agencies that often undertake useful odd jobs of social work and now and then, through visiting lecturers, give their members some idea of the world outside America.

American education has been the target of severe criticism, and some of this criticism, for reasons I shall mention in the next chapter, seems to me well deserved. Yet when one has made proper allowance for all the weaknesses and defects, the fact remains that America's opportunities for free education up to the highest level, not only through regular schools and colleges, but also through a great variety of extension and correspondence courses and a wide network of free libraries, are unmatched in the world. Some critics of American education may overlook the point that there are limits to what the most skillful pedagogy can accomplish. The effectiveness of education depends mainly on the individual capacity to respond. The finest imaginable teaching cannot turn a dullard into a master of liberal arts and sciences. The boy or girl of natural gifts, if given the tools of learning, will make good use of them, and America can justly boast of providing these tools in profusion.

Free and easy American manners and the independent behavior of American children shock some Europeans, accustomed to more formality and class distinction and discipline for the younger generation. Both of these American qualities can be overdone. The American from Des Moines who discovered King George V on a morning walk and rushed up to him with the cry, "Say, King, shake hands," made a good story for the press on both sides of the Atlantic, but his im-

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pulsive act could have become very irritating if it had found too many imitators.[1] At home and abroad, the American "brat" can be a first-rate nuisance. And, as will be pointed out in detail in Chapter Seven, I believe that the failure to take stern measures to put down the plague of juvenile criminality which goes by the euphemistic name of "delinquency" is a national disgrace.

A sense of social equality is an excellent antidote for the impulse to social revolution. Propagandists of class war and dictatorship of the proletariat are not likely to meet much success in a society where the delivery boy greets all and sundry with a cheerful, democratic "Hi," where most people, if they thought about the matter at all, would think of themselves as middle class, where such an honorific term as the German *gnädige Frau* would simply make no sense.

A society that is open enough for energy, merit, and ability to rise quickly from the bottom to the top, a society in which there are many rich prizes in the lottery of opportunity, is a stable society, well insulated against advocates of social upheaval. Many factors have helped to create such a society in the United States: political institutions well calculated to maintain liberty under law; the possibility, for more than a century, of pulling up stakes and "going West" if opportunities seemed too cramped at home; the new frontiers that have opened up in science, invention, and industry since the physical frontier in the West disappeared.

American political institutions have certainly proved their worth. Perhaps the most dramatic proof of their value is the periodic ceremony of an outgoing president of one political party riding in the inaugural procession of the incoming president of the other. Macaulay and other European observers foresaw a prospect of chaos and instability in America's republican institutions, but the Founding Fathers built better than their critics realized. With the great and tragic exception of the Civil War, the American Republic has been happily free from civil strife, from the squalid pattern, all too familiar in some countries, of military conspiracies and revolutions that change nothing but a few faces at the top.

Operated, as it must be, by fallible human beings, our political system of checks and balances, with its three co-equal branches of government, has experienced its periods of stress and strain. Sometimes one branch, sometimes another, has tried to encroach on functions belonging to the other. The implied powers of the presidency have never been clearly defined, and it is possible for the president, in his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to take steps calculated to maneuver the enemy into firing the first shot, thereby making the Congressional declaration of war a mere formality.

There have been times when Congress has overstepped its proper bounds, notably during Reconstruction following the Civil War. It was only the courageous votes of a few Republican senators who placed the country and justice ahead of partisanship that prevented the conviction and removal from office of President Andrew Johnson. This was perhaps our narrowest escape from a *coup d'état* that would have opened a Pandora's Box of mischief and permanently disturbed the balance between our three branches of government.

More recently, it is the Supreme Court that has created the impression of exceeding its recognized function of interpreting law by undertaking to make law, which is the proper task of the national and state legislative bodies. Most important, perhaps, of these quasi-legislative decisions of the Supreme Court is its ruling that the maintenance of racially separate schools is illegal. This decision has been praised on the grounds that racial discrimination of any kind is incompatible with democracy, that it raised United States prestige in Asia and Africa, that integration in the schools is a logical sequel to integration in the armed forces. But it is a well-proved maxim of political prudence that a law tends to lose

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an indispensable element of moral sanction when it is strongly opposed by a very large proportion of the people who are expected to submit to it. This is certainly the case as regards integrated schools in most Southern communities.

The citizen's proper respect for the law of the land is placed under severe strain when an enactment which amounts to radically changing the social customs of a large section of the country originates not in the elected legislatures of the states affected but in the ruling of an outside body, based, apparently, on moral judgment and political expediency rather than on any clearly defined rule of law. Over a large part of the South, the Supreme Court decision, several years after its promulgation, remains a dead letter. The unhappy experience of Little Rock shows that bayonets are not enough to enforce the atmosphere of peace and harmony which must prevail if a school is to function at its highest efficiency. Indeed, one gets the impression that fanatics of the theory of racial integration lose sight of the complicated and difficult factors involved and also of the true interests of the children, white and black, who are being used as guinea pigs in this experiment.

The Supreme Court has also gone out of its way to nullify the clear intent of Congress and of state and municipal bodies and to interfere with the work of Congressional committees investigating the ramifications of the communist conspiracy in this country. It even interfered with what would seem to be the natural right of the secretary of state to dismiss one of his subordinates who had, to put it mildly, given repeated evidences of partiality for the Chinese communists and of extremely bad judgment. The secretary of state was Dean G. Acheson; the official was John S. Service, whose reports from China during the war years were full of vituperation of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist Government, which the United States was committed to support, and of eulogies of the Chinese communists, such as the following: "The [Chinese] Communists, from what little we know of them, are friendly to America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China. . . . Politically any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past."

Surely an official does not have a vested right in a foreign-service job. Surely he may be rightly and properly dismissed without being proved a Benedict Arnold. Apart from loyalty, a diplomat's qualifications should include the ability to distinguish friends from enemies and willingness to co-operate in implementing the policy of the government he represents. And it is highly questionable whether a judicial body like the Supreme Court is qualified to pass on the policy and administrative considerations which entered into the dismissal of Mr. Service.

The Supreme Court has been called the Shield of the Republic. It scarcely seems to deserve that title during a period when a whole series of its decisions seem calculated to make conditions easier for communist conspirators and more difficult for the federal, state, and municipal agencies which have been endeavoring to expose them and bar them from positions of public trust and confidence. But this latest phase of judicial usurpation of legislative functions will probably pass. The Republic will survive, just as it has survived unwise laws passed by Congress and the stretching of presidential prerogative. There is a power in public opinion that tends to right a balance disturbed by excessive self-assertion of any one of the three branches of government.

Since the end of the second world war, there have been many expressions of concern in American intellectual circles about pressures making for conformism. It has been suggested that investigations of communist activity, especially those sponsored by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, create an atmosphere of political terror. And there is the somewhat broader fear that social pressures, operating on corporation executives and their wives and in other groups, tend to create

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a kind of mass-produced "organization man." The prominent role of advertising and the deadening effect of the mass media of communication and entertainment, brought into many millions of households by radio and television, are also singled out as factors making for depreciated individuality and lowered standards of taste.

Volatility, a product of restless energy, is a characteristic American trend. The pendulum of public opinion swings more violently than in older, more mature, perhaps more tired and cynical countries. There was such a swing of the pendulum in regard to communist espionage, propaganda, and infiltration into government service and opinion-making agencies. During the war years, the communist propagandist and the communist spy had a free hand in the United States. The prevalent attitude toward such unpleasant facts as the basic philosophy of the Soviet regime, its record of oppression at home and aggression abroad, and the reasonable prospect of how it would behave after it emerged from the war as the dominant power in Eurasia was that of the traditional three monkeys: "See no evil. Speak no evil. Hear no evil." Then the realization gradually dawned that Stalin was not an Abraham Lincoln in Soviet disguise; that Soviet designs of world subversion for the ultimate purpose of world domination had not been abandoned; that a considerable number of Soviet secret agents had been making hay while the sun shone in unsuspicious America, sometimes penetrating to high positions in government service.

Naturally, there was a somewhat violent reversal of judgment and emphasis. Instead of the bland assumption that there was no Soviet espionage, there was a tendency to exaggerate what this espionage had accomplished. There was some following of false scents, a tendency in some cases to draw the conclusion that because a man had obviously been a rather uncritical Soviet sympathizer, he had also been, in the complete sense, a conscious Soviet agent. It was sometimes un-fairly assumed that what a man had written twenty or thirty years ago necessarily represented his views and determined his conduct in the present.

These occasional errors and excesses should not obscure the fact that the Congressional committees which investigated communist activity were performing a job that had long been neglected and that was urgently necessary in the interest of national security. There was much talk of "witch hunting," but wizards named Hiss and witches named Coplon did exist, and if one looked under enough beds, one might find someone who answered to the name of Klaus Fuchs.

Moreover, the "terror" of this period, the power and significance of Senator McCarthy, were grossly and systematically exaggerated. At the time when Supreme Court Justice Douglas intoned his phrase about "the black silence of fear," one could walk into any bookstore and take his choice of a dozen volumes purporting to expose the current "witch hunt." When Lord Russell returned to England from a visit to America and informed the readers of the *Manchester Guardian* that anyone who quoted Thomas Jefferson was in peril of being jailed, an unusual number of books about Jefferson and his writings were pouring off the presses without let or hindrance. In a famous university with which I am familiar and on almost all other American campuses, it would have been the professor who sympathized with McCarthy, not the one who opposed him, who would have risked personal ostracism and adverse effects on his career.

With McCarthy dead and the Supreme Court making a shambles of federal and state laws and regulations aimed at making the way of the communist conspirator more difficult, there is little substance in the claim that the American is dragooned into political conformity. If the vast majority of the Americans who go to the polls cast their votes for one of the traditional two big parties, the explanation is not pressure or coercion. It lies, rather, in two circumstances. The American political system, with its absence of proportional representation and simple majority method of Congressional election, is unfavorable to minority or "splinter" parties. And the typical American voter, not being ideologically minded, hates to "lose his vote" by casting his ballot for a candidate who has no chance of victory.

The question how much conformism is produced by indirect social pressure is more complex and not so easily answered. Modern industrialism does put a stamp of greater uniformity on people, and America is the world's most thoroughly industrialized country. However, many things that might be stigmatized as conformism are entirely voluntary. Babbitt had his moments of doubt, even revolt. But in the end, he felt better about shouting as loud as his neghbor at the Boosters' Club luncheon.

A philosopher might laugh or frown at the prodigious energy which an American journalist will expend to obtain a news beat or an American salesman to get an order ahead of a competitor, but this kind of action is deeply ingrained in the American nature. And, although "organization men" may sometimes kick in the traces and wish themselves "away from it all" on some balmy island, leisurely pursuing some agreeable occupation without deadlines or time clocks or exacting travel schedules, one may wonder whether this dream would bring satisfaction if it were realized. Apart from the practical financial issues involved, would a man who was competent in some profession or occupation, such as lawyer, salesman, or editor, enjoy exchanging this for a prospect of writing unsuccessful plays or novels or painting pictures which no one would want to buy? The answer in most cases, one suspects, would be no. Retirement, even if the financial provision is adequate, is often a hard experience.

For the man who has the courage and individuality to prefer the pursuit of an art or a hobby to the competition of the market place, America offers more than average opportunity

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to take his chance. Possibilities of casual earnings are greater; so is the opportunity, limited though it is by the level of direct income taxes, to achieve economic independence by saving. Social fluidity and personal mobility are greater; it is easier for an American than for a European to pull up stakes and seek an asylum in Mexico or the islands of the Caribbean.

So American conformism is something developed from within rather than imposed from without. And what is most "right" with America is not the high material standard of living, even though many of those who profess to disparage it would be unhappy without it. America's greatest contribution to Western civilization is the wide freedom it offers to its citizens, old and new, to choose the kind of work for which they are best fitted and to lead the kind of life they most desire, with a minimum of direct and indirect regimentation and compulsion. The "unalienable right" to the pursuit of happiness, affirmed in the Declaration of Independence, has not been altogether a dead letter, although the individual, in the last analysis, must create his own happiness.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

# *What's Wrong with America*

SOME of the defects of America are the reverse side of its virtues. Some are consequences of the growing pace of industrialization and urbanization and can be found in other countries as they are caught up in the same process. A few, notably the disgraceful figures of juvenile criminality, violent crime in general, and racketeering, are peculiarly American and call urgently for effective counteraction.

The immense competitive energy which Americans put into the invention and making and selling (especially selling) of products of every conceivable variety gives the nation the highest known general material standard of living. But it leaves the average American drained of time and capacity and desire for cultivation of the mind and the spirit or even for indulging in intelligent recreation.

On this last point, anyone familiar with European resorts and their hosts of mountain walkers is impressed by the contrast in similar mountain resorts in the United States. The American on vacation is usually unhappy if he is not in a car, running up an impressive mileage, but not really seeing the country through which he is traveling. If he is a tourist in Switzerland or Austria, the chances are about 100 to 1 that he will rush restlessly from one well-known town to another, never taking time out for a stay in some inn far off the beaten

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track, where he could improve his health and get acquainted with the magnificent scenery by settling down to a series of all-day hikes. Many Americans in cities give the impression of having completely lost the use of their legs. They feel that they must drive even to the store on the next block. Yet walking is one of the simplest and healthiest of exercises and something that any one can engage in without the danger of overstrain that exists in some of the more active sports.

Far too few Americans keep up their playing of competitive games, like tennis, after school and college years. They take their sport vicariously, watching baseball, football, basketball and other contests. More and more, they are taking even this vicarious sport second hand, watching games on television.

An impartial historian of American culture and civilization, writing from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, would scarcely fail to note that the quantitative expansion of American education and culture in the twentieth century was accompanied by symptoms of sharp qualitative deterioration.

By general agreement, America's three greatest senators were Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun. More than a century has passed since these men left the political scene. Why have they found no successors of comparable intellectual distinction, grasp of basic political ideas, capacity for self-expression?

Several explanations may be advanced, but one of the most plausible, surely, is that Webster, Clay, and Calhoun grew up in an age when comics were unknown, when television had not been invented, when school was considered a place for hard study, not for agreeable recreation. And when they entered public life, they were not subjected to the myriad distractions which the mechanical progress of the twentieth century makes possible and which cuts disastrously into the time left for serious reading and, what is still more important, for digestion of what is read.

The correspondence, in their old age, between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams was carried on at an intellectual summit which would certainly not be congenial to any prominent political figure of the present time. These men were not professional scholars; both had led lives filled with public and private concerns. Adams was the second, Jefferson the third, president of the United States. The explanation is simple. Higher educational practice at that time knew nothing of snap courses in which poverty of ideas is masked by pretentious pompousness of professional jargon. What was presupposed and expected was a thorough grounding in the Latin and Greek classics and familiarity with the outstanding works of history and political science.

The art of intelligent conversation has conspicuously declined in the United States. It is rare, even in an academic community, when a few people gather for the kind of far-ranging discussion in which Dr. Johnson and his friends often engaged, as recorded by the incomparable Boswell. The most popular form of social intercourse in the United States is the most deadening to the mental faculties and the least productive of ideas. It is the scrappy, often senseless, gabble of the noisy, overcrowded cocktail party.

American civilization in the twentieth century, while immensely showy in externals, lacks depth of inner content. Boisterous, hail-fellow-well-met good fellowship is a poor substitute for the increasing lack of genuine friendship, based on a sharing of ideas and ideals.

One is impressed by the gaping contrast between the technical perfection of the devices which make possible what would have seemed to past generations miracles of communication and the petty and unworthy ends to which these devices are often put. What price the invention of printing when it serves the massive proliferation of the moronic "comics" which are softening the brains of American children? Television could be a tremendous aid to a broadened popular culture if it would present Shakespeare and Wagner festivals or great orchestras playing Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*. But 90 per cent of what appears on television is calculated to make the viewer wish it had never been invented.

American engineers have been ingenious in working out methods of evading the jamming by means of which the communist authorities try to shut off their captive peoples from communication with the West. But it may be questioned whether there is always the same skill and ingenuity in preparing messages worth listening to, even after the transmission has been made possible.

This American dilemma, the contrast between perfection of mechanical means and the smallness of the ends to which these means are applied, is the reflection of a profound and growing schism in world civilization. There is a deep gap between men's knowledge and wisdom, between their material and moral progress, between the power which scientific invention has placed in their hands, a truly awesome power of mutual destruction, and the virtue and prudence which are required if this power is to be placed under restraint.

Such a schism did not exist in the nineteenth century. During the hundred years between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the first world war, the curve of progress in all fields was unmistakably pointed upward. People throughout the Western world were unmistakably better fed, better clothed, better educated, and more humanely treated if they got into prison and stood a better chance of recovery if they became sick. Government by consent of the governed had become much more of a reality. And the period was one of high creative vitality in literature, in music, in philosophy, in the arts.

It is after the end of the first world war that sharp breaks and contrasts begin to appear. Science and invention, accumulative by nature, march on with seven-league boots. But morally, and in humanistic culture, there is clear evidence of retrogression. The worst acts of cruelty and oppression that can be laid to the account of the nineteenth century seem almost humane by comparison with Hitler's designs of racial extermination, with the "liquidation" of whole classes of people at home and abroad by Stalin. The spread of free institutions, however imperfectly these were developed in some countries, is replaced by totalitarian tyranny in which the element of popular consent and the possibility of open protest are completely destroyed.

Just at the time when the airplane, the radio, and other modern inventions eased the physical problem of human communication between distant lands, when superficial thinkers were hailing the advent of "One World," communism injected into the world a divisive principle unknown since the era of religious wars. Stalin and his satraps in the satellite countries sealed off the populations under their rule against Western contacts of all kinds with a thoroughness and efficiency which could not have been matched in Tsarist Russia. Since Stalin's death, there has been some easing, especially in Poland and Yugoslavia.

The Soviet master design for "cultural exchanges" with the United States and other Western countries is shaped toward the end of obtaining for the Soviet Union the maximum results in propaganda and technical information while giving the Western participants the minimum of unwatched, unforced contact with the Soviet peoples. A Soviet author, traveling freely in Europe, meeting and forming a nonpolitical friendship with an American author, is the sort of thing that does not happen in this age of state planning. This was the pattern of the famous literary friendship between Turgenev and Henry James. The brave old world in which one could buy a ticket to any destination and set out without concern for visas, inconvertible currencies, and immigration quotas has disappeared, perhaps forever.

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And so far, the twentieth century, although it has registered tremendous, almost frightening, scientific triumphs, has been far less impressive than the nineteenth in literature, history, and the arts. A later chapter will discuss what seems to me the sorry plight of music in the twentieth century. It is ironical that just when young authors, composers, and artists are coddled as never before by foundation and private grants and subsidies, they seem to have much less to say than their predecessors, who faced a harder struggle.

A trend of the times that is very marked in the United States and that can also probably be found in most other countries is the decline in the sense of individual moral responsibility. This may be traced very largely to the influence of two Continental thinkers, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Their interests lay in quite different fields, but their theories, if carried to logical conclusions, both tend to destroy man's belief in himself as a morally free agent, able and obligated to choose between right and wrong, between good and evil.

In Marx's view of the world, the overshadowing issue is the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which is fatalistically predestined to end in the triumph of the workers and the establishment of a socialist economic order. Besides being a dogmatic atheist, Marx scornfully brushed aside moral ideas as mere class inventions of the capitalist class to justify the continued enslavement of the workers. His whole philosophy is deeply suffused with determinism and also with the conviction that human judgments and feelings are determined by class relations.

Freud's theory of psychoanalysis leads, but by a different road, to the same conclusion: that man is not capable of exercising free will. According to Freud, the subconscious, over which the individual exercises no real control, tends to dominate his character. Another Freudian conviction is that all experiences in the first period of childhood are of the greatest importance to the individual. These experiences, in

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combination with his inherited sex constitution, tend to shape his character.

It would be inaccurate to assume that many Americans have acquired a firm grasp of the principles of either Marx or Freud. Both authors are technical in their language and, as a general rule, are not "easy reading." But it is a familiar historical experience that ideas, even if fully comprehended by a small minority, may strongly affect the climate of an age. The theories of state and society held by Rousseau and the other philosophic thinkers of the eighteenth century were not familiar to the Paris mobs that supported the Reign of Terror or to the recruits who filled the ranks of the revolutionary armies singing the *Marseillaise*. But the connection between these ideas and the course of the French Revolution is close and unmistakable.

Marx and Freud together have done much to undermine and even destroy the belief that man is a free moral agent who may properly be called to account for his crimes and vices. This is certainly not unrelated to the appalling figures of crime, adult and juvenile, which are America's national disgrace.

One could cite many illustrations of the change that has come in the atmosphere of moral responsibility. Two distinguished men of the nineteenth century, General Ulysses S. Grant and Sir Walter Scott, through no direct fault of their own, became involved in the heavy losses of unsuccessful business ventures. Both shortened their lives by unremitting work in the effort to pay off debts, which they regarded as moral obligations. In modern times, the preferred course would have been to resort to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or some other handy government agency for saving individuals from the consequences of their mistakes.

Herbert Hoover, although he has fortunately lived far into the twentieth century, has always displayed a sturdy, old-fashioned sense of moral responsibility, and he has communi-

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cated it to his sons. During Mr. Hoover's presidency, his oldest son was offered a position at a salary well in excess of what his experience at that time would normally have commanded. The son's response was brief and to the point: "My father's name is not for sale."

The contrast with the notorious behavior of at least two of the sons of Mr. Hoover's successor in the White House scarcely needs to be drawn. Here is an excellent example of the old and the new fashion in the sense of moral fitness. Here is another example of the same tendency. Great historians of the past habitually give detailed sketches of the characters of the men and women whose activities they describe. This practice is now frowned on in some academic circles and referred to disparagingly as passing "value judgments."

There was a time when the American doctrine of opportunity implied the risk and penalty of failure as well as the chance and reward of success. This was the philosophy behind Grover Cleveland's declaration, when it was suggested that the government appropriate money to relieve farmers who had suffered damage to their hay crop from hail, that while the people should support the government, the government should not support the people. Now, the prevalent theory is that the government possesses some mysterious, inexhaustible source of wealth, out of which it can and should compensate everyone for errors in judgment or bad luck. Of course this theory is as illusory as the South Sea Bubble. Its fallacy was spotted long ago by the French economist Frédéric Bastiat, who referred to the state as "the great fiction, by means of which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone."[1]

Government, by its very nature, does not create wealth. All it can do when it goes into the business of subsidization of special group interests is to rob Peter to pay Paul, to pillage the thrifty for the benefit of the thriftless. This development, of turning citizens from independent producers into pensioners, has always been the besetting danger of democracies, and many of the barriers against this danger which existed at the time when our Constitution was adopted have disappeared or have been thrown down.

It is in agriculture that this theory of regarding the state as a horn of plenty, or bottomless well, has been pushed to its logical extreme of absurdity. Largely as a result of the government's refusal to let the free-market system perform its natural function of discouraging overproduction, the United States has piled up, at enormous public expense, huge mountains of unsold wheat, cotton, butter, eggs, and many other farm products while keeping prices artificially high for the consumer and acquiring a good deal of international bad will by trying to dump the unwieldy surpluses in competition with countries, like Canada, that are trying to market their export crops by normal commercial methods.

It is not only in farm policy that one can find excesses of the welfare-state theory that no organized group with visible voting power must ever be made to suffer economic loss or inconvenience. The power of organized trade-unionism, like the power of the farm bloc, makes a mockery of the free-market system and upsets the equilibrium which such a system, if allowed to function normally, would create.

A very important factor in the steady decline in the purchasing power of the American dollar, the creeping inflation of the postwar years, has been the ability of the stronger trade-unions to force wages up, irrespective of the increase in labor productivity. This process inevitably means higher prices, hence diminished wages and salaries for those groups in the population who do not possess the monopolistic bargaining power of the trade-union leviathan, which has grown in membership from three million to seventeen million in the past quarter-century.

The hearings before the McClellan Committee of the Senate have brought out abundant evidence that the excessive

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power enjoyed by the trade-union leadership has led to grave abuses of various kinds. Some trade-union leaders have grossly abused the trust of the rank and file, embezzled union funds, and employed squads of professional thugs to beat up and terrorize union members who stand up for their rights. The widespread use of violence and the resort to far-flung boycott pressure against companies, like the Kohler firm in Wisconsin, which refuse to sign on the dotted line for what the union demands are symptomatic. Such cases of employer resistance are rare; the excessive power of the unions has made genuine collective bargaining, which would have checked inflation by holding wage increases to the level of increased productivity, very difficult. As Professor Edward H. Chamberlin of Harvard says, at the conclusion of an acute analysis of the swollen weight of the trade-unions in the national economy:

"At one time laborers did not have the freedom to which they were entitled to form unions and to bargain collectively; and the economic power of those unions which existed, although important, did not on the whole menace the economy. But this situation no longer obtains. There is abundant evidence that unions today do have too much economic power. When this is the case, the public interest requires that steps be taken to reduce it."[2]

Certain practices of business groups are also to blame for the distortions of a normally functioning free-market economy which bring about such paradoxes as rising consumer prices in a period of falling production, profits, and employment. Among such practices are understandings designed to keep up prices which genuine competition would reduce, failure to pass on to consumers some share of the benefits of cheapened and enlarged production, and collusion, in some cases, with racketeers who have got hold of and perverted honest trade-unions.

Protective tariffs are a scandal in a country like the United States, which has an enormous surplus of exports over imports and the most advanced technology in the world. There may be a case for protection of young industries in an economically undeveloped country, but the United States has long passed out of this stage. Any industry with the advantage of location in the United States which cannot meet foreign competition has no economic right to exist. Tariffs, like farm subsidies or wage increases that are out of relation to improvement of labor productivity, are unjustified levies by special interests on the general standard of living.

In nervous fear of permitting any group with voting power to be hurt or inconvenienced, even temporarily, by the normal functioning of a free-market competitive economy, we seem to be running the risks of placing our economy on artificial stilts and of accepting creeping inflation as a permanent feature of our economic life. Apart from the question of whether inflation, once it becomes accepted as almost inevitable, is likely always to remain at a creeping pace, the steady erosion in the purchasing power of the dollar, which has been going on for the last two decades, is a form of robbery of all recipients of fixed incomes and holders of such conservative forms of investment as government bonds, life-insurance policies, and savings-bank deposits.

Two qualifications should be added to this survey of negative trends in American economic life. First, every industrial society requires a system of social insurance against unemployment, accident, illness, and old age. Voluntary forms of insurance should always be given preference over compulsory forms. Second, the United States, while it has not avoided the world-wide trend toward more comprehensive social security, has not gone as far as some European countries, notably Great Britain and France, to say nothing of out-of-the-way countries like Uruguay, in South America, in forcing the employed and the thrifty to support, in one way or another, the nonproducers.

When social security provisions pass a certain point, there is a sharp distinction between "producers" and "consumers" of this novel commodity of the twentieth century." ("Collecting security" is in some communities a recognized occupation of those who prefer what they can get from state handouts to the labor and wages of unskilled work.) There is little doubt that Great Britain faces a serious problem as the burden of those who live on various forms of social security becomes heavier on those who provide it. This is why there was, especially after the Suez crisis, a stampede for the exits of the British welfare state, with long lines in front of the Canadian and Australian immigration offices. It is the younger, the more ambitious, the better educated, those with the best prospects of making a good living by their own exertions, who feel the impulse to leave Great Britain. In their places come West Indians and European refugees, rather less promising groups, on the whole, from the standpoint of contributing appreciably to British national wealth.

The extremely high social benefits paid to French workers and the complicated system of subsidies paid to industrial and agricultural producers, based on the general principle that the least efficient enterprise has a right to a living, have contributed to the steady downward course of the franc and to the difficulties which high-priced French goods encounter in competitive foreign markets.

Americans have always been proud of their system of free general education, including not only elementary and high schools but state universities. If the only test of education were exposing the largest number of people to various types of education, the United States could fairly claim world leadership. An American professor lecturing in Germany was able to turn away critical questions of German students about treatment of the Negroes by remarking that there are more Negroes in universities and colleges in the United States than there are students in German universities.

Even by comparison with the Soviet Union, with its ambitious program of mass education, the comparative figures in the mid-1950's were in favor of the United States. The percentage of students in universities and colleges in America to the general population in the mid-1950's was seventeen per thousand; in the Soviet Union, the ratio was less than seven per thousand. Whereas completion of high school is obligatory in most areas of the United States, only about one-third of Soviet adolescents finish the ten-year school, which is the Soviet combination of elementary and high schools. Between one and two million Soviet youths who are not considered promising scholastically are assigned to manual-labor jobs between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.

The impressive American quantitative showing in education is offset by some very grave qualitative defects, which furnish several items for "What's Wrong with America." The American professor's reply to the German student, while it scored a good debating point, was not altogether fair or ingenuous. For the type of education provided in most Negro colleges, and in a good many predominantly white colleges and universities for that matter, is not seriously comparable with what can be obtained at Oxford or the Sorbonne or Heidelberg.

The faults of American higher education are numerous and well known: student bodies swollen beyond the possibility of effective individual instruction at some of the bigger state universities; pedantry and hairsplitting in subjects for graduate research; presidents who are professional money-raisers rather than dedicated leaders of education; underpaid faculty members and overpaid athletic coaches as part of a general pattern of commercialized athletics; an excess of "extracurricular activities." Of course there are honorable exceptions, both among the universities and among the small and medium-sized liberal arts colleges, a specific American contribution in the educational field. But there is enough truth in the savagely satirical novel of university life, *Purely Academic*, by Stringfellow Barr, to purge any tendency to undue complacency about the American achievement in the groves of Academe, even though the figure of more than three million students in what are supposed to be institutions of higher education is a world's record.

The situation is even worse at the intermediate level; the public high school is unmistakably the weakest link in the American educational chain, basically because of certain factors which have profoundly influenced the American school during recent years. One such factor has been the move to make junior high school training, at least, compulsory for all by setting the school-leaving age at sixteen. Whether this was a wise move is debatable. It may be that some youths with what might be called sixth-grade minds would be happier and better off if they were allowed to quit school and go to work at an earlier age. Or it may be argued that every child, if properly differentiated according to aptitude, would benefit from some kind of school training up to the age of sixteen. Unfortunately, however, a perverted conception of democracy, prevalent in some education circles, leads to the conclusion that every child is entitled not only to equal educational opportunity but to the same kind of education, through the high school level, as every other child. A result of this theory has been a disastrous downgrading in the stiffness of high school requirements, with the dullard and the near moron, not the bright student, as the principal object of consideration.

There has also been a tremendous vogue for "progressive," ultrapermissive theories of education, which leave the child to follow his own devices and reject even the mildest forms of discipline. This has been an unmistakable contributing factor in the growth of juvenile criminality. The combination of swamping the high schools with poorly qualified students, the lowering of sights in the curriculum, and the relaxation of discipline have made for conditions which range from bad to mediocre in many high schools and are positively scandalous in some big-city areas, notably in New York and Brooklyn.

The launching of the Soviet earth satellites ahead of ours may have served a good purpose in awakening American public opinion, with a shock, to the fact that Soviet educational training, especially in scientific subjects, where the element of biased political indoctrination does not come in, is in some ways superior to our own. I had an opportunity to discuss the intermediate school training systems of the United States and the Soviet Union with a man of unusual expert knowledge of the subject, Alexander G. Korol, a member of the senior research staff of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Korol devoted years of study to preparing the most complete available survey of Soviet methods in training for science.[3] He is also familiar with American educational conditions. Here is his estimate of how the race between the United States and the Soviet Union in this important field of education stands at the present time:

"Hundreds of so-called courses are given in American high schools. Many of these, basket-weaving, baton-twirling, car-driving and the activities that are lumped together as 'life adjustment,' are not mind-toughening subjects at all. They are frills or, at best, hobbies. There is even a move to prepare schoolbooks in especially easy language, so that the children will not 'strain their brains.' Why shouldn't they strain their brains? That is what schools are for. Why shouldn't they ask their parents, learn to look up words in the dictionary, acquire a genuine grasp of their native language?

"There is no such coddling of the student in the Soviet intermediate school. The number of subjects taught is about twenty, not one a frill or a hobby. School in the Soviet Union keeps six days a week, with 33 hours of class-room instruction and 20 hours of homework. The pedagogic methods are old fashioned, the physical equipment is often inferior to ours

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and the absence of liberty in the Soviet system affects adversely the manner in which some subjects are taught.

"But there is no doubt that the average Soviet student works harder, has a better harmonized curriculum and gets a better grounding in subjects where teaching is unaffected by political indoctrination. The Soviet student would not, as sometimes happens in our high schools, get geometry without algebra or physics without preparatory mathematics.

"God forbid that we should ever slavishly imitate the Soviet system, with its substitution of intensive training for humanistic education, its arbitrary indoctrination, its brutal methods of early selection, under which a 'late starter,' like Winston Churchill, would have been assigned to digging ditches. But we can profitably learn some lessons from Soviet educational methods. The most important of these lessons, not only because the Soviet Union is a political, economic and military competitor, but because it is a good thing in itself, is to give our children what few of them now get: hard, systematic, concentrated mental work."

What are the remedies for the obvious and serious weaknesses of our public schools? The first, it seems to me, is to be fair to our bright children by identifying them, on the basis of tests and achievement records, and sending them to special scholastic high schools, where the curriculum will be stiff, where the few basic subjects will be taught, and where "life adjustment" foolery will be thrown out the window. Those children who obviously cannot keep up with or profit from such a type of training should be assigned to manual-training or vocational schools, where mental training would be along simpler lines. Children in these schools should, however, be required and expected to read intelligently, to write legibly, to spell correctly—accomplishments which are sadly lacking in many college freshmen under the present system. The danger of misjudgment in assigning students to one or the other type of secondary school could be avoided by making transfer between the two types of institutions easy.

Another type of reform must be started at the grass roots, with local school boards and parents' associations. This is to recall schools to their primary function: to impart to their pupils precise knowledge suited to their age and mental development under conditions of reasonable order and discipline. It is probably not generally realized how much havoc so-called progressive views in education have played in wrecking educational standards and turning out great numbers of semiliterates.

Much information on this subject may be found in such books as Professor Arthur Bestor's *The Restoration of Learning* and Mortimer Smith's *The Diminished Mind*, his *And Madly Teach*, and a symposium, *The Public Schools in Crisis*, edited by him. The struggle to regain our schools for the proper training of our children in basic cultural values will not be easy, for the false doctrines of misnamed "progressive education" have struck deep roots in some of the teachers colleges which turn out not only teachers but key administrators in the public school system. These are apt to call any questioning of their methods the work of bigots or ignoramuses. But this is a struggle which must be won if American children are not to be denied their birthright and American educational standards are not to go into a deep eclipse.

In most countries, the word "school" does not inspire an immediate association with the word "crime." But conditions in the schools of certain areas of New York and Brooklyn became so bad during the winter of 1957-58 that most school news was about shocking crimes—knifings and other forms of aggravated assault, actual and attempted rape, extortion, and general rowdyism. A devoted judge, Simon S. Leibowitz, who cherished the naïve idea that one of the freedoms of American school children should be freedom from gang vio-

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lence and terrorism, spoke, with only too good reason, of "the terrible, horrible mess we call the public schools."

But the outspoken judge and the members of the grand jury which undertook to investigate crime in the Brooklyn public schools received little co-operation from the city and public school authorities, who seemed to take the orgy of crime as something to be expected and showed more resentment against those who were exposing it than against the juvenile thugs and rapists. *U. S. News & World Report*, in its issue of February 7, 1958, published an article entitled "Biggest City's Nightmare—Its Crime-Ridden Schools." The first paragraphs, which give an excellent summary of the sorry plight to which the worst of the New York public schools are reduced, are as follows:

"In this largest of the nation's cities school officials are facing a crisis of crime. The crime is committed by teen-aged school pupils. It is committed in the schools—on playgrounds, in corridors, even in classrooms.

"These crimes, although by juveniles, are not 'schoolboy pranks.' They include such violent acts as rape, murder, assault with deadly weapons. They are committed against teachers, as well as against children. Many of the criminal acts are linked with gang warfare that goes on constantly between rival young hoodlums battling for mastery in their schools....

"Teachers, in some parts of New York, are admitting that they stand in terror of their pupils. Parents are expressing fear for their children's safety. Mothers are helping teachers patrol the corridors in some schools. The grand jury foreman suggested last week that parents might boycott the schools unless something was done to protect their children....

"The great majority of the crimes occurred in schools that are heavily populated by Negro and Puerto Rican pupils—mostly in Brooklyn and Harlem."

Police received reports of 3,298 incidents of crime or violence that occurred in public schools or on public school

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grounds in 1957. It seems safe to assume that this is a record of shame unapproached by any city in the civilized world. If more than 3,000 crimes were committed in the course of a year in the schools of London, Paris, Berlin, or Rome, this would certainly inspire a cabled news story.

In one Brooklyn junior high school, most inappropriately named after the great American jurist John Marshall (Scarface Al Capone would have seemed a more suitable sponsor), incidents involving knifing and rape occurred in such swift succession that the harassed principal committed suicide. The student body contained about an equal proportion of Negroes and Puerto Ricans and whites. In another school, a pupil, not yet fifteen, stabbed and seriously wounded a schoolmate. The young stabber was not given any punishment in school, was taken before a judge, paroled for "lack of a suitable custodial institution," and turned up in school the next day, presumably ready to try his knifing skill on someone else.

A touch of irony was added to the grim and sordid travesty of education that goes on in all too many of these terrorized New York schools. The New York *Herald Tribune* was in the forefront of reporting the deplorable conditions in the "tough," "difficult," and "integrated" (the three adjectives were usually synonymous) schools of Harlem and Brooklyn. Its issue of September 23, 1957, published an article by Francis Sugrue on why teachers, especially women, are reluctant to accept assignments in what are euphemistically called "difficult schools." After reading this and similar articles, one wonders that any teachers are left in schools, where they are in constant danger of being assaulted with knives, broken bottles, baseball bats, and other lethal weapons. As one woman teacher said of her charges, "They know more foul names in second grade than you ever will."

Yet the *Herald Tribune*, while faithfully reporting what racially mixed schools have produced in its own backyard, editorially assumed an attitude of high moral self-righteous-

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ness in condemning the opposition in Southern states to abolition of segregation. It seems to me that just the experience of New York is calculated to show that the opposition of Southern communities with large Negro populations to integration is based on something more respectable than race or color prejudice. It might be a good point for United States propaganda agencies in Asia and Africa, but would it be good for the children of both races concerned or for the moral and intellectual health of America's young generation if the knifings and rapes of the John Marshall Junior High School in Brooklyn were transferred to fully integrated high schools in Atlanta or Memphis or Charleston? Is it not highly probable that if such outrages occurred in the charged, explosive atmosphere of the South, the sequel would be an explosion far more detrimental to racial amity than the maintenance of separate school systems?

I am not writing as an advocate of any theory of the inherent absolute superiority of members of one race to those of another. It is my strong conviction that every human being should be treated on his merits or demerits and be neither flattered nor abused because he belongs to some ethnic or social or economic or religious group. It seems to me obvious that some individual Negroes, by their achievements—in literature, in the arts, in science—are clearly superior to the great majority of white Americans. And many Negroes who have not won the distinction of George Washington Carver, Ralph Bunche, Richard Wright, or Marian Anderson are doubtless more likable and attractive human beings than are many whites.

My own background is Northern, with a grandfather who was a veteran of the GAR, and I have never been conscious of feeling racial prejudice in America or anywhere else. I enjoyed very much the opportunity at conferences sponsored by the American Friends to meet Negro scholars from Howard and other Negro universities and colleges. I am a football fan, and I have considered it a privilege at games in the Harvard stadium to be sitting next to an elderly Negro, a man of great natural charm and dignity, who was a star football player himself on a university team some fifty years ago and who follows the game with the eye of an expert.

But it is an unmistakable, if unpleasant, fact that Negro group behavior is still appreciably below the imperfect standard set by white Americans. Here is the testimony of a talented Negro journalist, Carl Rowan, on this subject in the *Saturday Evening Post*:

"In New York City Negroes constitute 10 per cent of the population and commit about 35 per cent of the crimes.

"For the nation as a whole Negroes have about eight times as much illegitimacy as whites. . . .

"A California police official has stated that 60 per cent of our crime lies squarely in the Negroes' lap; and he added that the papers ought to show what the crime problem is and where it is."

To say that all this is a result of discrimination against the Negro, even if indisputably true, would not meet the immediate problem of the parent who wants to send his children to schools where they can study without the tension of actual or threatened crime. The moral case for using federal bayonets to force integration of schools on communities which are strongly opposed to it is, I think, seriously weakened by the conditions which have accompanied large-scale integration in New York, where the atmosphere might have been expected to be more favorable.

New York's crime-ridden schools, where former President of Harvard Conant's innocent remark that there is an advantage in "mixing with all sorts of people while at school"[4] seems of rather doubtful validity, are only a projection of one of America's most conspicuous national disgraces: the scope of juvenile criminality and the failure to do anything effective to repress it. The American adult crime record is also, or should be, a cause of national humiliation. A few official statistics will show the dimensions of these two cancers that are turning large sections of our big cities into jungles, with wild beasts in human form on the prowl.

The year 1956 set an unenviable all-time record for major crimes in the United States, with 2,563,150 reported. In fact, the crime curve is rising much faster than the population curve. There were about 1.5 million major crimes in 1940; the 2 million mark was passed in 1952; the figure in 1954 and 1955 was a little over 2.2 million. Almost 13,000 human beings were violently done to death in 1956, and more than 20,000 women were raped. These figures are shockingly high when compared with those in other civilized countries.

An American has about fifteen times an Englishman's statistical chance of being murdered. A Columbia University professor was rightly humiliated when a visiting official from West Berlin asked whether Central Park was not a pleasant and convenient place for a night stroll. The Berlin official, although he came from a city where family life had been terrifically disrupted by bombing and occupation, could scarcely believe that Central Park was distinctly unsafe after dark. Nor has there ever been a case in St. James' Park in London or in the Bois de Boulogne in Paris when a visiting diplomat was stabbed, as happened to the United Nations representative from Nepal in Central Park.

What is still more disgraceful for the present and very ominous for the future is that almost half the major crimes in the United States are committed by youngsters under the age of eighteen. Because I read New York newspapers most, I do not know the details of teen-age terror in other large cities. But the over-all figures indicate that the problem is nation wide. What one gets from reading New York newspapers is a dreary, sordid, and even frightening picture: gangs of young hoodlums, armed with dangerous and even lethal weapons, terrorizing whole neighborhoods; juvenile vandals breaking into and wrecking schools and branch libraries; a tremendous proliferation of criminal gangs, of which there are estimated to be scores in the New York metropolitan area alone. What is even more disgusting than the existence of these gangs, which should be stamped out with the full force of the law, is the tendency of social agencies—and even branches of the police force—to treat them as if they were independent powers.

An American traveling abroad may be homesick for many things, but two features of American life are happily left behind. Nowhere on the Continent is juvenile criminality a major problem. There are some young ruffians known as "Teddy Boys" in England, but in viciousness and scope of criminality, they are well behind the American teen-age hoodlums. Nor does one find in Europe that loathsome American species, the racketeer, the adult criminal who "muscles in" on trade-unions and makes a specialty of extortion.

I was in West Berlin in the summer of 1957 when Victor Riesel, labor journalist who was blinded by acid thrown in his face by an agent of racketeering thugs, visited the former German capital. The Berlin journalists gave him a reception, and their spokesman remarked that, fortunately, no such outrage as Riesel had suffered had ever occurred in Germany, although some of their colleagues in the past had been kidnapped by communists from the Soviet Zone.

Trade-unions in Europe have their faults. The communists have not been pried loose from their grip on the larger French and Italian labor organizations. The British trade-unions are addicted to restrictive practices, and, periodically, one of their local branches will "send to Coventry," or boycott, a member who has been working too hard and too efficiently. But they are free from the ugly disease of racketeering.

Of all these evils, especially juvenile criminality, there has been a vast amount of discussion, yet the situation grows worse, not better, from year to year. Indeed, paradoxical as it may sound, there might be more effective action to get rid of the young thugs who infest parts of our large cities if there were less discussion and if sentimental social workers and pompous psychiatrists could be kept out of the picture. The fashionable attitude today is to expend so much sympathy and "understanding" on the so-called delinquent that the just claims of the victims of his brutality, hoodlumism, and vandalism are completely forgotten. I know the case of one young thug which shows that anyone under the age of sixteen can commit any crime, possibly excluding murder and rape, without any need to fear the consequences. First, this young hoodlum insulted and tried to assault a girl on the street. The police took him in—and sent him home with a reprimand and an injunction to be a good boy. His next achievement was taking part in a brutal gang beating of a university policeman. This time, he was "put on probation," which did not seem to cramp his style unduly, as he soon became involved in a gang fight. He is still walking the streets, unpunished for any of his offenses.

This helplessness in the face of teen-age terror is just about the worst imaginable therapy, for the aggressive bully always goes farther when he realizes that nothing will happen to him as a consequence. Whatever the root causes of the steady and ominous growth of crime, adult and teen age, on the streets and in the schools, it cannot reasonably be attributed to acute poverty. The year which witnessed the record rate of crime, 1956, was one of the most properous in American history. Few, if any, of the two and one-half million major crimes committed in that year fall in the category of stealing a loaf of bread for a hungry family.

Alcoholism and broken families are often cited as causes of juvenile crime, and better housing and more playgrounds are suggested as remedies. Better living amenities are desirable on every count. But the typical "hard-core" young criminal will turn a playground into a shambles, and low-cost housing projects are often nests of juvenile gangs. After all, it is people who make slums more than slums that make people.

If we want to get rid of the dictatorship of the sewers—and it is becoming an ugly fact of life in our large cities—stern and drastic emergency measures are needed. What one misses so far in the public reaction to the mounting rate of crime and juvenile delinquency is the familiar American crusading spirit. Some American crusades have been for good ends, some for bad; some have led to desirable positive results, and some belong in the museum of foolish notions. But a crusade to clean up crime and juvenile delinquency is long over-due. Other civilized nations do not put up with these things, at least not on the same scale. Why should we?

The first condition of effective action is to make certain that punishment is swift, sure, and severe. Juveniles and adolescents would not be committing nearly half the major crimes in the United States if they did not know that the risk involved in these crimes is negligible. For the hard-core delinquent, the serious offender, the leader in a murderous gang, the pupil who goes after the teacher with a broken bottle or plunges a knife into a schoolmate, whipping is the punishment that fits the crime. Hoodlums will know that American society means business when corporal punishment is established for serious offenses, especially for all crimes of violence, in school or out of school. Public whipping would be a desirable penalty for juvenile crimes of brutal violence because the physical pain and humiliation would act as a salutary deterrent. In cases where there has been serious injury to a person or destruction of property, the penalties prescribed by law should be administered.

For dealing with crime in general, the need is for strengthened police forces, for encouragement of police officers to use firearms if there is any attempt to resist or escape, for strong-minded juries and judges who will impose maximum sentences. The dictatorship of the sewers, which raises its ugly head wherever racketeers infiltrate or gangsters terrorize a section of a city, is as repulsive as the Mau Mau terror was in Kenya, and this, it may be recalled, was not put down by appealing to the better nature of the Mau Mau. The more or less permanent situation that is sometimes hideously dramatized by such events as the murder trial of seven young thugs, members of the "Egyptian Dragons," who beat and stabbed to death a crippled boy in Highbridge Park is a revolt against civilization and should be treated as such.[5] When the crime record soars in some "tough" district, it would be a worthwhile idea for the city authorities to appeal for state aid and a declaration of temporary martial law, which would facilitate suitable sentences for any criminals who might be caught.

Meanwhile, well-meaning sentimentalists, whose maudlin sympathy for brutal criminals makes them forget what the victims of these criminals have to suffer, are not much help. At the height of the New York school crime crisis, the head of a large New York college delivered a speech of lachrymose sympathy for the young stabbers and rapers.

The passing of well-deserved death sentences on four young Negroes who murdered a shopkeeper in Queens provoked an amazing outburst of sympathy, not for the shopkeeper, but for the worthless thugs who murdered him, on the editorial page of a leading New York newspaper. The author of the outburst expressed the hope that the sentences would be upset on appeal—something that seems, indeed, only too probable. Apparently, he did not stop to reflect that nothing could upset the sentence of death which the thugs had carried out on the shopkeeper.

Mark Twain, who was certainly not lacking in the quality of humanity, had an appropriate comment on individuals who, in their desire to be kind and merciful to killers, are actually being cruel to the real or potential victims of these killers. In *Tom Sawyer*, there is a character named Injun Joe, a local "bad man," who is accidentally locked in a cave and dies. "This funeral," writes Mark Twain, "stopped the growth of one thing—the petition to the Governor for Injun Joe's pardon. The petition had been largely signed; many tearful and eloquent meetings had been held, and a committee of sappy women been appointed to go in deep mourning and wail around the Governor, and implore him to be a merciful ass and trample his duty under foot. Injun Joe was believed to have killed five citizens of the village, but what of that? If he had been Satan himself, there would have been plenty of weaklings ready to scribble their names to a pardon petition, and drip a tear on it from their permanently impaired and leaky waterworks."

If the best single thing America offers to its citizens is wide opportunity and freedom of choice, the worst is the erosion of character. This is a consequence of the diminished sense of moral responsibility, and it leads both to the ugly crop of all kinds of crimes that we are harvesting and to our inability to take those stern and resolute measures which are necessary if this revolt against civilization is to be put down.

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## CHAPTER EIGHT

# *Ten Mistakes of Marx*

"The evil that men do lives after them." This applies with singular force to the work of Karl Marx, a man infinitely more influential after his death than during his life. The existence of this apostle of socialism, communism (he used the two words interchangeably), and class war was spent, for the most part, in obscure and sometimes squalid poverty. Marx could not make even a humble living as a writer and journalist; he had no other profession or trade. He would probably have had to go on poor relief, less generous in England in his time than it is now, if it had not been for handouts from his disciple and collaborator, Friedrich Engels, who enjoyed the advantage of a successful capitalist father.

Marx's record of political achievement at the time of his death in 1883 was quite sterile. Because, in a moment of thoughtless bravado, he had renounced Prussian citizenship, he could not go to Germany or take any intimate part in the young German socialist movement. He played no role in British politics. To put it mildly, Marx was not a mellow or lovable character. His habit of excommunicating from the socialist movement all who disagreed with him and of launching torrents of personal abuse and slander against political opponents, like Lassalle, kept his circle of personal friends very limited. But even if there were few mourners, literally or figuratively, at the grave of Marx the man, the theory of Marxism, the vision of a world in which the workers, or proletariat, oppressed by capitalism, would break their chains and become the architects of a new millennial order, marched from success to success.

By the time of the first world war, Marx was revered as the founding father of their creed by the socialist parties which had sprung up in most European countries. Because a Russian genius of revolutionary action, Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov, better known as Nikolai Lenin, swallowed Marx's ideas whole, without reservation, Marxism became the official doctrine of the new communist state in Russia. This state, whose rulers have never wavered in their conviction that their power will one day encompass the entire world, is the result of a successful revolt against all the values of Western civilization, against religion and moral law, against natural rights and civil and personal liberties. After the second world war, communism extended its dominion over China and the countries of eastern Europe so that today, it has been imposed as a dogmatic faith on more than one-third of the inhabitants of the globe.

The influence of Marx is by no means limited to nations under communist rule. The appeal of Marxist ideas to European socialists, to the often intellectually half-baked leaders of newly emancipated countries in Asia, has been considerable. And, although the number of persons who can honestly claim to have read through, with comprehension, Marx's supreme work, the immensely long, dry, and abstruse *Das Kapital*, must be small, the simplified outline of Marxist theory presented in the *Communist Manifesto* possesses considerable psychological appeal.

Marx professed to know all the answers, to offer a complete explanation of human activity on the basis of his theory of historical materialism. In the Marxist scheme, there is a hero, the proletariat, and a villain, the bourgeoisie, and the hero is represented as the certain winner in the struggle. There is a vision of revolutionary triumph that will transform the conditions of human existence and usher in a millennium, of the precise nature of which, to be sure, Marx offers few and vague hints. To the trusting minds that accept Marx's premises and assumptions without question, there comes an intoxicating sense of being in step with history, of professing a faith rooted not in fantasy but in infallible science.

Favorable winds followed the launching of the Marxist ship. Scientific discoveries and progress in so-called higher criticism of biblical theories had shaken the bases of traditional religious faith, especially among the educated classes. The harshness and social inequality of capitalism in its early stages, even though, in the opinion of Professor Hayek and other competent scholars, these traits have been overemphasized, had aroused many dreams of social reorganization along more equitable lines.

Marxism supplied a new secular faith to those who had lost their old religion and furnished a blueprint to those who were dreaming rather vaguely of altering the existing economic system. Although phrased in dry, materialistic terms, Marxism could appeal to a generous imaginative mind as a challenge to action, with the suggestion of a struggle between right and wrong and an assurance that right would triumph in the end. And the proposal to nationalize all means of production in the hands of the state, which would be under the control of the proletariat, furnished a target at which leaders of movements of discontent could aim.

The Achilles' heel of the Marxist secular religion is that it voiced statements and uttered prophecies which can be measured against the background of the actual course of human events. Marx has already been proved a singularly uninspired prophet, with an abnormally high proportion of bad guesses chalked up to his discredit. Other thinkers, especially Oswald Spengler and Jakob Burckhardt, were far more successful in divining the shape of the twentieth century, which, in Spengler's phrase, might produce another Caesar but not another Goethe.

Examination of the works of Marx and his colleague, Engels, reveals ten big mistakes, some so fundamental that they completely discredit, as a preview of the future, the whole superstructure of faith in capitalist ruin and doom and inevitable socialist triumph. Marx had laboriously erected this superstructure on a foundation of Hegelian metaphysics and minute research into the seamy sides of British capitalism, as revealed in British government reports. Here are these mistakes.

Mistake Number One. *The doom of capitalism is assured because under its operation the rich will become richer and fewer; the poor will become poorer and more numerous.* This is the prospect set forth in the *Communist Manifesto*, a far more rhetorical and colorful work than *Das Kapital*:

"While there is a progressive diminution in the number of the capitalist magnates, there occurs a corresponding increase in the mass of poverty, oppression, enslavement, degeneration and exploitation. But at the same time there is a steady intensification of the wrath of the working class—a class which grows ever more numerous and is disciplined, unified and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist method of production. Capitalist monopoly becomes a fetter upon the method of production which has flourished with it and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point where they prove incompatible with their capitalist husk. This bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

These are resounding words, but their resonance is that of a dud shell because during the eleven decades that have passed since young Marx and Engels hurled their *Communist Manifesto* in the face of Europe, capitalist countries have developed along lines completely different from those foreseen in the *Manifesto.*

What was in Marx's time a social pyramid has become more like a cube, with the top enlarged, the bottom contracted, and the difference between top and bottom considerably diminished. The capitalist system has brought to the working class not increasing "oppression, enslavement, degeneration and exploitation" but an ever growing increment of new inventions and comforts that did not exist, even for the wealthy, a century ago: automobiles, radios, washing machines, television sets, to say nothing of money in the bank, insurance policies, or stocks and bonds. The most eloquent soapboxer would have difficulty now in convincing the American or western European worker that, in the climactic words of the *Communist Manifesto*, he has nothing to lose but his chains.

Mistake Number Two. *Socialism can only come about when capitalism has exhausted its possibilities of development.* Or, to put it in Marx's own words, in his *Critique of Political Economy*: "No form of society declines before it has developed all the forces of production in accordance with its own stage of development."

But of the three countries which, according to Marx, were ripest for the transition to socialism (as most industrially developed), the United States is still, by and large, the freest from socialist experiments, as well as the most prosperous. The larger part of Germany, which developed under free political and economic institutions, achieved an amazing recovery after shedding Nazi and Allied occupation controls and resorting to old-fashioned individualist incentives. Great Britain has gone farther in collectivism, but its socialistic "New Deal," enacted without violence and outright uncompensated expropriation, falls far short of Marx's imagined "dictatorship of the proletariat."

On the other hand, the countries in which violent revolu-

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tions were carried out in the name of Marx, the Soviet Union and China, were, on Marx's own theory, altogether unripe for socialism. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, capitalism in Russia was in a fairly early stage of development. It was very far from having "developed all the forces of production." Capitalism had made still less impact on China, where most of the peasants lived in precapitalist conditions.

Experience has shown that in precise contradiction of Marxist dogma, capitalism is harder to overthrow as it strikes deeper roots and proves what it can do. There is strong probability that, although political and economic changes would have come to Russia in any event, there would have been no communist revolution if Prime Minister Stolypin's far-sighted agrarian policy had been given enough time to yield solid results. Although Alexander II abolished serfdom in Russia in 1861, the peasant remained severely curbed in economic initiative by the *mir*, or village community, to which he was forced to belong.

All too late, Stolypin, after the disorders in the Russian countryside during the 1905 uprising, conceived the idea that one cause of revolutionary unrest was poverty and that the best way to attack poverty was to give the capable and energetic peasant the chance to get away from the restrictions of the *mir* and set himself up as an independent farmer. Legislation permitting the peasant to demand his share of land and leave the peasant community, where the periodic redistribution of land was one of a number of features which tended to keep all its members on a low level of production, was therefore enacted. Large numbers of peasants responded to the invitation, but this reform, which in a generation would have given Russia a solid class of politically and economically conservative land-owning peasants, was nipped in the bud by the outbreak of the first world war. The legislation was suspended for the duration of hostilities, and the whole idea, one of the most promising in Russian economic history, perished irretrievably during the wild anarchy of 1917 and the communist despotism that followed.

Mistake Number Three. *The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a just and feasible form of government.* Here are two assumptions: that the proletariat, or industrial working class, has some kind of inherent right to rule, in preference to other groups in the population, and that the working class can exercise governing power.

Both of these assumptions are false. Marx himself never clearly explained why the workers, for whom he foresaw increasing misery and degradation, would be qualified to rule. And Soviet and Red Chinese experience offers the clearest proof that dictatorships *of* the proletariat in theory become ruthless dictatorships *over* the proletariat in practice. It is not the workers in factories and mines who exercise absolute governmental power in communist states. The communist "elite," the real power in these states, is composed of bureaucrats, some of whom have never done any manual work, while the remainder ceased to do any after they became bureaucrats.

Mistake Number Four. *Under socialism the state will "wither away."* This is derived from Marx's belief that the state is an instrument for the suppression of one class by another. In the classless society of socialism, therefore, there will be no need for the state.

Events have played havoc with this theory. Nowhere is the state more powerful, more arbitrary, more of a universal policeman, snooper, and interventionist than in the Soviet Union. Yet the new regime there has certainly done a thorough job of abolishing private property in means of production, thereby, according to Marx, inaugurating a classless society. One is left to choose between two alternatives: either Marx's theory of the state as an instrument of class rule is humbug, or the kind of class rule that prevails in the Soviet Union must be uncommonly crude and ruthless. Actually, in-

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security of private property has been historically associated with despotism and lawless dictatorship. Respect for private property has gone hand in hand with the maintenance of political, civil, and personal liberties.

Mistake Number Five. *All ideas, all forms of intellectual and artistic expression are merely a reflection of the material interests of the class in power.* This belief finds repeated expression in Marx's writings, notably in *German Ideology*, where he writes: "The class which has the dominant material power in society is at the same time the dominant spiritual power. . . . The dominant ideas are nothing but the ideal expression of material conditions."

One of the few wisecracks associated with the name of Marx is that the Church of England would give up all of its Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith rather than one thirty-ninth of its property. But the historical record shows that this interpretation of human conduct is inaccurate. Men die far more often for ideas than for material interests. Proof of this can be found in the course of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The communist victory there was not due to any improvement in the material condition of the masses after the communist take-over of power. This definitely did not happen.

What did happen was that the organized, disciplined communist minority held the masses in an iron grip with its double weapon of propaganda and terror, kept passions of class hatred and envy at the boiling point, whipped laggards into line by ruthless regimentation, and thereby kept the communist regime in power during the years of civil war and famine. The qualities of human will and energy, apart from all materialist factors, are vastly more important than Marx was willing to recognize.

Sometimes the materialistic interpretation of culture becomes comical absurdity. I once heard a Moscow musical announcer, with a straight face although possibly with tongue in cheek, offer the following contribution to aesthetic theory: "Comrades, we will now hear Glinka's overture, *Russlan and Ludmilla.* This is a cheerful, buoyant piece of work because when it was written, Russian trade capitalism was expanding and conquering the markets of the Near East." To carry any semblance of plausibility, this would seem to require proof that Glinka owned stock in the expanding companies—a highly improbable contingency in view of the traditional improvidence of musicians in general and Russian musicians in particular.

Ironically enough, there are cases when this idea of culture as the direct reflection of the interests of the ruling class are true. But these cases are only in the Soviet Union and other communist countries, where the novelist or playwright who gives too unfavorable a picture of the members of the ruling clique soon finds himself in trouble. The literature of free countries, on the other hand, is full of very unfavorable representations of the so-called pillars of society.

Mistake Number Six. *Capitalism in the nineteenth century had exhausted its productive possibilities.* This flat statement is made by Marx's alter ego, Friedrich Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring,* which was written before the appearance of the internal combustion engine, X rays, aviation, synthetic chemistry, and a host of other enormously important additions to the productive process, all of which were brought into existence by the stimulus of capitalism.

Mistake Number Seven. *Production depends on class antagonism.* To quote Marx, in *The Poverty of Philosophy*: "From the very moment in which civilization begins, production begins to be based on the antagonism of orders, of states, of classes, and finally on the antagonism between capital and labor. No antagonism, no progress. This is the law which civilization has followed down to our own day."

Like many of Marx's "laws," this is a mere unsupported assertion of a pedantic dogma. No proof is adduced. The greatest human constructive achievements, from the cathe-

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drals of the Middle Ages to the skyscrapers and dams of modern times, have been the fruit of co-operation, not of antagonism.

Mistake Number Eight. *Nationalism is a negligible force.* Marx and Engels lived in an age of rising national consciousness. Conflicting nationalism was the strongest of the forces that unleashed World War I. Yet in all the writings of these prophets of socialism, the attitude toward nationalism is one of contemptuous deprecation. As Isaiah Berlin, a fairly sympathetic biographer, writes: "He [Marx] consistently underestimated the force of rising nationalism; his hatred of all separatism, as of all institutions founded on some purely traditional or emotional basis, blinded him to their actual influence."[1]

Mistake Number Nine. *War is a product of capitalism.* This idea has found some acceptance outside the ranks of the Marxist faithful. The temptation to seek an oversimplified scapegoat for war is strong. Although theoretically, such Marxist motives as the struggle for trade, colonies, and commercial spheres of influence might lead to international conflict, there is no serious historical evidence that any great war was touched off by such considerations. There were differences of interest between the industrializing North and the mainly agricultural South before the Civil War, but these could easily have been compromised without bloodshed. What made the fratricidal conflict "irrepressible," in Seward's phrase, were two big political and moral issues: secession and slavery.

World War I was entirely political in origin. The starting point was the clash between Slav nationalism and Austro-Hungarian determination to hold together an empire with a polyglot population. A system of tight and almost automatically functioning alliances turned what might have been an Austrian punitive expedition into Serbia into a general European war.

World War II was the handiwork not of any magnates of capitalism but of a plebeian dictator, Adolf Hitler. His motivations, conquest and military glory, antedate the modern capitalist system by centuries. The three governments that proved best prepared for war were the communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, the Nazi dictatorship in Germany, and the authoritarian militarist regime in Japan. Capitalism makes for free trade, free markets, limited governmental power, and peace. The principal war threat now comes from the expansionist urge of Soviet communism.

Mistake Number Ten. *The worker is cheated because the employer, instead of paying him the full value of his work, holds out on him profit, interest and rent.* Or, as Marx himself states his theory of surplus value:

"All surplus value, whatever particular form (profit, interest or rent) it may subsequently crystallize into, is in substance the materialization of unpaid labor. The secret of the self-expansion of capital resolves itself into having the disposal of a definite quantity of other people's unpaid labor."[2]

It requires little reflection or research to realize that surplus value, like other Marxist catch phrases, is a myth. How, under any economic system—capitalist, fascist, socialist, communist—could industry expand and provide more jobs for more people if part of the value of present production were not withheld from immediate consumption to finance future construction? Perhaps the best refutation of Marx's rabble-rousing myth of surplus value as a peculiarly dirty trick played by capitalists on workers is the extraction of what might fairly be called surplus value on a gigantic scale in the Soviet Union. One of the most striking examples is the imposition of a sales or turnover tax that exceeds 100 per cent on many articles. Another is the forced sale of state bonds to the population, followed by the repudiation of these bonds.

It is amazing that with such a demonstrable record of failure to understand either the world in which he was living or the direction in which that world was going, Marx should be

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hailed as an unerring prophet. Perhaps the explanation lies in his appeal to psychological and emotional factors, to Utopian idealism, to individual frustration, to class hatred and envy, to the need which some intellectuals felt for a secular religion to replace the other-worldly faith they had lost.

Actually, there is nothing remotely scientific about Marx's socialism. He started with a set of dogmatic, a priori assumptions and then scratched around in the British Museum for facts which would seem to bear out these assumptions. Like the emperor in the fairy tale, Marxism, for all its ponderous pretensions, has no clothes on when examined in the light of realities, in Marx's time or in our own. His supposedly infallible system of interpreting historical development is riddled with errors about the past and bad guesses about the future, of which the foregoing ten are only some of the most obvious and glaring.

## CHAPTER NINE

# *The Power To Destroy*

"THE power to tax," said Chief Justice John Marshall, "involves the power to destroy." He spoke more wisely than he knew. Not for many, many years after Marshall's time were excessive taxes levied in free and civilized countries. During the nineteenth century, the golden age of conservative liberalism and liberal conservatism, the right of the citizen to retain property he had inherited or acquired was taken for granted as one of the natural rights that figure so largely in the thinking of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic.

There was no general income tax in the United States until 1862. This was certainly one of the reasons for the development in American character of the individual self-reliance, neither expecting handouts from the state nor submitting to excessive burdens imposed by the state, which is noted in de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America.*

The rates of taxation during the Civil War, the sternest ordeal in American history, were unbelievably mild by modern standards: 3 per cent on incomes from $600 to $10,000 and moderately progressive rates above $10,000. The whole idea of a levy on personal income was tossed out the window in 1872 as inconsistent with the American ideal of unlimited personal opportunity. An attempt to levy a 2 per cent tax on incomes in 1894 was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme

Court. Only the passing of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913 imbedded the principle of the federal income tax firmly in the United States fiscal system.

At first, the federal income tax was a very thin part of what has become a monstrously large instrument of fiscal extortion. The standard rate of income tax was 1 per cent, with exemptions of $3,000 for single and $4,000 for married persons. (Of course these exemptions were much higher than they would be at present because of the severe depreciation in the purchasing power of the dollar.) There was a surtax of 1 per cent to 6 per cent on incomes in excess of $20,000 (the equivalent of about $53,000 in current dollars).

There was a similar line of development in Great Britain. Gladstone, the great leader of the British Liberals in the nineteenth century (who bear no resemblance to American "liberals" of the twentieth century), wanted to abolish the income tax altogether and reduced it for a time to twopence on the pound (less than 1 per cent), despite the fact that Britain was then carrying a pretty heavy load of imperial commitments around the world. Only the Boer War, at the end of the nineteenth century, brought the rate up to a shilling to the pound (5 per cent).

Notwithstanding what might have seemed the innocuously low rates which were set after the United States income tax was legalized, voices of warning were raised against the principle of a levy which placed all the earnings of American citizens at the mercy of politicians, with the politician's compulsive urge to buy popularity by spending other people's money. This urge is as old as recorded history. We learn from Plutarch that the Athenian statesman Pericles, in order to insure political success, "turned to the distribution of the public moneys; and in a short time, having bought the people over, what with moneys allowed for shows and for service on juries, and what with other forms of pay and largess, he made use of them against the council of Areopagus."[1] Pericles never lost an election after he had discovered the golden key to victory.

Senator Benjamin Harvey Hill warned that the new tax would enable the government to "make all property and rights, all states and people, and all liberty and hope, its playthings in an hour and its victims forever." And Representative William Bourke Cochrane of New York declared in 1894, when Congress first authorized the income tax bill nullified by the Supreme Court, that "democratic institutions must perish from the face of the earth if they cannot protect the fruits of human industry wherever they are, or in what ever proportion they may be held by the citizens."

Even these Cassandras, one suspects, would have been appalled by the fantastic growth in the weight of this burden. This point may be illustrated by a single salient comparison. The income tax brought in 80 million dollars the first year after its imposition. It was realizing over 31 billion dollars in the mid-1950's. Of course, during the intervening forty years, population and real wealth have grown, but not in such a steep proportion as more than 300 to 1, the relation between the current take of income tax and what was collected in 1914.

This ever increasing appropriation by nations of the fruits of the labor of their citizens, or subjects, is a world-wide trend, with one paradoxical exception. Rates of income tax in Great Britain are higher and exemptions are lower than in the United States, although there is no British equivalent for the state income taxes, which often add substantially to the taxpayer's bill in the United States. The German national income tax has been cut and is less steeply graduated than the American in the upper brackets. However, Germans who are not refugees and who were not bombed out during the war are obliged to pay a substantial levy, the so-called *Lastenausgleich*, for the benefit of those who were, and this probably equals the score.

Japanese rates of income tax, now, in contrast to prewar times, applied equally to foreigners, are so heavy (Japanese wage and salary scales are much lower than American) that many foreign journalists and businessmen pulled up stakes and moved from Tokyo to Hong Kong. There has been a report from Formosa that some income tax rates were as high as 114 per cent, with the finance minister promising to look into the matter.

The one exception to this crushing load of direct taxation is found, curiously enough, in communist-ruled countries, which started off with programs of wholesale nationalization, confiscation, and robbery and which still do not, with negligible exceptions, tolerate private ownership of industrial or commercial enterprises. But experience has taught the communist political bosses that unequal pay for work of unequal value is the best medicine for stimulating productivity. So there are very sharp wage and salary differentials in the Soviet Union and its satellites, in addition to substantial prerequisites of office, in the form of superior housing and vacation facilities, state-provided automobiles, etc., for top-level officials, leading members of the managerial bureaucracy, and key scientists.

And in Tito's Yugoslavia, at least at the time of my visit there in 1955, there was no income tax at all. (13 per cent is the highest rate of income tax in the Soviet Union). Lest this start a stampede of Americans to Yugoslavia, I hasten to add that there are many features of life under Tito's brand of communism that are even less pleasant than filling out income tax returns.

The power to tax has indeed proved that it involves the power to destroy. Growing like a Frankenstein monster in the twentieth century, the personal income tax has destroyed for American citizens many precious advantages which their forefathers enjoyed, including:

(1) The sense of personal independence that comes from being able to provide themselves for their years of old age

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and retirement. The drain on earnings represented by the multiple forms of income tax (most states and some municipalities have adopted this tempting method of bleeding the taxpayer) spells for many individuals the difference between independence and dependence, between the chance for a man of thrift and diligence to "save up" for his later years and being forced to rely on a state or company handout. Anyone with a medium middle-class income can take paper and pencil, count up what he has paid to satisfy the exactions of assorted tax collectors, and reckon what he has lost in terms of retirement benefit. In an age that prides itself on its concern for security, exorbitant rates of personal income tax are a most acute source of personal insecurity. Money that could otherwise have been saved for a rainy day is quickly siphoned off by the insatiable demands of the state.

(2) The sense of economic freedom. The United States conquered the wilderness, built great cities, and carved out rich farm areas on land once tenanted by a few nomadic savages. It made itself, in Shakespeare's phrase, "the envy of less happier lands" because the individual American was free to earn what he could and keep what he earned. Now the omnipotent and omnicompetent state, like a racketeer, "muscles in," demanding a large first cut of everyone's earnings, a cut that becomes progressively larger as the individual presumably becomes more competent and efficient and able to earn more money.

A reversion to serfdom under modern conditions is suggested by an arrangement under which almost everyone must put in a considerable amount of time, working without compensation, for the government. The amount of time involved varies from one to two months for those in lower brackets to three to six months as steep progression exercises a leveling influence on those in the middle and upper brackets. In the case of the highest incomes, of which 91 per cent may go to the government, the individual may reckon that he is working only a few weeks for himself.

There can be only one end to the prolonged operation of the kind of steeply graduated income tax that is now in force in the United States. This is to transform what was once a people of self-reliant individualists, accustomed to relying on themselves in emergencies, into an amorphous mass of wards and serfs of the state. These will be neatly ticketed with social security numbers, conditioned to give up to the state more and more of what they earn, and required to look to the state to satisfy more and more of their needs. One of the most insidious results of the present burden of direct taxation is that by stripping many middle-class families of their cash reserves, it wins over people who would normally prefer to stand on their own feet, to advocacy or passive acceptance of socialized medicine, socialized housing, socialized food, socialized everything.

(3) The spark plug of incentive is brought to a sputtering halt by a tax system that penalizes prosperity as a crime and makes it almost impossible, without inherited wealth, to build up the medium and small fortunes which formerly testified to the vitality of the individualist economic system. Consider a situation that must often arise in a small business. The income of the owner is $200,000 a year. He might be able to increase this to $300,000 by going to some trouble and risk in installing new machinery that would make for higher productivity. But how much of the extra $100,000 would he be able to keep? Only a few thousand dollars. Is it reasonable to expect a man to work as hard if he must turn over nine-tenths of the fruit of his labor to the state as he would if he could keep all or the greater part of it himself?

The sky was the limit as regards the rewards of energy and initiative under the capitalist system before the first world war. This was certainly one reason why capitalism achieved

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such enormous productive successes. Marx and Engels, who wished to destroy the capitalist system, knew what they were doing when they put a demand for a heavily graduated income tax into the *Communist Manifesto.*

In the United States, where socialism has never possessed mass appeal and the Socialist Party has long been in a state of complete decomposition, where outright nationalization would be rejected by an overwhelming majority, the ever growing exaction of the progressive income tax has brought about much that might have been expected from the advent to power of a constitutional socialist party. It has been regarded by Left Wing political and economic theorists not primarily as a source of revenue but as a legitimate and desirable instrument of social and economic leveling. It has discouraged thrift and diluted incentive, sometimes to the vanishing point. It has enormously restricted the range of individual opportunity. It has made the individual vastly more dependent on the government and avid for government handouts. It has shifted the balance in America from an individual-centered to a state-centered economic and social system.

(4) Both morally and fiscally, an excessive tax on personal income is the worst imaginable form of exaction. It leads to a vast amount of legal, semilegal, and illegal evasion. It can only be enforced with the aid of a host of snoopers and priers. It lends itself to blackmail and political corruption, as the scandals of the Truman Administration showed.

Much more could be said in criticism of this form of fiscal extortion, and much has been said very ably by a man who has seen the machinery of extortion from the inside. Mr. T. Coleman Andrews, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, signalized his departure from that office and rendered a conspicuous public service by publishing an article entitled "Abolish the Income Tax," sprinkled with adjectives and expressions like "brutal," "confiscatory," "murderous," and "brigandage." From a wealth of personal experience, the former Commissioner drew the conclusion that the income tax legislation was so complicated that very few taxpayers did or could understand it.

Almost two years had elapsed since the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 had become law, and it had not been possible for the Treasury Department to work out an official interpretation of that law. The punch lines of Mr. Andrews' article are contained in these paragraphs from his appeal to members of Congress:

"Whether you believe it or not, everybody is being overtaxed and the middle class is being taxed out of existence. Thereby the nation is being robbed of its surest guaranty of continued sound economic development and growth and its staunchest bulwark against the ascendancy of socialism. We, who somehow have managed to hold on, finally are beginning to see the shameful extent to which we have been made the special victims of rapacious tax enactments—and we don't like it....

"High rates of tax don't mean anything when there isn't anything to tax."

A weakness in the position of Mr. Andrews was that he called for the abolition of the income tax without indicating what should replace it. He merely advocated a Congressional examination of the whole problem of taxation, an excellent idea in theory, but one that would be likely to bog down in endless delays in practice. Present rates of income tax, which in many cases confiscate the individual's margin for saving, have been more or less passively accepted on two false assumptions: that the current level of government spending in all fields is untouchable and that there is no other means by which revenue could be raised.

No one who has had even slight acquaintance with government operations is likely to be convinced that no savings in this field are possible. Bureaucrats are a close second to rabbits in the gift of proliferation. There is sound truth, as well as humor, in "Parkinson's Law," first publicized in *The Economist*, in which the author offers mathematical formulas to show how eight men in a government office are gradually hired to do the work formerly performed by one and how the number of government employees has an irresistible tendency to increase, even though the department where they work has much less to do. Concrete examples are the British Royal Navy and the Colonial Office. In both, the number of persons employed continued to grow steadily, while the Royal Navy was being drastically cut back and more and more areas were emerging from colonial status.

The monumental reports of the commission headed by Herbert Hoover show the feasibility of savings running into billions of dollars. What is lacking is not the *possibility* to economize but the *will* to economize, both in the executive and legislative branches. It is elementary human nature to spend government money more freely than one's own money, and there is certainly room for economy in mismanaged overseas government enterprises and in handouts to unfriendly neutral governments.

Nor is it necessary to rely so predominantly, as the United States Government has done, on direct methods of taxation to raise revenue. Heavy direct taxation in Great Britain is supplemented by a steep "purchase," or sales, tax. The burden of German taxation is distributed about evenly between direct and indirect levies. Indirect taxation is a main source of revenue in France and Italy. On the other hand, the United States gets more than 80 per cent of its revenue from direct levies on individuals and corporations.

As long as the Soviet threat remains unabated, it would be unrealistic and dangerous to toss out the personal income tax without answering the question of where the money would come from for necessary military preparedness. It would be unrealistic, under present conditions, to advocate the complete abolition of the personal income tax. But, in view of its many deficiencies and its positively disastrous effect, at the present rates, on individual self-reliance and on the functioning of what is supposed to be an individualist economic system, it is both desirable and feasible to bring this levy down to more moderate levels.

A suitable goal for conservatives to aim at would be an across-the-board halving of the personal income tax, with the lowest rate 10 per cent and a ceiling of 50 per cent on the highest bracket. The vitalizing effect of such a reduction on enterprise and thrift, on the formation of capital, on the individual's ability to provide for his own old age, would be tremendous. Such a program of financial reform should be accompanied by the repeal of the capital gains tax. This is a "heads you win, tails I lose" proposition, from the standpoint of the taxpayer, which brings in little revenue and exercises a serious adverse effect on the desirable liquidity of the capital market. The clear and flagrant injustice involved in the double taxation of money paid out in dividends should also be eliminated.

Under present legislation, the government takes 52 per cent of the profits of corporations under the corporation income tax and then taxes a second time, as personal income, whatever sums are paid to individuals as dividends. In the case of persons in the higher tax brackets, this means that the government, without assuming any of the risks of business operation, confiscates 90 per cent or more of the profits. And there are demagogues ignorant or unscrupulous enough to allege that the American taxation system unduly favors the well-to-do!

The revenue lost by cutting the personal income tax, from the highest rates to the lowest, in half could be made up in two ways: by economies with real bite, to which the Hoover Commission has pointed the way, and by a manufacturers' excise tax, from which food and medicines would be exempted. Such a tax, at 10 per cent, would bring in about 16 billion

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dollars, just about the sum that would be lost by a 50 per cent reduction in personal income tax. This rate of 10 per cent could be lowered proportionately as economies in government operation were made effective.

History shows that the abuse of taxation, the power to destroy, as it has been so aptly called, is an important factor in the decline and fall of civilizations. Consider this picture of the state of the Byzantine Empire under the reign of Justinian, as drawn by a scholarly historian:

"At last the whole wealth of the empire was drawn into the imperial treasury; fruit trees were cut down and free men were sold to pay taxes; vineyards were rooted out and buildings were destroyed[2] to escape taxation. . . . The increase of the public burdens proceeded so far that every year brought with it a failure in the taxes of some province, and consequently the confiscation of the private property of the wealthiest citizens of the insolvent district, until at last all the rich proprietors were ruined and the law[3] became nugatory."[4]

Small wonder that there was little will to resist the barbarian invasions in the West or the Moslem sweep in the East. The sucking up of power, initiative, and privately produced wealth into a bureaucratically centralized apparatus of government is one of the most unmistakable of historical danger signals.

For the last quarter of a century and more, this signal has been flashing with increasing urgency to the American people. Now the time has come to reverse the fatal trend toward concentration and centralization, to curb the power to destroy which is implicit in a form of tax that makes a mockery of the right of private property and gives an impersonal state a lien of elastic and unlimited proportions on the labor and wealth of its citizens. A decisive downward trend in the ever rising curve of personal income taxation would resound throughout America with the invigorating effect of a new Declaration of Independence.[5]

## CHAPTER TEN

# *Baseball: The American Symbol*

FROM the moment in April when blue-suited umpires in eight major league and countless minor league baseball parks call "Play Ball!" to the crisp October day that see the last man out in the World Series, baseball dominates the American sports scene, and with good reason. For baseball is more than the best available spectator sport. It is more than America's favorite and characteristic national game, which almost every American boy (and a good many American girls) has tried to play at one time or another. Baseball is an American institution. It is the American character in action.

Politics stops at the baseball diamond's edge. Former President Hoover, whom a sports writer called the truest fan who ever sat in the White House, is a familiar figure at the World Series. Former President Truman, while in office, took time out to watch a televised game in the unusually exciting series between the New York Yankees and the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1949. Unfortunately, he was interrupted by some affair of state and missed the decisive blow by a pinch hitter that robbed the Yankee pitcher of both victory and the extremely rare honor of pitching a no-hit game (about as infrequent as a royal flush in a poker game) in the World Series. Adlai Stevenson, on the other hand, flunked a test in baseball lore. Meeting Allie Reynolds, who acquired national fame as a pitcher for the Yankees, in the course of his election campaign, Stevenson committed the grave *faux pas* of saying: "I wish I could *hit* like you." And the baseball fan vote went glimmering.

During the last war, questions about the baseball races were sometimes used to trap infiltrators in American uniforms. There was logic in this procedure. No spy, however well briefed otherwise, would be likely to know who won the pennants in the National and American leagues. For baseball is an American heritage, and it is unusual when a European, however well assimilated in other respects, becomes a baseball "addict." To be sure, I know one erudite professor of economics, Russian born and with a European chess-playing background, who amazed me and almost bowled me over with his expert knowledge of the merits and defects of the Boston Red Sox. But he was distinctly an exception.

Baseball has also established a firm foothold outside the United States, mainly in countries of the Western Hemisphere —Canada, Mexico, Cuba, and other Latin American countries. These countries, incidentally, have been producing some excellent professional players, able to meet the stiff competition of the major leagues and sometimes more familiar with the rules of baseball than with the rules of English grammar and pronunciation.

Efforts of the American armed forces to introduce baseball to Europeans have not been successful. The game is still waiting for its first European star. The only overseas country where baseball is genuinely popular is Japan. And it is something more than a little unorthodox, by the American standard, to have a player, as he comes to bat, doff his cap and bow to the umpire. Such a gesture in any American ball park, where the umpire is always assumed to be on the side of the visiting team, would elicit first incredulous silence and then a storm of jeers.

What makes baseball such an authentic expression of the American national spirit? First, it is intensely dynamic, fast in execution, and charged with the elements of suspense, uncertainty, and crisis. Its contrast with the British national pastime, cricket, is like the contrast between the American politician "running" for Congress and the British politician "standing" for Parliament. A baseball game, unless it goes into extra innings, is usually over within a little over two hours. A cricket match, with plenty of time for "tea breaks," may last two or three days.

Nothing in baseball can ever be taken for granted. The worst team in the league may rise up and beat the best team in the league. A game that looks lopsided and dull as one team piles up a big lead in the early innings may turn into a spine-tingling thriller as the team that is behind comes to life and starts a late-inning rally, one of the most exciting possibilities of baseball.

Of course, baseball games, like other sporting contests, may be one sided, as well as close, but the rules make for frequent situations of intense drama when everything hinges on what happens to the next pitch. Fighting spirit and will to win are all important, both in the individual players and in the team. "Good losers," snarled "Muggsy" McGraw, the Napoleonic leader of the New York Giants in the early years of the big leagues, "are easy losers." And on the infrequent occasions when he lost, Muggsy was pretty ungracious about it.

My choice as the most interesting team to see in action (although there have certainly been better ones) is the Detroit Tigers of 1907-11. Managed by a red-haired extrovert named Hughey Jennings, who blew shrill whistles, gave a good imitation of the Rebel Yell, chewed grass, and otherwise made himself conspicuous in the coaching box, and spearheaded by Tyrus Raymond Cobb, the greatest individual player of all time, the Tigers, win or lose, lived up to their name by putting up a tremendous fight. They simply did not know when they were beaten, and their late rallies, after pitching and fielding lapses had put the opposition well ahead, were proverbial.

Although I lived at that time in Philadelphia, which had a very good team, the Athletics, headed by Connie Mack, who continued to manage until very advanced years, I conceived such a hero-worship for Ty Cobb that I became a "fifth columnist," going out to Philadelphia's Shibe Park to root for the Tigers whenever they were in town. Cobb could do everything except pitch. He could hit and field and run surpassingly, and no one has matched or is likely to match his lifetime batting and base-running records. Cobb played the game with a fierce, passionate energy, a single-minded concentration that had to be seen to be believed. He always tried to keep one jump ahead of the opposition in his thinking, and he usually succeeded. A good symbol of the enterprising spirit of America was the fiery Georgian, dashing for third base when most players would have stopped at second and quite possibly drawing a wild throw and coming in to score.

There have been more affable and likable figures in the game than Cobb, who never gave or expected quarter. He was a mean, tough, hard competitor. When he slid into a base in a cloud of dust, it was just too bad for the opposing infielder if he did not keep out of the way of Cobb's gleaming spikes. But of all the Immortals in baseball's Pantheon, the Hall of Fame at Cooperstown, New York, Cobb, by general agreement and consent of sports writers and rank-and-file fans, is the greatest, and he is likely to remain on this pedestal forever. As Matthew Arnold said of Shakespeare: "Others abide our question. Thou art free."

Baseball is highly American in its quick alternations of fortune, in its "shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves" quality. Although team play is essential, baseball is also an individual game, and it often happens that in the same game, the man who earns the jeers of the more fickle fans by striking out at a critical moment or by fumbling or throwing wildly a ball hit in his direction becomes the hero of the day when he breaks up a deadlock by hitting a home run.

Baseball possesses two elements of a great tradition: stability and continuity. A proposal to increase or reduce the number of members of Congress would probably invite less stormy and heartfelt discussion than a suggestion that a batter should be called out on two or four strikes or go to first base on three or five balls.

A Rip Van Winkle waking up after a fifty-year sleep would find the essentials of baseball in 1958 unchanged from those of 1908. Nine men on each team—a pitcher, a catcher, four infielders, three outfielders. Nine innings, or times at bat, for each team, is still the regulation length of a game, with extra innings in the event of a tie. Three strikes (unsuccessful swings at the ball or failure to swing at a pitched ball which the umpire considers to be over the plate) and the batter is out. Four balls (bad pitches by the umpire's ruling) and the batter goes to first base, the first leg in his effort to get around the three bases and come in to score a run. A home run, a ball hit with such power that it soars over the park wall or into the spectator stands that are sometimes located in front of the wall, remains the supreme offensive achievement. It means that all men who may be on bases score automatically, along with the hitter of the mighty blow. The strike-out at the critical moment or the swift double play, getting two outs in one operation, are still the best possible defensive successes.

Although America is proud of being a free country, there are certain fields where authority is absolute. In baseball, the element of authority is represented by the umpires, usually retired players themselves, who call the decisions. They are as all powerful as a traffic cop or the United States Supreme Court. When the umpire (four of them are required to service a big league game) jerks up his thumb to signal "Out!" after scanning one of the hairline-close plays in which baseball abounds, the player is out, even if half a dozen enraged teammates and fifty thousand screaming fans in the stands voice loud and emphatic disagreement.

The methods of baseball competition have remained much the same. At the top of the pyramid are two eight-club leagues, the American and the National. It is here that the professional baseball player, after working up from the sand lots or from a college campus through an apprenticeship in the minor leagues, gets his chance at glamor and big salaries, with the reported $125,000 (baseball players' salaries are not officially made public) paid to Ted Williams, the temperamental star outfielder of the Boston Red Sox, by millionaire-owner Tom Yawkey as the Mount McKinley of baseball financial achievement.

Each team in each league plays every other team in its league a total of twenty-two games, half on the home grounds and half away, and the winners of the two races meet in what is rather chauvinistically called the World Series, a best-of-seven-games contest at the end of the regular season. No non-American team has ever entered this competition.

In every tradition, there must be some provision for changing times and conditions. The rules of baseball, like the laws of the ancient Medes and Persians, have remained practically unchanged, but the use of a livelier ball has led to larger scores, to a proliferation of home runs, and to some changes in strategy. Home-run records have gone up, stolen-base records have gone down. What is the use of risking being thrown out trying to steal a base when a Hank Aaron, a Mickey Mantle, or a Ted Williams may come up and drive you in with a home run? High-scoring games have become more common, and changes in the rules have made for this same trend in football and basketball. Inflation in scoring points has gone hand in hand with inflation of the dollar.

For almost half a century, the list of cities maintaining big-league teams remained unchanged, but changes in population, the stagnation of some old cities and the growth of new ones, the competition of television with the live game, have led to a number of changes in the last few years. The former Boston Braves (every team has its cherished nickname) made the first breach in the *status quo* when they became the Milwaukee Braves. Both the quality of their playing and the income of their owners improved noticeably after the migration from Boston (where spectator enthusiasm was mainly confined to the American League Boston Red Sox), with its almost empty stands, to Milwaukee. Here the Braves were a sellout from the beginning, and loyal fans gave them a tremendous homecoming welcome after they lost the 1956 race by a narrow margin. Then they swept through to a National League championship and to the proud position of World Champions after beating the renowned Yankees in 1957.

The St. Louis Browns became the Baltimore Orioles and have gradually worked their way up from last place to fifth under the stimulus of the change. The Philadelphia Athletics, once a great team under the generalship of Connie Mack but long in the doldrums, started a new phase of their career in Kansas City.

And in 1958, the boundary of the baseball empire took a westward swing, made possible by the development of air transportation. Two historic teams, the Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants, took up new residence in Los Angeles and San Francisco. This gives major-league baseball nation-wide geographical scope and leaves Chicago as the only city where the truly rabid fan can watch a game every day of the season, with the American League White Sox at home when the National League Cubs are away and vice versa.

The coming of age and the assimilation of certain ethnic groups are reflected in the make-up of baseball's "400," the players who have reached the top of the profession in the big leagues. Twenty-five is the standard number for a big league team, counting extra pitchers and substitutes for other positions. Fifty years ago, big-league players were predominantly of English and Irish descent, with a sprinkling of Germans (like Honus Wagner, famous and beloved shortstop of the Pittsburgh Pirates) and an occasional Slav or Scandinavian name. Today, Slav, Italian, and Latin American names are much more prominent in the daily reports of runs, hits, and errors. Indians, regularly nicknamed "Big Chief," have been in the game from the beginning, and the color line disappeared when university-educated Jackie Robinson became a star player for the Brooklyn Dodgers more than ten years ago. Robinson has now retired; baseball is a young man's game, and a baseball professional is a "veteran" after thirty.

Perhaps a Negro still has to be a little better than a Caucasian to make the big leagues, but Willie Mays, Don Newcombe, Larry Doby, and Hank Aaron are only a few of the Negroes who have followed the trail blazed by Jackie Robinson. The change-over from all-white teams took place with a minimum of unpleasant or unsportsmanlike incidents. As is fitting, baseball, the American game, holds open the door of opportunity for any American, from the holder of a college degree to a graduate of the college of hard knocks, who can pitch, bat, field, and throw with sufficient ability.

The fascination of baseball is reflected in my own personal experience. As a boy, I knew the approximate batting and pitching averages of the leading players in both major leagues and the strong and weak points of every club. I left America in 1922 for eighteen years of work as a correspondent in the Soviet Union, Japan, and France. During this period, I was completely cut off from the great American game. I would not have known who won the World Series.

When I returned to America and settled down in Cambridge in 1940, the old fascination quickly reasserted itself. I discovered the location of the two baseball parks which then existed in Boston and have gone, on the average, to twenty-five or thirty baseball games every season since that time. I resumed my boyhood habit of "scoring" every game

I saw, keeping a record, with a special kind of shorthand, of every play, working out the complete score (catalogued under "At Bats, Runs, Hits, Outs, Assists, Errors") after the game, and shouting with delight if, the next morning, my amateur scoring was confirmed in every detail by the official score.

The crowd at a baseball game is an excellent cross-section of America, male and female, old and young, people of quite varied tastes and backgrounds united in close attention to the unfolding contest. You may find yourself seated next to a young boy, excited by his first big-league game, perhaps a shortstop on his neighborhood playground or sand-lot team, or perhaps you will sit next to a dyed-in-the-wool fan who can talk with knowledge and discrimination of the baseball stars of past decades and snap out accurate statistics, such as "eighteen" if you remark that Mickey Mantle or Ted Williams has been hitting a good many home runs early in the season. At one game I attended, the face of an elderly gentleman in the next seat looked familiar, and before long, we recognized each other as holders of subscription seats at the Saturday evening concerts of the Boston Symphony Orchestra; we mingled comments on the game with discussion of our likes and dislikes in music. And women can be just as ardent fans as men; I know of one elderly bedridden lady whose life is much enriched by the possibility of listening to baseball games on the radio. It was the late Mrs. Calvin Coolidge who once won a nation-wide baseball-quiz contest by spotting, with unerring memory, the name and occasion when a player in the World Series made an "unassisted triple play," a "one-in-a-million" occurrence in baseball.

Sinclair Lewis' George F. Babbitt boasted that he knew three languages: American, baseball, and poker. And a figure of speech drawn from baseball can count on a wide common denominator of understanding. A nationally syndicated commentator recently began a serious discussion of Soviet Premier

Bulganin's "peace offensive" as follows: "This is like Mickey Mantle advising the American League pitchers how to pitch to him. There might be a smitch of doubt over his objectivity."

Baseball is one of the best icebreakers in conversation among American men of almost all groups and interests. The game has won its unique position on its merits. It is a grand game to watch, strenuous without brutality, fast without being too complex, a nice balance of team play and individual achievement, brain and brawn, luck and skill.

It might be an exaggeration to say that a well-contested game between two leading contenders for a big-league championship is the intellectual equivalent of a match between two masters of chess. But there is far more to baseball than swinging a bat at a ball. There is the closest study of the habits and weaknesses of every batter and pitcher. Fielders shift their positions in line with where the batter is most likely to hit. The manager of a baseball team must be an expert, not only on baseball lore and strategy, but also on the psychological problems involved in handling a group of taut and sometimes temperamental athletes, mostly young men, whose skill at the game may exceed their maturity. He must face difficult decisions that arise in the course of the game: whether to replace a pitcher who has started out well and has begun to falter and show signs of tiring, when to use a pinch hitter, and a host of other tactical problems.

Compared with baseball, racing, whether of human beings, horses, dogs, or boats, seems boringly simple. Golf has its magnetism for the addict; to the spectator, it seems tediously slow. Tennis, a more sparkling game, lacks the element of team co-operation. Football is probably the nearest rival of baseball for holding spectator interest. But football has become so complicated that the players themselves, to say nothing of the watchers in the stands, are often deceived with respect to who has the ball and what the ultimate aim of the play is. Baseball, while not lacking in fine points of strategy, is a more direct and open game. Boxing is on the primitive and brutal side.

Baseball remains America's king of sports. One of its conspicuous practical benefits to its devotees is the complete abstraction from worry that one enjoys at a hotly contested game. If more people were instructed in this delightful cure for mental stress and strain, there would be fewer patients on the couches of psychoanalysts.

Two last proofs that baseball is enthroned as *the* American game. Although big-league baseball is big business, running into many millions of dollars in gate receipts every year, it is not subject to the anti-trust law. By an agreement among the clubs that would scarcely stand up to legal challenge in another occupation, a baseball player may sign a contract only with the club that holds title to his services. He may be (and often is) "traded" from one club to another. The limitation on free competition for players' services is defended by the argument that unrestricted bidding would lead to a situation in which the richer teams would get all the stars, thereby making for lopsided and uninteresting races. As it is, there are some perennial weak sisters in the big leagues, notably Washington, which always seems to be "first in war, first in peace—and last in the American League."

Baseball has its epic, "Casey at the Bat," the tale of a mighty slugger who plunged the hometown fans into woe by striking out at the critical moment. A final tribute to what began as a game and developed into a national institution, symbol of American character and personality, was the attempt of an American composer, William Schuman, to utilize "Casey at the Bat" as the basis of an opera.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

# *Compulsory Cacophony*

ONE of the most compelling reasons for professing conservative sympathy in the twentieth century is the sharp decline in the quality of the creative arts since the first world war. Science and technology are accumulative processes which can be destroyed or reduced to a lower level only by the realization of the darkest imaginings of the Cassandras of the nuclear age. But in literature, art, and music, the trend has been toward lower levels, and this is equally true, although for differing reasons, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Under communism, the arts suffer the fatal blight of state patronage and state dictation. Writers, artists, and musicians in the Soviet Union enjoy a privileged existence if they combine a minimum of craftsmanship with willingness to toe the Party line, to write, compose, and paint in the style which the Communist Party bosses may demand at any given moment.

It is not surprising that the result has been a period of banality and mediocrity unparalleled since Russia came of age culturally in the nineteenth century. In some fields—history, economics, philosophy, biography—the demands of propaganda have imposed a complete blackout on independent research and original thinking. The more talented Soviet writers have led a harried, censored existence; some have committed suicide, like the poets Mayakovski and Essenin; others, such as

Pilnyak, Babel, and Feffer, belong in the extensive Soviet category of "missing, presumed dead." The greatest living Soviet writer, Boris Pasternak, who was deservedly awarded the Nobel Prize in literature after the publication (outside Russia, to be sure) of his *Doctor Zhivago,* a magnificent panoramic novel about life in Russia before, during, and after the Revolution, was subjected to a disgraceful campaign of organized persecution and vilification. He was called a traitor and a Judas (this from atheistic communism!), compared unfavorably with a pig and a snake, and threatened with the loss of his Soviet citizenship and expulsion from Russia, his native land, to which he is passionately attached. Under this terrific pressure, perhaps supplemented by threats to his family, he was compelled to withdraw his grateful acceptance of the Nobel prize. Similar conditions have prevailed in other communist-ruled countries, from the Soviet Zone in Germany to China. Tibor Dery and Gyula Hay were the most famous names in a long list of Hungarian writers sentenced to long terms in prison for their part in that country's heroic bid for freedom in October-November, 1956.

Western intellectuals have been more fortunate than their brethren behind the Iron Curtain because they have been free to write and speak, to paint and compose as they chose. The pity is that they have so little to contribute to the old and rich edifice of Western culture and civilization. Too often, obscenity has been equated with power, obscurity with depth, and a mannered, artificial style with sophistication.

In this chapter, I propose to confine myself to a discussion of modernistic music, partly because it is an art in which I take a keen personal interest, partly because, it seems to me, real problems of cultural freedom and tolerance are posed by the widespread practice of imposing cacophony on captive audiences. At a time when some statesmen pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of co-existence with communism, musical conservatives who attend concerts are concerned with finding

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some tolerable basis of co-existence with cacophony. A musical conservative, then, may be defined as one who believes that music has become a decadent, if not lost, art because of the widespread abandonment by modern composers of traditional standards of form, harmony, and melody.

The revolution in music, like some other revolutions, has been a gradual process. It set in about the time of the first world war, with Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring* as its harbinger. Perhaps its most important single event was the invention of the twelve-tone scale by Arnold Schönberg. Whatever may be thought of the aesthetic value of twelve-tonal music, it represents a much sharper break with the past than any innovation in musical history. This is why the musical conservative, with a taste sufficiently catholic to enjoy and admire composers as different in style and temperament as Bach and Tchaikovsky, Wagner and Brahms, finds himself running out of comprehension and tolerance when he is exposed to the more dissonant works of Honegger and Hindemith, Berg and von Einem, Bartók and Stravinsky, Charles Ives, Roy Harris, and a host of other composers who write in the new idiom.

One cannot, of course, lump together all modern works in sweeping condemnation. There are works which are free from atonal dissonance, but the main trend is certainly away from melody, toward cacophony. The typical modernist composer prefers discords to chords, dissonance to harmony, chaos to form. He is conspicuously lacking in the classical virtues: dignity, tranquillity, restraint. Some of the more extreme modernist works seem to aim at reflecting and depicting some phase of acutely advanced nervous disorder.

The characteristic modernist symphonic work (and I have listened to a good many since my return to the United States in 1940) has no recognizable beginning, middle, or end. It could be played backward with equal comprehensibility. A parallel trend in art finds expression in a recent news item

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from London. Those in charge of an exhibition of American abstract art were hampered in hanging a picture called *The Bride* by grave doubt about which was right side up.

Most contemporary music critics are inclined to make obeisance before the shrine of similarly "abstract" music. But one critic, Henry Pleasants, who received a formal musical education and specialized for a long time in appraising modernist compositions, makes out a good case for the proposition that Emperor Modern Music really has no clothes on.[1] He offers this technical explanation of what many amateur music lovers instinctively feel as the difference between music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and music of the present:

"The feeling for key, or tonality, which gives each of the contending voices in a Monteverdi or Mozart dissonance a sheltered destination in a tonally agreeable consonance is gone. Without harmonic order there are no tonal safe havens. Both composer and listener are left as helpless flotsam on a sea of tonal discomfort.

"Music in which dissonance offers no prospect of resolution deprives the listener of his tonal bearings, and its claim to tonality is either academic or fraudulent."[2]

To the musical conservative, the atonal dissonance which has become the distinctive hallmark of modern music suggests the degradation of a noble language, like Latin or Greek, into a barbarian dialect. An American comedy presented the figure of a modernist composer as an elderly professor with a poorly adjusted hearing aid who boasts that his supreme work, a concerto for the left hand, is written for the ears of the twenty-first century. Another character, listening with the ears of the present, finds in the concerto the sounds of a concrete mixer in vigorous action. Caricature? Perhaps. But a news report of the Festival of Contemporary Music in Donaueschingen, Germany, described the performance of a work by a French "twelve tonist," Pierre Boulez, as "too

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much, even for a largely professional audience. One outraged woman blew a police whistle during the pause between the first and second movements. It was a nice clear sound."

One result of the current cacophonous idiom in music is the appearance of a breach between the composer and the musical public that is unparalleled in more than two centuries of the history of music. It is ironical that just when the composer is coddled as never before with awards, subventions, and all kinds of support, both public and private, he should have the least to say that is inspiring or significant to his lay audience.

A letter from a friend in Washington illustrates the gulf between the high priests of the esoteric cult of modern music and a very considerable body of concertgoers. Enclosed in the letter was an enthusiastic description by a Washington music critic of a prize-winning symphony by a composer named Maurice Weed. The critic used such phrases as "directness and power of thematic material . . . the sonorities of a rich homophony . . . superb string writing . . . impressively contrived finale."

There was, however, one sour note in this glowing communiqué. The critic referred to "the strange mental block" of "some fifty people" who got up and left before this modern masterpiece was completed. My friend's letter supplied the explanation. The first note of the symphony, he said, was an ear-splitting dissonance, and it was followed by much more of the same. And he reported the number of defectors at far more than fifty.

Advocates of contemporary cacophony rely heavily on the argument that great music is invariably rejected and dispraised when it is first produced. But, although highly selective research may show some instances of critical error and public indifference, any fair survey of standard works of musical history and the biographies of the famous classical composers makes nonsense of the picture of the typical creative musical genius starving in a garret and leaving a legacy of unpublished manuscripts for future ages to discover and appreciate.

Such composers as Haydn, Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, Schumann, Chopin, Liszt, Verdi, and Berlioz were widely played and applauded during their lifetimes and were often greeted with spontaneous ovations after the performance of their works. Wagner faced more difficulties because of the scope of his operatic innovations and because of his exacting demands in staging. But such operas as *Lohengrin* and *Tannhäuser* won prompt approval. And before he died, Wagner was able to have a special opera house built according to his specifications, paid for by public subscriptions, and to see the first of the Bayreuth festivals that still commemorate his work before packed audiences. Is there a single living composer who would be likely to receive such a tribute?

Some musical reputations, high in their age, have shrunk with the passing of time, but it would be impossible to name even one great classical composer who went unnoticed and unappreciated during his lifetime. The contemporary cacophonist who dreams of a belated triumph in the twenty-first century is living in a world of unrealistic fancy. Indeed, one of the characteristics of music composed during the last generation is the absence of lasting characteristics. The "first performances" of new symphonies are almost invariably and deservedly last performances.

The musical conservative must expect to come under a heavy barrage of critical fire if he tries to make his views public. The champions of music's discordant new tone, or absence of tone, are highly articulate and full of intolerant missionary spirit, even though there are several reasons for believing that they are in a minority among lovers of music. And there is an establishment, or vested interest, of the modernist composers, of critics who acquire their reputations by rationalizing their outpourings, of conductors who are not immune to the temptation of logrolling, and of publishers interested in pushing the sales of the new works.

One frequently used argument is the application to music of the naïvely fallacious liberal dogma of perpetual progress. Whatever is new, it is contended in politics, economics, or the arts, must be better than what went before simply because it is new. This dogma should have received its death blow with the emergence, in the twentieth century, of communism and nazism, which clearly exceeded the worst tyrannies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in calculated cruelty and scientifically organized oppression. Even an elementary knowledge of the history of culture and civilization teaches that there are declining, as well as advancing, periods in human achievement.

It has also been suggested that modern music must be heard not because it is aesthetically attractive, a proposition which few—even the boldest—of its advocates would claim, but because it expresses the spirit of the age. So much the worse, one is tempted to retort, for the spirit of the age.

Finally, it is argued that modern music demands special "understanding" and the kind of strained mental concentration that would be appropriate for solving a problem in higher mathematics or following the moves in a complicated chess match. The conservative view would be that the essential purpose of music is to create beauty, to appeal to the ear, the senses, and the emotions as well as to the mind. A dry, cerebral style of composition that requires the constant use of a mental slide rule for comprehension will always remain the esoteric enjoyment of only a very small circle.

There are depths of profundity, challenging mind and soul, holding the closest attention, in the great works of classical music, in the symphonies of Beethoven and Brahms, in the operas of Wagner, the ballades and *études* of Chopin. But these works are intrinsically beautiful, apart from their historical, intellectual, and psychological implications. Music without beauty is a contradiction in terms. One might well use an Orwellian term and call it "unmusic."

It is proverbially useless to dispute about taste. Are there objective facts to support the contentions that music went into a creative tailspin after the first world war and that the music of the last forty or fifty years has, with few exceptions, failed to reach the heart and stir the imagination of the musical public? I would submit the following:

(1) Successful contributions to opera repertoire during the last forty years are so few that their complete elimination would scarcely be noticed. Where is the twentieth-century Wagner, the twentieth-century Verdi?

In further comment on the fiction of the great composer unappreciated in his own time, it is worth remembering that the first performances of many of Verdi's operas were received with almost delirious enthusiasm, with a throng of his admirers carrying him in triumph to his hotel in Milan after the production of *Otello* and a plaque marking the occasion of a similar demonstration in Rome after the *première* of *Falstaff*. Are there any records of similar demonstrations for Stravinsky and Britten after the productions of *Rake's Progress* and *Peter Grimes*? And is not the conspicuous failure of modern operas to win public favor due mainly to one obvious cause: the impossibility of singing effectively to an orchestra accompaniment of braying discords?

(2) A New York radio station specializing in music broadcasts polled some two thousand listeners on their favorite composers. Beethoven was first, followed in order by Mozart, Bach, Brahms, and Tchaikovsky. Need more be said?

(3) A famous American orchestra which annually inflicts a heavy dose of cacophony on its captive subscription audience regularly falls back on Beethoven and Brahms when it gives its annual pension-fund concert. On this occasion, it shows no inclination to rely on the box-office appeal of Hindemith, Honegger, or Stravinsky.

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(4) Two conductors of the ripest musicianship, Bruno Walter and the late Arturo Toscanini, conspicuously omitted "twelve-tone" compositions from their concerts and thereby won the heartfelt blessings of musical conservatives in their large radio and record audiences. And Pablo Casals, one of the outstanding violoncellists of all time, was quoted in an AP dispatch from Zürich as saying: "There is nothing sincere about modern music. . . . Nobody loves it. It completely lacks all conviction."

It is not likely that in the nineteenth century, so fecund in great music, any famous conductor or artist would have felt justified in rejecting the new music of that era so unreservedly. In half a dozen recitals by such eminent pianists as Artur Rubinstein, Wilhelm Backhaus, and Myra Hess during a recent typical season in Boston, at least 90 per cent of the music presented on their programs was composed before 1900. Evidently, in the judgment of these outstanding artists, there are very few twentieth-century compositions worth playing. And where, in this field of composition for the piano, is there a contemporary Chopin, Beethoven, Schumann, Brahms, or Liszt?

No reasonable person would suggest that composers of the "every chord a discord" school should, in a free country, be enjoined, inhibited, or otherwise restrained from writing as they please. But along with this natural right of the composer to free expression, there is an equal natural right of the concertgoer to some choice of what he wants to hear. This second right is denied and trampled on by the zealous missionaries of cacophony when they make it impossible, or at least very difficult, to hear classical works without a strident infusion of the modern.

Music is in a different category from painting, sculpture, and literature. If one is allergic to paintings that are equally unintelligible, however they may be hung, and to literary experiments that equate obscurity and obscenity with genius, one can leave these things alone. It is not necessary to view the more eccentric efforts of Salvador Dali as the price of seeing the works of Michelangelo and Rembrandt. Nor is there any compulsion to read *Finnegan's Wake* and *The Naked and the Dead* as prerequisites for reading *War and Peace* and *The Brothers Karamazov*. But this sort of compulsion *does* operate in music. There is usually only one first-rate orchestra in a large city. The musical conservative has the choice of attending its concerts, which are usually available only by subscription for the entire season, or of staying at home with record and radio performances. And it is standing practice with programmers to give the cacophonous novelty the middle spot, with classical works as protective flankers at the beginning and the end. Henry Pleasants exposes this indoctrination trick with his usual pungent acumen. Quoting Honegger, curiously enough, to the effect that the contemporary composer is a gate-crasher, Mr. Pleasants says:

"The familiar spectacle of the contemporary work sandwiched between Beethoven and Brahms exposes the gate-crasher in full silhouette, sneaking into the concert hall under the coattails of the elect. It also shows the conductor's part in the conspiracy. There is Beethoven on one side to make sure that the audience comes in. There is Brahms on the other side to make sure that it does not get out until the gate-crasher has been heard."[3]

That this is not an exaggeration but an accurate description of the nature of concert programs is clear from three typical programs played by the Boston Symphony Orchestra:

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| Respighi | *Old Dances* |
| Petrassi | *Concerto for Orchestra*<br>[highly cacophonous] |
| Mendelssohn | *Italian Symphony* |

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| Brahms | *Tragic Overture* |
| Piston | *Sixth Symphony* |
| Beethoven | *Violin Concerto* |

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| Beethoven | *Fidelio Overture* |
| Honegger | *Sixth Symphony* |
| Tchaikovsky | *Fourth Symphony* |

For the musical conservative, the jangling effect on the nerves of being compelled to listen to an outburst of noisy dissonance between two classical works is almost indescribable. A proposal to reconcile the right of the modern composer to be heard with the right of conservatives in an adult audience to avoid forced feeding with uncongenial music was put forward in a discussion of the subject in the letter columns of the Boston newspapers. It was suggested that dissonant modern works, as many as the conductor's judgment demanded, should be played exclusively in special, separate concerts. This would seem to be fair to all concerned. The cacophonous composers would get their hearing. Those who genuinely enjoy such musical forms or wish to understand them would get their fill at the special concerts. Those who find modern music decadent and alien to the great musical tradition could exercise their natural right of rejection by staying away. But this proposal found no favor with those responsible for framing the programs. Amusingly enough, some who were most insistent on the obligation to play modern music expressed unconcealed horror at the thought of being subjected to a whole evening of it.

Apostles of dissonance fear the result of letting modern music stand on its own feet and take its chance of audience reaction for the same reason that communists fear free elections. The prospective verdict in the case of new music, measured in concert attendance, would be humiliatingly unfavorable. Surely there must be some fundamental flaw in a musical style whose advocates fear the result of a test in the free market place of popular opinion and judgment.

There may be a fairer solution of this problem of coexistence with cacophony when and if musical conservatives become more organized and articulate and more insistent on their right to some choice of what they are to hear. Meanwhile, the pathetic spectacle of captive audiences, patiently sitting through many works which the majority of their members neither understand nor enjoy and responding with feeble, perfunctory applause, goes on. Cacophony remains compulsory.

The admirable debunking job which Mr. Pleasants has performed on modern music has been duplicated in the field of the visual arts by the late Wyndham Lewis, vitriolic British artist, writer, and critic. Mr. Lewis holds forth vigorously against what he considers the humbug of eccentricity in modern art. He regards current abstract painting as an empty hoax, sustained by dealers and by a gullible public mortally afraid of being considered old fashioned. (This pitiful intellectual snobbishness goes far to explain the limited amount of professed esteem which modern music has gained.) Here are examples of Mr. Lewis's well-aimed polemical thrusts:

"Extremism is not easy to define or to describe. It is a disease like foot and mouth disease, which disastrously visits, not cattle, but artists. It is a disease which appeared, for the first time, among European artists, not more than fifty years ago. . . .

"Of the six illustrations, only two . . . are designed to illustrate the terrible pictorial aberration whose idiot name Real cannot be tolerated outside of the pathological clinic [A reference to the *Réalités Nouvelles* exhibitions of Paris]. . . .

"It is a great mistake to think of the painter as free. He *could* be free, to a certain extent, but he is not. His most hare-

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brained 'experiments' are not wild and daring acts of free adventure; on the contrary, he is probably least free when most eccentric."[4]

This age is witnessing an interesting process of conservative revolt, of sharp questioning of what were once considered original views that have now become imbedded in liberal and socialist dogma. On both sides of the Atlantic, there are more and more expressions of disillusionment with welfare-state collectivism. American college students are becoming skeptical of skepticism and are seeking new values in old religious faiths. Voices like those of Mr. Pleasants and Mr. Lewis may be harbingers of an aesthetic new era, when melody will no longer be an anathema in music and when beauty of line, color, and design in the visual arts will again regain its rightful position.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

# *What Became of Isolationism?*

WHY has isolationism, the almost unquestioned basis of American foreign policy before the first world war and a resurgent faith in the interwar period, virtually disappeared today? In seeking the answer to this question, one finds some useful guideposts to the correct direction of American foreign policy in this troubled and dangerous age.

Isolationism is so often used as a term of mere abuse that it calls for fair and accurate definition. The United States has never been isolationist in the sense of wanting to ring down an Iron Curtain against contacts with the outside world. Americans have always been active in foreign trade, curious about foreign lands, hospitable to foreign visitors, and perhaps more concerned than they should have been with the opinions and reactions of these visitors. There is, as often happens, a very modern ring in the observations on this subject by the wisest, profoundest, and most observant of all these visitors, Alexis de Tocqueville:

"The Americans in their intercourse with strangers appear impatient of the smallest censure and insatiable of praise. The most slender eulogium is acceptable to them; the most exalted seldom contents them; they unceasingly harass you to extort praise, and if you resist their entreaties they fall to praising themselves. . . .

"Such is not the case with the English. An Englishman calmly enjoys the real or imaginary advantages which, in his opinion, his country possesses. If he grants nothing to other nations, neither does he solicit anything for his own. The censure of foreigners does not affect him, and their praise hardly flatters him; his position with regard to the rest of the world is one of disdainful and ignorant reserve. His pride requires no sustenance. It nourishes itself."[1]

Americans have always been quick and generous in responding to appeals to relieve the victims of famines, floods, and other natural disasters in foreign lands. The American missionary effort, in which there has been a large leaven of medical and educational work, created outposts of American religious and cultural effort in many far-off countries, including China, Japan, India, Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon.

The isolationism in which almost all Americans firmly believed in the nineteenth century was abstention from Europe's wars and from alliances and other commitments which would pledge this country to involvement in such wars. This attitude was made clear, in accents of wise and persuasive statesmanship, in Washington's *Farewell Address*:

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation.—Hence she must be engaged in frequent controveries, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.—Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected. . . .

"Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences. . . . There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. 'Tis an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard."

The *Farewell Address* and the Monroe Doctrine became the twin foundation stones of a simple American foreign policy based on two main propositions: that Europe would not interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and that the United States would not intervene in Europe. This policy was decisively breached for the first time by America's entrance into the first world war and by President Wilson's commitment to support and participate in an association of nations for the purpose of preventing future wars. The immediate occasion for the United States' declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917, was the German announcement of intention to wage unlimited submarine warfare. This was a head-on collision with the American position that such use of the new submarine weapon was in contravention of American neutrality rights.

But there were deeper reasons behind this formal pretext. American emotional sympathy, especially on the eastern seaboard, was strongly with Great Britain and France. This largely explains why the British extension of the definition of contraband and the right of blockade far beyond previous precedents excited no such protest as did the German attempt to break the blockade by submarine sinkings. Moreover, America's economy had become geared to a prosperity supported by heavy allied orders for war material.

President Wilson, tormented by doubts about the consequences of American involvement in war on the very eve of his speech asking Congress for a declaration of hostilities, sought to give this involvement the character of a crusade for freedom. He proclaimed the slogan: "Make the world safe for democracy." His Fourteen Points were conceived as the blueprint of a just peace settlement to be maintained by a new institution, the League of Nations.

Wilson had gravely underestimated the bitterness and persistence of European political antagonisms, the disruptive effect of the war-engendered doctrines of communism and fascism, and the willingness of the American people to underwrite a doubtful scheme for enforcing what was increasingly recognized as an unjust peace. The terms imposed in the Treaty of Versailles and the related settlements justified the bitter European postwar joke that Wilson deserved the Nobel Prize for mathematics because he had made fourteen equal zero. And the League of Nations displayed all the weaknesses that might have been expected in an alliance of everyone against no one. Its prestige and authority steadily declined, and it expired unobtrusively with the outbreak of the second world war, which it had proved quite helpless to avert.

The prevalent feeling in the United States after the first world war was disillusionment. There was widespread belief that the idealistic purposes of America's intervention had been frustrated. It became increasingly clear that the world had not been made safe for democracy, but ripe for violent dictatorships. In retrospect, the occasion for American involvement, insistence on the maintenance of a booming war trade with one group of belligerents, did not seem worth the human cost. Headlines like "Pittsburgh Bans Beethoven"; the solemn rechristening of sauerkraut as "Liberty Cabbage"; hysterical ministers shouting from their pulpits, "I say: GOD DAMN THE KAISER; and I'm not swearing"—these and similar by-products of the martial spirit looked sillier and sillier in the gray morning after the emotional war debauch.

Disenchantment with the fruits of a crusading war in Europe produced a large crop of anti-war novels and plays. Isolationist sentiment began a new ascendancy. The strongest

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proof of the general American conviction that intervention in the first world war had been a mistake was the neutrality legislation, passed by overwhelming Congressional majorities, of the 1930's. This legislation provided that whenever the President should certify the existence of a state of war between two foreign nations, an embargo on the sale of munitions to both should be imposed. American citizens were forbidden to travel on ships of belligerent powers. American ships were forbidden to enter war zones or to carry even nonmilitary cargoes to ports of countries at war. There was to be no repetition of the emotional storm aroused by the torpedoing, in May, 1915, of the British liner *Lusitania* (which was carrying munitions), in which many Americans lost their lives.

It is interesting, though inconclusive, to speculate on what might have happened if the Roosevelt Administration had sincerely tried to carry out the letter and spirit of the Neutrality Act and thereby make it clear that there would be no second American intervention in a European war. On this hypothesis, it is quite probable that British and French statesmen would have recognized the advisability of throwing a protective ring around western Europe and letting Hitler and Stalin fight it out for the eastern part. The second world war would have been a duel between the two barbarous dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin. Surely, if it had to come, this would have been its least obnoxious form. But at least as early as President Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech of 1937, American policy was clearly directed toward the organization of a second crusade, this time against the Axis powers. Long before Pearl Harbor, many government acts and speeches clearly pointed in this direction, despite periodic solemn assurances to the contrary.

The many investigations of the subject have not conclusively cleared up the sinister mystery of Pearl Harbor. Two highly important questions remain without satisfactory an-

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swers. Why did the President and the highest military and naval authorities behave as if they were oblivious to the danger of a Japanese surprise attack on the most obviously tempting strategic target, the United States Pacific Fleet, massed at its moorings at Pearl Harbor, although the broken Japanese cipher code gave the clearest intimations that a big, unexpected blow was in preparation following the impending breakdown of diplomatic talks in Washington? And why were the commanders on the spot, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, given such imperfect information about the rapid worsening in American-Japanese relations? Until these questions find convincing answers, the suspicion cannot be stilled that the American warships and planes in Hawaii were used, perhaps half-consciously, as sacrificial bait to lure a Japanese attack that would bring the United States into a war that was heartily unwanted by the majority of the American people.

The United States' dilemma, as a participant in the second world war, was that the conflict could not be won, at least in Europe, without the aid of the Soviet Union. But just as certainly, it could not be won morally and politically with the Soviet Union as an ally. It is possible that a cool-headed, realistic statesman in the White House, even after America's involvement in the war, could have steered a more hopeful course than the one which was actually followed. Such a statesman, inspired by a healthy distrust of Stalin's future intentions and intent on keeping Soviet power out of central Europe, would have tapered off aid to the Soviet Union after the Battle of Stalingrad. He would have set as an ultimate goal a reasonable negotiated peace with a Germany under non-Nazi leadership, composed of men of the type who perished in the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler and whose survivors are prominently represented in the present government of the German Federal Republic.

Such a statesman would have aimed at similar political results in Japan, making every effort to drive a wedge between the fanatical militarists and the reasonable groups in Japan, forcing Japan to withdraw from territory seized by force after 1937, but never forgetting that Japan might be useful in the future as a check on Soviet and Chinese communism.

Sober considerations of this kind seem to have exercised no influence on the Roosevelt Administration. Some political wartime decisions, the "Unconditional Surrender" slogan and the endorsement of the "goat pasture" Morgenthau Plan (largely the handiwork of Harry Dexter White, repeatedly identified as a communist agent), seemed almost deliberately designed to create a sense of solidarity between the German people and their Nazi rulers. The progressive offering up of Poland's territorial integrity and political independence on the altar of appeasement, a disgraceful sacrifice that was finally consummated at Yalta, reflected not only an obtuse disregard for moral values but also a complete absence of foresight of the consequences of a Soviet expansion far beyond the ethnic limits of the Soviet Union.

What, indeed, could be expected from an Administration that told Adolf Berle to "jump in the lake" when he reported the revelations of Whittaker Chambers about communist infiltration into government service, that allowed Soviet spy rings to function without let or hindrance, that regarded anyone who thought, spoke, or heard evil of Soviet communism as a suspected "fascist," even if the critic had a long career of devotion to human liberty and opposition to totalitarianism of all kinds?

Isolationism, or nonintervention, as urged in 1940 and 1941 by Americans of high patriotism, like Charles A. Lindbergh and General Robert E. Wood, was a reasonable and feasible policy recommendation with respect to the state of the world at that time. Indeed, in retrospect, a "Kilkenny cats' fight" of the dictatorships in Europe, with Hitler's military energies swallowed up in the struggle with Stalin's tyranny, seems a promising alternative to what actually happened.

With respect to the Far East, it is hard to conceive how a more dangerous and difficult situation than the present one could have come about if the United States had stood aside and let the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese communists, and the Soviet Union contend until a more or less permanent balance of strength was established. There is the word of such high authorities as President Roosevelt and his Secretary of Defense, Henry L. Stimson, that America's war in the Orient was fought in behalf of China. There is an element of truly fantastic futility about the spectacle of a bitter, bloody conflict fought to "save" a country which soon passed under the control of our most implacable enemies and which was the principal belligerent in another war against the United States only five years after the surrender of Japan.

The gap between promise and performance after the second world war was far greater than after the first. Nothing in the Treaty of Versailles, harsh and unjust as it was, could be fairly compared, in terms of cruelty and social dislocation, with the driving of many millions of people from their homes which accompanied the establishment of communist rule over Europe east of the Elbe. There were no such outrageous injustices in 1919 as the transformation of Königsberg into Kaliningrad, of Breslau into Wroclaw, the taking away from Poland of such old centers of historic Polish culture as Lwów and Wilno, or the assignment to Poland of big territories in East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, which had been ethnically German for centuries.

The four freedoms became four fictions for one-third of the population of the world as communism conquered vast new realism in China and adjacent lands in Asia. The Atlantic Charter, the closest equivalent to Wilson's Fourteen Points, emphasized the right of all peoples to self-determination, freedom in trade relations, and disarmament. But the postwar settlement, a negation of the principle of self-determinaton, created everywhere a lively and justified sense of insecurity and laid on the world a much heavier burden of permanent armament. The darkest predictions of isolationist critics of Roosevelt's foreign policy fell short of the mark as regards some aspects of the postwar world.

Taxes of unprecedented severity in time of peace have caused popular grumbling and justified economic concern, but Congress has consistently voted military and economic aid with large bipartisan majorities. Had President Truman met the Chinese communist challenge in Korea head on and applied General MacArthur's prescription for military victory, the American people would have backed him to the limit. What irked most Americans about the war in Korea was not the armed resistance to communist aggression. It was the half-hearted nature of this resistance, the undue deference to the qualms and fears of lukewarm allies and to Nehru's defeatist, back-seat driving, the sense that our armed forces were being compelled to fight with the crippling handicap of a man with one hand tied behind his back.

At the present time, the United States, apart from its vague obligations under the UN Charter, is specifically committed to help defend against aggression an enormous arc around Europe and Asia, from Norway to Turkey, Japan, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries in Asia. The acceptance of such far-reaching responsibilities would have seemed incredible before the first world war or during the inter-war period. Yet this vast expansion of United States military commitments has been accepted with little opposition or criticism. The isolation from foreign conflicts which was taken for granted before 1914, which seemed most attractive in the thirties, which created, until Pearl Harbor, strong opposition to President Roosevelt's successive steps toward war, is almost dead.

Is this an example of national folly, the result of some kind of collective brainwashing, as the few surviving advocates of isolationism maintain? Is it the continued pursuit, despite the harsh lessons of experience, of ideals that are Utopian, or at least unrealizable by military force, such as making the world safe for democracy or making over foreign lands in the image of America or achieving perpetual peace by perpetual war or extirpating sin in international relations?

I think that the answers to these questions are in the negative. And I write as an unreconstructed opponent of the crusading philosophy with which Wilson and Roosevelt sought to justify American participation in the two great wars of the century. But the shape of the world in which we live has changed drastically since 1917 and since 1939. Choices which could have been made in those years are no longer open to us.

The danger to the United States from a draw or even from a German victory in the first world war was vague and debatable. Wilson was right when, before America entered the hostilities, he praised the idea of "peace without victory." It is a sobering reflection that such a peace, could it have been realized in 1916 or 1917, would most probably have averted two of the greatest blows ever sustained by Western civilization: the victories of communism in Russia and national socialism in Germany, with their fearful toll of human suffering. It has already been pointed out that there were promising alternatives to the interventionist course of the Roosevelt Administration and its obsession with total victory, even at the price of turning over large areas of Europe and Asia to communism.

But there was no alternative, compatible with the security of the United States, to taking up the challenge of communist imperialist expansion at the end of the second world war. After this ordeal by combat, only the United States and the Soviet Union had reached the finals as world powers. The former balance of power, which depended on a more or less equal diffusion of national strength among a number of states, had ceased to exist.

The wartime policies of the Roosevelt Administration,

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which contributed so much to creating a monstrous imbalance of power in Europe and in Asia, deserve the strongest condemnation. This power vacuum, which the Soviet Union was certain to fill, thereby building up the greatest world empire in history unless the United States interposed its own strength, could not be wished out of existence merely by assigning blame to such figures as Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss, and Harry Dexter White. Positive action along many lines was urgently required, not for any crusading aim, but for elementary needs of American defense in an age when nuclear weapons and supersonic planes and missiles had largely nullified the protection of America's ocean barriers. Among the requirements of this positive action were the building up of America's own defenses, the creation of a network of alliances in Europe and Asia, and the establishment of a globe-girdling system of air bases and, later, missile sites.

A question may fairly be posed to those who "point with alarm" to America's present situation as foreshadowing a garrison state, an American empire, a militarized economy. What would life in these United States be like at this moment if there had been no American attempt to block the course of Soviet expansion? Suppose that western Europe had gone the way of eastern Europe, that Korea and other outposts in Asia had been allowed to fall. We should then face a gigantic totalitarian empire on both of our ocean frontiers. Our pattern of trade and our assured supply of raw materials would be completely disrupted.

Is it not overwhelmingly probable that in such a situation the present dangers and burdens would be multiplied tenfold, that the demands on our manpower would be crushing (after all, less than one in sixteen inhabitants of the world is an American), that we should experience, for sheer national survival, a measure of militarization and state control of industry and regimentation of civilian life never known before, even in time of war? The world, as a result of the fantastic pace of scientific advance, has become too small a place for a country like the United States to hide in. The enormous and increasing range and power of modern weapons make fanciful the idea of a successful retreat into a defensive shell, political, military, or economic.

Neither isolationism nor interventionism is a rational goal in itself. At different times and under changing circumstances, each may be desirable as most serviceable to the interests of the United States. When the United States was a young republic, well protected by distance and expanse of ocean, isolationism from the feuds of Europe was a highly sound and sensible policy. But "isolation from Europe" today would mean turning over Europe, with its large, trained population, its rich heritage of Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman civilization, and its potent industrial resources, to the domination of the new barbarians from the East.

We have almost certainly seen the last war between European nations. If positive progress toward unity among the non-communist nations of Europe is slow and halting, these nations have, at long last, reached the conclusion that they are too weak to afford the luxury of fighting each other. There is no danger that America will find itself caught in the middle of a war between France and Germany or between Italy and Austria, for such wars are no longer within the range of political possibility.

We were unconsciously preparing a Pandora's Box of future troubles when we departed from isolationist principles by taking over colonial rule in the Philippines after the war with Spain. It is still arguable that isolationism would have served us better than the course which was actually followed, with disillusioning results in both cases, in the first and second world wars. But isolationism, with its flat rejection of foreign alliances and overseas commitments, is neither a safe nor a practicable policy for the United States now, when the communist empire weighs so heavily on the scales of world power that only the full deployment of the strength of the United States can maintain a precarious balance. To advocate isolationism today is, however unwillingly and unconsciously, to aid the communist grand design of world domination.

To reject isolationism as a policy unsuited to the circumstances of our time is not to endorse a vague and sentimental internationalism. All schemes of world government are unreal fantasies. There is no warrant for submitting American vital interests to chance ballots in that Tower of Babel, the misnamed United Nations. We shall do well to stop our ears against the siren voices that would try to persuade us that we will somehow enhance our safety by giving away large chunks of our national substance to uncommitted and often unfriendly neutrals. There should be little question about the relative priorities to be assigned to an air force and missile development program second to none and lavish handouts to such countries as India and Indonesia.

The beacon light for our foreign policy should be neither an obsolete isolationism nor a Utopian internationalism. It should be intelligent American nationalism, willing to cooperate on a basis of mutual interest with foreign powers that are going our way in their policies, able to distinguish, with appropriate discrimination, between friends and allies, neutrals, and enemies. It is this kind of straightforward nationalist policy that is best calculated to win confidence and respect and to bring America through the perils and pitfalls of this uncertain age without disaster.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# *The United Nations: Emblem of Futility*

No EDIFICE can be stronger than its foundation. Because the United Nations was built on a faulty foundation of false assumptions, a record of cumulative failure, leading up to downright impotence, was clearly indicated from the beginning.

The UN, as anyone may quickly learn by reading its Charter, was committed to the proposition that five victor powers (two of these, France and China, belonging in this category only by courtesy) in the second world war would remain allies in war, able to dominate and police the world. Many provisions of the Charter are quite meaningless on any other basis.

For instance, very extensive powers are vested in the Security Council, composed of the five victor powers as permanent members and four others chosen on a basis of rotation. Each of the permanent members possesses the right of veto, so that the Security Council, conceived as the executive organ for maintaining peace, cannot act unless the Big Five are in agreement.

Under the Charter, only the Security Council can act. The functions of the General Assembly, where each member has one vote and there is no right of veto, are restricted to talk. Article 24 of the Charter states that the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Article 12 provides that the General Assembly shall make no recommendations in regard to a dispute or situation with which the Security Council is dealing unless "the Security Council so requests."

Article 6 states: "A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly *upon the recommendation of the Security Council*."[1] What this means is that any permanent member of the Security Council and any minor nation which enjoys the favor of a permanent member may commit international assault and battery with complete immunity, as far as action by the UN is concerned, since a unanimous decision of the Security Council is a prerequisite for the expulsion of an offending member.

Article 108 provides that the UN Charter may be amended by a vote of two-thirds of the members, "including all the permanent members of the Security Council." So every permanent member may not only commit aggression with immunity but may also block any change in the Charter.

Article 47 describes in detail the functions assigned to the Military Staff Committee, designed to act as the strong right arm of the Security Council for enforcing its decisions. This Article may look impressive on paper, but, not surprisingly, it has been a dead letter in practice. It would require a considerable stretch of the imagination to conceive that American, British, and Soviet representatives would co-operate harmoniously in this phantom Military Staff Committee, or anywhere else for that matter.

It is clear, then, that the United Nations cannot function as a live organism unless the five charter members are in full agreement on all essential issues. The Security Council, especially, with each permanent member able to exercise the veto, is as helpless as a paralyzed limb in the face of serious and prolonged disagreements among the Big Five.

It should not have required much knowledge of history to foresee that a wartime coalition would most probably disintegrate rapidly as soon as the enemy that brought the coalition into being had been defeated. Nor should it have required much perspicacity to anticipate that the Soviet Union, which had broken a long list of non-aggression treaties with smaller neighbors and had concluded a brutal and cynical deal with Hitler for the division of the independent states of eastern Europe, would not be bound by paper promises.

The cold war which began between the communist empire and the nations opposed to communism soon made a mockery of the basic assumption of the Charter: co-operation and agreement among the Big Five. The United Nations became the Divided Nations. Its Charter bears no more relation to current international realities than Plato's *Republic* or Thomas More's *Utopia.*

Most important of these realities is the enormous expansion of communist imperialism. Before the second world war, Stalin announced as a principle of Soviet foreign policy: We shall not yield an inch of our own soil. We do not want a foot of foreign soil. The Soviet dictator did not say: We do not want a foot of foreign soil—except Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, half of Poland, big slices of Finland and Romania, eastern Czechoslovakia, the Kurile Islands, and South Sakhalin, plus a political strangle hold on Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, and a large part of Germany.

This is the record of Soviet expansion before and during and after the war. The United Nations, with the Soviet Union exercising its veto almost a hundred times and its members hopelessly divided among themselves, was quite unable to check this upsurge of imperialist aggression. Indeed, a fair analogy for the situation in the Security Council would be a city police department in which the most notorious local gangster possessed a seat, with an unlimited veto on law enforcement. In such a case there would be no occasion for surprise if the crime statistics should rise appreciably.

Former Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson attempted to alter the UN constitution in such a way as to make it more effective in the setting of the cold war. Under his persuasion, the General Assembly, in November, 1950, passed the Uniting for Peace resolution. This conferred on the Assembly the right to offer recommendations, including the use of force, should the Security Council be prevented from taking action to maintain international peace by the exercise of the veto.

The practical utility of this step is doubtful for two reasons. First, the legality of the resolution is questionable because it introduces an important change in UN procedure. Article 108 stipulates that the Charter may only be amended by the agreement of all permanent members of the Security Council. Second, and perhaps more important, it seems highly improbable, in view of what happened in Korea, that there would be any wholehearted rally of the UN members, with weapons in their hands, to the banner of collective security if there should be a second crisis of the Korean type.

It seems illogical and unconvincing to try to represent NATO, SEATO, and other alliances directed against communist aggression as consistent with the UN Charter. Mr. Acheson and others who have made this attempt cite Article 51 of the Charter:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

There is also Article 52, which authorizes "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action." But Article 51 also specifies that "measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council." And Article 54 provides that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Is it not ridiculous to imagine General Lauris Norstad, present commander of the NATO forces, reporting his secret plans to the Soviet delegate in the Security Council? Indeed, the only idea that could be more absurd is that of the Soviet Union communicating to the Security Council the latest military plans drawn up at a conference with the eastern European satellite states. It would seem more honest and forthright for the United States Government to affirm that NATO, SEATO, and similar anti-communist alliances are the logical and inevitable result of the proved unworkability of the UN setup than for it to twist facts and logic in an attempt to prove that such alliances are compatible with the wording of the Charter.

From an organization set up on the faulty foundation of a false assumption, nothing but futility and failure could be expected, and this is an accurate characterization of the record of the United Nations. From Kashmir to Hungary, from Korea to Palestine, the United Nations has proved unable to justify the hopes of its advocates by sponsoring and carrying through settlements based on justice and likely to promote permanent peace. In the next few paragraphs are a few conspicuous examples of this futility and failure.

Long before the outbreak of war in Korea, the United Nations set up a commission to prepare the way for holding a free election in a united Korea. The communist regime in control of North Korea, at Soviet dictation, never admitted this commission within its borders. It was the same story in the case of another commission which the UN appointed in the postwar years to look into the threat to peace resulting from the support of Greek communist insurgents by the neighboring communist states of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. These states, with Soviet backing, simply thumbed their noses at the UN commission. Peace was finally restored to Greece, partly by military action and partly because Tito deserted, or was expelled from, the Moscow camp and discontinued his aid to the Greek guerrillas.

Kashmir would have been an excellent subject for UN mediation and adjudication. It is an area in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent, where a predominantly Moslem people was under the rule of a Hindu prince. When the British quit India and the two states of India and Pakistan were set up, there was a dispute concerning the allegiance of the people of Pakistan. A free plebiscite under UN auspices would seem to offer the fairest solution, and it is certainly the one which Prime Minister Nehru of India, the self-righteous critic of imperialism, power politics, and "East-West blocs" would have recommended—if he had not been personally interested in the outcome. But Nehru, in this case, has acted like the toughest old imperialist. Indian troops occupied the richest part of Kashmir; advocates of a plebiscite were jailed, and all the efforts of the UN commission, which has been in existence for years to arrange a free vote, have been in vain.

Palestine was another item in the record of failure. The UN decreed the creation of Jewish and Arab states in this former British mandated territory but drew boundaries so irregular and indefensible that the two states could only have existed on a basis of close economic co-operation, which was not forthcoming. The Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab states refused to accept this UN decision and tried to wipe out Israel, the Jewish state, by force of arms.

Israel was successful in the military operations, and the armistice line, which was drawn when fighting ceased in 1949, was more favorable to Israel than the UN boundary. The United Nations was unable either to stop the original Arab attack or to enforce respect for the original boundary recommendation or to bring about peace instead of the present sullen and precarious armistice.

Korea, sometimes claimed as a victory for the UN in resisting aggression, has actually been the greatest failure of all. The conflict there from 1950 to 1953 may have been formally a UN war, but in practice it was a South Korean-U. S. fight. At the cost of 140,000 casualties, the American people learned, or should have learned, that the United Nations is a shield of papier-mâché, that the theory of collective security, of all the members of the UN forming a posse to catch the criminal whenever aggression has been committed, is a pitiful and dangerous illusion.

There can be no doubt that the UN powers which voted in favor of resisting Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea possessed enough manpower and military resources to have crushed this aggression and warned off both the Soviet Union and Red China from new adventures. The point was that they did not choose to use this manpower and these resources. Without the United States, South Korea would certainly have been overrun.

A minority of UN members sent token military units to fight in Korea. These units rendered excellent service in most cases, but their numbers were too small to affect the result seriously. And the value of these contributions was offset by the defeatist, back-seat driving of many UN states. Prime Minister Nehru of India, head of a country of some 300 million people, could not spare one soldier for the UN expeditionary force. He did send an ambulance unit and some jute bags and was prodigal of advice, pointed, of course, in the direction of giving the communists all, or most, of what they wanted.

Pressure from Great Britain and France was an important, if not decisive, factor in preventing the United States from using its immense superiority in atomic weapons and in air and naval power to win the war, once we had become involved. It is the opinion of two distinguished military authorities, commanders for a time in the Korean War, that victory could have been won if their hands had not been tied by restrictions on bombing enemy bases in Manchuria and strategic targets in China, by the failure to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea or in diversionary attacks on the Chinese mainland, and by other inhibitions which would not have prevailed if the United States had been fighting a national war with the simple objective of defeating the enemy.

The Korean war was probably the most unpopular conflict in American history, and for good reason. The mistake was not in fighting but in failing to fight systematically for victory. The moral of the Korean story should be: *No more UN wars.* One cannot imagine an agency less suited to conduct a war than this confused Tower of Babel, with its communist bloc and its large and growing bloc of neutralists. It would be criminal negligence, after the lesson in Korea, to stake American lives again on a UN "police action" in which most of the police can be relied on to scuttle for cover or to remain, hands in pockets, on the sidelines.

If we must fight, let it be for some plain issue of national security or in implementation of a clearly defined treaty of alliance obligation. The idea that the United States should resort to arms only if the United Nations has established that an act of aggression has been committed is fraught with grave risk in this age of split-second warfare. A nuclear offensive might be over before the last speaker from Burma or Ghana or Indonesia had been heard on what should be done about it.

Hungary afforded further proof of the physical and moral impotence of the United Nations. The Soviet intervention in Hungary has often been interpreted as a move to suppress a rebellion against communist rule in that country. This would have been bad enough, but what actually happened was much worse. For it was the legitimate government of Hungary, even by communist standards of legitimacy, that was the victim of the intervention. This government was headed by a veteran communist, Imre Nagy, who had been so caught up by the nation-wide movement for freedom and national independence that he came out, in a communication to the United Nations, for the removal of Soviet troops and the granting to Hungary of a neutral international status.

The Kadar regime that is now ruling Hungary was an afterthought, a puppet creation of the Soviet occupation authorities. Its sole title to be considered the government of Hungary was provided by Soviet tanks and bayonets. It would seem that the least the United Nations, in self-respect, should have done in the face of this provocation was to refuse to recognize the credentials of the Kadar regime, to declare the Hungarian seat in the UN vacant until a government plausibly representative of the Hungarian people was in existence. It would also have been a suitable gesture if all representatives of the free nations had walked out of UN deliberations when the Soviet representative or the Hungarian puppet regime spokesman tried to defend the destruction of Hungary's short-lived freedom with what, to recall the words of Cordell Hull to the Japanese envoys at the time of Pearl Harbor, were "infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

But strong moral gestures of this kind were avoided. The condemnatory resolutions voted against the Soviet action and the excellent factual report put out under UN auspices were better than nothing. The example of Hungary showed that the moral influence of the United Nations is much less than some optimists hope. It would be difficult to imagine a more flagrant violation of UN principles, but the assassination of Hungarian freedom was carried out with impunity, and the

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UN was not even allowed to send an observer to the obsequies.

It is important to emphasize the helplessness of the United Nations, as an institution, to deal with any serious crisis because well-meaning people in the United States and elsewhere, turning their eyes away from the hard realities, persist in urging that the UN be strengthened and that the United States, instead of boldly and straightforwardly shaping its own policy in the light of its sense of justice and its national interests, leave all the difficult decisions to the UN.

Only recently an American of considerable experience in public service suggested that the defense of Formosa should be made a UN responsibility. A better prescription for risking a new Korean-type war in the Orient could hardly be imagined. Red China has a healthy respect for U.S. military power. When, as is now the case, this military power is clearly committed to the defense of Formosa in the event of attack, there is little danger that an attack will take place. To dilute or diffuse this responsibility by turning it over to the UN would be an invitation to aggression.

Some groups, obsessed with the supposed dangers of nuclear-arms tests, would place on the frail shoulders of the UN the awesome burden of supervising international nuclear disarmament. That way lies, at best, futility; at worst, disaster. And there are unteachable doctrinaires who continue to parrot the slogan "Settle international differences by enforceable world law." As if there were any common accepted propositions in law and morals between the communist and the non-communist world or any supranational power capable of enforcing a legal verdict between nations, even if there were any recognized legal authority capable of handing down such verdicts!

The United Nations, on its own power, has accomplished nothing that would not have come about, in all probability, as a result of the balance of power among its members. The dispatch of an "emergency police force" to Egypt during the

Suez crisis was possible not because of any sudden general respect for UN authority but because the clash of power interests had reached an uneasy stalemate.

How impotent the United Nations really is against international wrongdoing when it has only moral force to rely on has been tragically revealed by the fate of Hungary. Here the issue of right against wrong, of freedom against slavery, was infinitely clearer than it was in the tangled, complex outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East which coincided in time with the Hungarian stroke for freedom.

Suppose that the United States in 1950 had not chosen to commit its military power to the defense of Korea? Can it be seriously suggested that UN resolutions, however strong in law and morals, however eloquently phrased, would have saved Korea from the fate of Hungary? The United States found it possible to intervene in Korea and did not find it possible to intervene in Hungary. That fact alone explains why the UN received some misdirected credit for "checking aggression" in Korea and revealed its full impotence in Hungary.

Or consider a threat to peace that seemed acute for a few days at the time of the Suez crisis, that could conceivably be revived if the political atmosphere in the Middle East should heat up to the boiling point. This is the threatened intrusion into the Middle East of Soviet military units, unconvincingly camouflaged as "volunteers."

No matter how many resolutions against this practice the United Nations might have passed, Soviet conduct, judging from all precedents, would not have been affected in the slightest degree, as long as there was no suggestion of action. A hint from President Eisenhower that the United States would take action was a far more impressive deterrent than any appeal from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold. The Soviet leaders are tough, cold-blooded realists. They respect the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean far more than the votes of such estimable but militarily helpless nations as Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Uruguay, and Iceland.

So, when really big and fateful decisions must be made, the UN cannot serve as an excuse or an escape from the necessity of making U.S. decisions. The President and Congress cannot abdicate their sole responsibilities to any international organization. In certain critical situations, it is a mere play with words to say, "Let the UN decide," because what the UN decides, in such situations, depends mainly on what the United States is able and willing to do.

It is also worth remembering that the make-up of the United Nations has changed profoundly since Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State, obtained the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution authorizing General Assembly action to maintain peace in the event of a Security Council deadlock. A two-thirds majority for the American viewpoint was reasonably certain in the sixty-nation UN of that time, but this is no longer true with its present membership of eighty-two nations because most of the newcomers belong to the neutralist Afro-Asian, or Bandung[2], bloc. The French Ambassador to the United States, M. Hervé Alphand, made a point distinctly worth noting when he said, in a speech at the time of the Suez dispute:

"No country can safely imagine the UN in its present state as the only way of determining and implementing international law. Because, if you go to the Security Council, you are faced with the Soviet veto. If you go to the Assembly, you could be defeated by the Soviet bloc and the Bandung group. No country could accept that in all cases its foreign policy should be dictated by the Soviet veto or the Bandung group."

And one need not be an alarmist to imagine circumstances in which the United States could not count on a two-thirds majority in the Assembly for action which might be vital to our security. Suppose, for instance, that the issue of Soviet "volunteers" for military action in the Middle East should come alive again or that fighting should break out in the area of the Formosa Strait and we should feel obliged to implement our defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government. In both of these cases, a Soviet veto would certainly block action in the Security Council, and there would be no assurance of the necessary majority in the General Assembly.

If vital American interests were involved, this country should be no more willing than was France in Suez or Algeria to leave decisions to a straw vote of some eighty-two nations, in which the Soviet bloc and the Bandung powers, plus a few other nations which might be disgruntled with us for some reason, might cast an adverse vote. However attractive such a course might seem in theory, in practice the United States could not afford to toss its sovereign right to determine its own foreign policy into a UN melting pot.

Some support for the UN is based on the comfortable feeling that even if this organization has accomplished little, it is a step in the right direction and can do no harm. This contention deserves careful examination. There is reason to believe that the existence of the United Nations has been harmful to the best interests of American foreign policy on at least five counts.

First, the setup of the UN almost forces the United States to take sides on issues like Suez and Algeria, where silence would have served our interests and expressed our feelings better.

Second, the United States in the UN is in a minority of "haves" surrounded by a majority of "have nots." The Economic and Social Council of the UN has been a prolific hatching ground for schemes designed to transfer American wealth, on one pretext or another, to "underprivileged" nations. On one occasion, the United States representative was in a minority of one in standing for the principle that private property should not be confiscated without adequate compensation. Should a Left Wing Administration come into power in Washington, the UN would be the logical agency for working out international "share the wealth" schemes.

Third, the tone and substance of resolutions to which the United States, as a member of the UN, is invited to subscribe are often at variance with the principles of the United States Constitution. Basic human liberties, such as freedom of religion, speech, and press, are treated in the UN Covenant on Human Rights as subject to government grant, limitation, or abrogation. The historical American view is that these are natural rights of men under God which no government may rightfully deny. The difference is important.

Fourth, the UN arouses hopes that cannot be realized, creates an illusion of security, and provides an excuse for dodging and postponing hard but often imperative independent decisions in foreign policy.

Fifth, the UN, with its obsolete and unrealistic Charter, is an incongruous anomaly in this age of the cold war. Its very name is a conspicuous misnomer. Its eighty-two member states, far from being "united," are deeply divided by issues of morals, politics, economics, and national interests. Apart from the fundamental cleavage between the communist empire and the nations which are consciously anti-communist, there are many bitter and divisive quarrels over issues growing out of the replacement of the old colonial order by new independent states, often precarious in their political and economic balance, and territorial disputes, of which conspicuous examples are represented by the names Israel, Cyprus, and Kashmir.

Can the United Nations stop war? Obviously, it cannot. For, even when it can agree on a decision, it lacks both the physical force and the universally respected moral authority to make this decision respected.

Can it help to remove causes of war by handing down judgments which would remove the causes of conflict? It cannot. Experience has shown that even small and weak peoples, to say nothing of a military colossus like the Soviet Union, do not accept these judgments as binding.

Can it serve as a forum of discussion? Yes. But it is very questionable whether discussion in the UN shapes the course of events to any appreciable degree. It would be hard to prove that Soviet policies of aggression and subversion have been affected by criticism in the UN. And political settlements are not, as a rule, advanced by public debates, where each side is under a psychological impulse to make its own position as stiff and uncompromising as possible. If any negotiated settlement of big East-West issues is possible (and this seems very doubtful), it is most likely to come out of the processes of the much abused, old-fashioned secret diplomacy, where negotiators can lay their cards on the table, unhampered by klieg lights of publicity and the necessity to strike militant poses.

Doctrinaire internationalists lament the "bypassing" of the UN, which was rather conspicuously left out of many of the big postwar political decisions—the creation of NATO and the Marshall Plan, the cessation of the wars in Korea and Indochina, and the arrangement of German military co-operation with the West, for instance—but it is really history that has been bypassing the UN, organized, as it was, on so many erroneous premises: that the Soviet Union would be a co-operative partner in maintaining world peace, that France could be considered a great power, that the nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek would continue to dominate China.

It is not practical politics to advocate the withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations. We should use its facilities, like those of any forum, in order to present our case for the judgment of the peoples of the world. But there should be clear recognition of the very sharp limitations on what the UN can be expected to accomplish and a watchful eye for those fields in which its activity may even be harmful to America. It is time for Americans to wake up from a dream world and stop playing "Let's Pretend," to face international realities as they are, not as we might like them to be.

Our security depends first on our own strength, second on alliances with nations which are sincerely committed to the cause of resisting and, if possible, rolling back the tide of Soviet and Red Chinese aggression. UN resolutions, behind which there is no force and authority, contribute nothing to this security. UN can never replace U.S. in the hope and loyalty of Americans or as a shield of American defense.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# *"No War, No Peace"*

FACED with German annexationist demands and with no military power at his back, the first Soviet foreign minister, Leon Trotsky, broke off peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk with the original formula: "No war, no peace." Trotsky recognized that with the Russian army in complete demoralization, not least through the efforts of the Bolshevik agitators themselves, it was impossible to go on fighting. It was Lenin who said at this time: "The Army voted for peace with its legs. It ran away."

Trotsky felt that it would be dishonorable for the new revolutionary government to accept German demands without appealing to the supposed solidarity of the German and Austrian workers and soldiers. The refusal to sign an unjust peace was supposed to be a spark tossed into a powder keg of unrest and discontent. The spark failed to ignite the powder. The German troops, as Lenin, with his colder realism, had foreseen, marched as ordered. The Soviet Government finally had to sign even harsher terms than those which Trotsky rejected. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which detached from Russia the rich food-producing area of the Ukraine, might have tolled the knell of the Soviet Republic if it had not been for a piece of sheer good luck. This was the military collapse of Germany a few months after the treaty had been signed.

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For different reasons and in different circumstances, the "No war, no peace" formula seems likely to govern Soviet-Western relations for a future of indefinite duration. Despite the continued tension in many parts of the world and the many injustices of the existing provisional settlement, the odds seem to be against a big war. Such a war would almost certainly involve the use of weapons so indiscriminately destructive that neither side could count on reaping any genuine harvest of victory. Such a war could be expected to create far more difficult problems than those which caused its outbreak. It could, conceivably, permanently reverse the trend, at least in the more industrialized and economically developed parts of the world, toward steadily rising material standards of living.

If large-scale war is, on balance, improbable, genuine peace, as that word was once understood, seems even less probable. This is because of the essential and unchanging nature of communism as a creed of world domination through subversion combined with force and threat of force and because of the tenacity and unscrupulousness of the Soviet leaders and the artificial closing of the human mind, which they regard as necessary for the maintenance of their dictatorial regime. They achieve this by means of a cradle-to-grave indoctrination of the Soviet citizen, combined with a systematic denial of the basic freedoms of speech, press, communication, and free, unobstructed contact with the outside world.

What makes this situation still more ominous is that the highest Soviet leaders convey the impression of being fanatics, rather than cynics, of believing their own false propaganda. To realize the full measure of the gulf of mutual incomprehension that yawns between the communist and non-communist worlds, one need only plow through the verbose communication in which Soviet dictator Nikita Khrushchev seeks to rebut a much shorter statement by John Foster Dulles. (Khrushchev and Dulles had both commented on an appeal against nuclear warfare published by Bertrand Russell, venerable British mathematician and philosopher, in the British radical weekly, *The New Statesman.*) Russell had suggested that peace should not be made to depend on the renunciation by either the Soviet Union or the United States of its basic philosophy. Dulles remarked, with some citations from communist authorities, that abandonment of this aspect of communist philosophy did bear a very direct relation to the prospects of peace.

In 9,000 words, Khrushchev, rambling on about the Crusades, the Wars of the Roses, and the alleged sad plight of the American Indians, never got around to answering Mr. Dulles's point. But he gave an exhibit, at once vivid and appalling, of the closed mind of the most powerful man in the Soviet Union. His reference to Hungary, for instance, packs six demonstrable factual falsehoods into two sentences, as follows:

"In Hungary the Horthy elements,[1] agents of foreign big monopoly capital, tried to overthrow the people's democratic order, to restore the hated fascist regime in the country. . . . The conspirators provoked a rebellion against the legitimate government of the Hungarian People's Republic, which the people had elected on a constitutional basis."

Two sentences, six lies, which may be identified as follows:

(1) It was not "Horthy elements" but workers and students, including many members of the Communist Party, who led the rebellion.

(2) There has never been the slightest proof that "foreign big monopoly capital" had anything to do with a highly spontaneous movement for freedom.

(3) There had been nothing in Hungary that by any reasonable use of words could be called a "people's democratic order." There had been only the terrorist tyranny of a small communist clique installed by the Red Army.

(4) There had been no effort to restore the "hated fascist

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regime." There is general testimony from foreign visitors to Hungary at the time of the uprising that the insurgents made the impression of being revolutionaries, coming from the masses of the people. The fighting was most stubborn around some of the big factories in the Czepel Island area.

(6) The revolt was not directed against the "legitimate government of the Hungarian People's Republic," even if one accepts communist standards of legitimacy. The "legitimate" prime minister, Imre Nagy, a veteran communist, went along with the revolt, was arrested in violation of safe-conduct when he left the Yugoslav Embassy, and was executed in the summer of 1957.

Where is the reasonable prospect of finding even a common language, much less a basis of agreement, in negotiation with a man who habitually utters "infamous falsehoods and distortions," to recall the words spoken by Cordell Hull of the Japanese envoys at the time of Pearl Harbor? What would be the worth of a non-aggression pact or a joint agreement not to test or use atomic weapons with a regime that has broken far more treaties and international agreements than it has kept?

Periodically, a kind of disease that might be called "summit mania" sweeps over the Western world. The pathetic fallacy that there is some miraculous value in a few days of personal talk between heads of state reappears. This fallacy has been exposed again and again and again since Neville Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden and Munich to meet Adolf Hitler and returned in the belief that he had brought back "peace in our time." Within a year, Great Britain and Germany were at war.

Appeasement worked no better with Stalin than with Hitler. The Soviet dictator did not become more friendly to the West as a result of the sweeping concessions made to him at Teheran and Yalta, at the expense of weaker countries. His appetite grew with eating. Stalin's promises, hailed by the gullible and credulous in the West—free, unfettered elections in Poland, democratic institutions in eastern Europe, treatment of occupied Germany as an economic unit—were violated as soon as they were put to the test.

After the Potsdam meeting of Truman, Stalin, and Churchill (replaced by Attlee after the British election), there was a respite from "highest level" conferences for ten years. But Sir Winston Churchill, whose judgment of the record and aims of communism was far more realistic when he was out of office than when he returned to power, began to recommend a top-level East-West meeting after the death of Stalin in 1953. This finally took place in Geneva in the summer of 1955. There, Eisenhower, Eden, and French Prime Minister Faure met the Soviet duumvirate of that period, Khrushchev and Bulganin. Again there were high hopes and plaudits from those who believed in the magical effect of "personal diplomacy," who were convinced that deep-rooted communist designs of international subversion could be charmed away with a smile or a grin.

The fruits of the much talked-of "spirit of Geneva" quickly withered on the vine. The handshakes and smiling interchanges between Eisenhower and Eden, Khrushchev and Bulganin, were given wide publicity behind the Iron Curtain—to convince the peoples of the futility of resistance to communist rule. Then the Soviet Government started new sapping and trouble-making operations in the Middle East, a part of the world which Stalin had, in the main, left alone. The big Czech arms shipment to the ambitious ruler of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was admirably calculated to stir into life the smoldering embers of strife in this inflammable region.

The Soviet representatives at Geneva gave only one promise of substance. They attached their names to a communiqué stating that "the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the

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German people and the interests of European security." But, with typical Soviet bad faith, they refused to take any step toward implementing this promise and made repeated, ostentatious demonstrations of support for their puppet dictatorial regime in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and, most recently, they have even refused to consider German reunification as a subject of discussion at a proposed new summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders began to apply pressure for such a meeting toward the end of 1957. For a time they tumbled over themselves to send new long and repetitious messages, even before earlier ones had been answered. The proposals put forward in the tens of thousands of words in these messages fall into two categories: pacts based on unsupported promises or declarations of intention and more or less cleverly baited traps designed to weaken the defensive power of the West and drive wedges into its diplomatic unity.

There would seem to be little reason to conclude a nonaggression pact between the NATO powers and the members of the communist Warsaw Pact in view of the fate of similar pacts concluded between the Soviet Union and its five western neighbors, Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. All these pacts were broken at the first convenient opportunity.

The Rapacki Plan (so called because it was first enunciated by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki) for a zone in central Europe free from nuclear weapons, including the sundered parts of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, has been vigorously promoted by Moscow and has won some support among individuals in the West who are so eager for "relaxation of tension" that they do not read the fine print of Soviet proposals.

Acceptance of this scheme would place American and British troops in Germany in a position of hopeless military inferiority by denying them the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It would also forego a potential military asset for the

West: a German army trained in the use of nuclear weapons and missiles. In exchange, the Soviet Government would give up nothing, for it is highly improbable that the Soviet rulers would ever trust either the Poles or the East Germans with nuclear weapons. It would be too uncertain how these weapons would be used. So the Rapacki Plan, on a closer view, turns out to be a typical Soviet heads-I-win-tails-you-lose proposition. It is an offer to bargain the foregoing of something the Soviets would never do anyway for some very real worsening of the Western military position. A subsidiary aim is to bring about the withdrawal of American military power from the Continental Europe.

The Soviet proposal to bargain renunciation of military activity in outer space, which would be difficult to control anyway, for U.S. abandonment of invaluable bases around the Soviet periphery (which, in the opinion of many high military authorities, is the most effective deterrent of Soviet aggression) is another example of the familiar Soviet technique of trying to trade shadow for substance. As regards that Soviet proposal which has won the widest measure of acceptance in the United States, the mutual stopping of nuclear tests, the words of one of our most distinguished nuclear scientists, Dr. Edward Teller, are worth heeding:

"There can be no doubt that, if a nation wants to carry out tests in secrecy, observation will become difficult and uncertain. In a contest between the bootlegger and the police, the bootlegger has a great advantage. Of course it will cost some money and effort to hide nuclear explosions. But the Soviet Union has never been stingy where a military advantage has been at stake."[2]

There are so many snares and pitfalls in controlled arms limitation that it would be criminal folly for the United States and other Western powers to stake their national existence on an agreement which the Soviet rulers might be able to evade. In violating an arms-limitation convention, the Soviet Union possesses two conspicuous advantages over the United States, or any free country for that matter. There is a far better chance to hide the location of an important atomic installation or missile-launching site in the Soviet Union because of the vast size of that country and the travel restrictions which bar foreigners from many areas. And there is little likelihood that the tightly regimented people of the Soviet Union would be of any help in reporting violations of an existing arms pact.

It is doubtful that there has ever been an arms-limitation convention that could not be broken if one side were bent on this objective. And the task of inspection is infinitely more difficult and complex in this age of startling new weapons, made possible by scientific advances which are still going on. The key to decisive military superiority might lie not in something easily grasped, like military units under arms or tangible weapons or air fields or even factories, but in some formula known only to scientists working in some secret laboratory. Complete security could be obtained, if at all, only by setting up a mutual system of scientific and industrial, as well as military, inspection far more minute and extensive than the Soviet Union or even the United States would be likely to accept.

In view of this situation, the most sensible and realistic course would be to terminate the endless, futile talks about arms limitation with a simple recital of Soviet acts of bad faith and the insuperable practical obstacles to establishing "foolproof" inspection. This should be accompanied by a declaration that our military preparation would be adjusted, increased or decreased, in line with what we could learn about the Soviet effort in this field. To be rushed or panicked or cajoled into concluding with the Soviet Government an arms-limitation convention that we would keep and they would break would be the greatest policy blunder in our history. Indeed, it is doubtful whether we would ever have a chance to commit another.

Should the United States try to purchase Soviet military withdrawal from the Soviet Zone of Germany and from the satellite states by offering to evacuate Germany? This is the substance of the policy of disengagement which has been advocated, with varying degrees of emphasis, by the British Labor Party, the German Social Democrats, and the American expert on Russia, former diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan. The temptations of this proposed policy are substantial, but the risks, at least at present, seem out of proportion to the prospective gains.

Up to the spring of 1959, the Soviet Government had repeatedly refused to admit as suitable subjects of discussion at an East-West conference German reunification in freedom or the establishment of free institutions in the countries of eastern Europe. With the twisted, perverted logic in which they excel, Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen maintain that any such discussion would be an infringement of the "sovereignty" of these nations, although it seems obvious that this "sovereignty" will only begin to exist when the force or threat of force of the Red Army is removed.

If this attitude should persist, there would be no reasonable alternative to the present course of holding the line in western Europe and hoping for some kind of ultimate collapse of dictatorship behind the Iron Curtain, either by evolution or revolution, as a result of internal stresses and strains. But what if the Soviet Government should change its diplomatic course and offer what is sometimes called the big swap—withdrawal of Soviet troops behind Soviet frontiers in return for evacuation of Europe by American forces?

It would certainly be no small prize to unite Germany without bloodshed and to give the peoples of eastern Europe, at long last, a chance to determine their own political destinies. But just because this prospect seems so bright, we should be on guard against booby traps. What tips the scales against accepting such a proposition, if it should ever be made, is the impossibility of devising any sure guarantee that Soviet forces, once withdrawn, might not come back when such a return would not challenge American military power existing in Europe, and thereby certainly touch off a big war.

It would be almost impossible to insure that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from eastern Europe would not be followed by changes of governments in power in that area and reprisals against the more hated communists. Such a development could easily be utilized in Moscow as a pretext for intervention, on the grounds that "fascism" was reviving. The treacherous Soviet method in Hungary, when promises of withdrawing Soviet troops were given at the very time when preparations were being made to crush the freedom movement with overwhelming military force, should not be forgotten. Even if there were no acts of violence, groups of hard-core communists, left behind in strategic locations, could create disturbances that would serve as an excuse for the return of the Red Army.

The political climate of western Europe without the shield now provided by the American troops would change beyond recognition. On one side would be a group of relatively prosperous but militarily weak states. On the other would be the communist empire, disposing of unlimited military manpower and equipped with terrific engines of destruction. Under such circumstances it might not even be necessary for the Soviet Union to commit a visible act of aggression in order to enforce its will. The mere threat of such an act might be sufficient.

It is a dangerous illusion to suggest, as George Kennan did in his much-discussed Reith Lectures in late 1957,[8] that the successful solution of internal social problems will provide a sure shield against communist aggression. Of course a nation is stronger for every purpose, including resistance to a foreign enemy, if its people are united, patriotic, healthy, and contented. Of course it is a good thing, quite apart from the challenge of communism, to improve schools and colleges, to replace slums with decent housing, to provide better facilities for recreation.

Social improvements, however good in themselves, are no substitute for adequate military defense, which a large and rich country can create through its own efforts and a small country can attain through alliances with powers bent on the same objective. Innocence and inoffensiveness and good social conditions will not insure survival in this Iron Age of the world. Hitler and Stalin did not overrun many neighboring independent states because the peoples of these states felt any yearning for nazism or communism. These peoples simply could not resist the bigger battalions of the totalitarian tyrants.

The French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Danes, and the Norwegians were leading much pleasanter lives than the Germans under Nazi rule. This did not save them from conquest and occupation. When the Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939 and overran the Baltic Republics in 1940, it was attacking countries with much higher standards of living and no desire for communism. The success of these attacks was the result of superior physical force, nothing else.

Kennan's idea that it would be possible for European nations to make certain that there would be no recruits among its peoples for the puppet regimes which would be set up in the event of Soviet military occupation seems a very wishful fantasy, especially after the Hungarian experience. If there was a Judas among the Twelve Disciples, it is not surprising that there should be a Kadar in Hungary, just as there was a Quisling in Norway.

It borders on absurdity to suggest that non-communist nations should not look to their military defenses until they have built an ideal social order or established a uniform, letter-

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perfect performance in democracy. A score of peoples who lost their liberty during the war (and some are still waiting for its return) can testify that innocence and inoffensiveness are no sound defense when predatory imperialism is on the prowl.

Equally unrealistic is the suggestion that the United States should declare an open season on all dictators and co-operate politically only with simon-pure democratic regimes.[4] In theory this might seem an attractive policy, but it overlooks some of the hard facts of international life. One of these facts is that free institutions have worked smoothly and successfully only in a small number of countries in western Europe and North America. Another is that dictators are as much a product as a cause of incapacity for orderly self-government. Dictators do not impose themselves on peoples with a healthy tradition of making free institutions work. If the choice is between a dictator on one side and communism or anarchical chaos on the other, the dictator may, in some circumstances, be the lesser evil.

Foreign policy is inevitably largely a matter of improvisation, designed to deal with crises that sometimes flare up unexpectedly and for unforeseen reasons. It would be useless to try to work out blueprints designed to guide the action of the United States Government in every conceivable contingency because there is almost always an element of the unexpected which must be dealt with on the spot.

One general proposition in American-Soviet relations cannot be emphasized too much or stated too often. We need, above everything else, constancy of purpose, the physical and psychological stamina to hold out in a marathon race with the Soviet Union that may last a decade, a generation, or even longer. The launching of the Soviet earth satellites and the heavy barrage of Soviet propaganda in favor of a new "summit" meeting (unaccompanied by any concrete suggestions calculated to assure the utility of such a meeting) seemed to unloose in the United States much unreasonable and exaggerated criticism of our foreign policy. Much of this criticism was directed against Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Undoubtedly, some instances of Mr. Dulles' manner, phrasing, and timing arouse reasonable reservations, but he was altogether admirable, it seems to me, in his stand during that winter of discontent, both at home and abroad, 1957–1958. Almost singlehanded, he stoutly and successfully defended the breach in the political and psychological defenses of the Western world through which forces of appeasement were trying to pour. By the summer of 1958, a swing in his favor was already manifest. History, I think, will justly appraise the magnitude of his service to his country and to the cause of human liberty during that difficult time.

The stock criticism of our foreign policy is that it follows "inflexible" and "outmoded" lines. We are told, usually in very vague and unspecific terms, that we must seek new methods and try to meet the Soviet Union halfway. (As if there had ever been a Soviet effort to meet us one-tenth of the way!) It seems to me that this critical trend is gravely mistaken. It recalls a warning voiced by that wise Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville:

"A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy and it will not await their consequences with patience."[5]

It may well be a condition of national survival for America to prove that de Tocqueville is wrong in this particular judgment, that a country living under free institutions *can* support a logical and consistent policy over a long period of time, even in the absence of quick, spectacular results. The ruthless, aggressive, uncompromising Soviet policy, bent on ultimate world conquest, has altered at times in outer form but never in substance or in ultimate objective. This leaves the United

States and its European allies much less room for maneuver than is often assumed. Unsatisfactory as the present world situation may be, it would be infinitely worse, in all probability, if American policy toward imperialist communism had been one of indifferent acquiescence or appeasement. And appeasement, yielding to Soviet demands without obtaining any equivalent Soviet concessions, is what foreign and domestic critics of American foreign policy are advocating, consciously or unconsciously.

Let us consider where certain practical applications of "flexibility" would be likely to lead us. It is hard to see what advantages we could gain by according diplomatic recognition to Red China and sponsoring its admission to the United Nations that would remotely compensate for the obvious and serious disadvantages which such a step would entail. The blow to the morale of the anti-communist forces in eastern Asia, in Japan, in Korea, in Formosa, in Vietnam, would be serious, perhaps mortal. The economically influential Chinese overseas colonies in southeastern Asia would almost automatically swing into the communist camp. There would probably be a political collapse in Formosa. Discouragement might well be followed by a stampede to get on the Red Chinese band wagon. To our disadvantage, the precarious balance of power in East Asia would be upset.

Similar consequences might be expected to follow the recognition of the puppet regime in the Soviet Zone of Germany and the abandonment of our demand that the German people, West and East, be allowed to settle the form of methods of reunification on a basis of free, all-German elections. It would be an insult to truth and common sense to equate the German Federal Republic, where there is freedom of speech, press, and election, with the "German Democratic Republic," which is merely the dictatorship of a small clique of German communists, many of them systematically trained in Moscow.[6]

Proposals for "thinning out" and "disengaging" Western

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and Soviet forces now stationed in central Europe must be viewed in the clear perspective of the facts of geography. One of these facts is that a mutual withdrawal to an agreed distance would almost back the NATO forces into the Atlantic Ocean, while it would have little effect on the strategic position of the Red Army.

Agreements on nuclear and conventional arms limitation are tricky and highly dangerous because of the many opportunities for evasion. There is much emotional force behind the periodic appeals to "do something" about the threat of a nuclear holocaust. But this is too serious an issue to be decided by blind emotion or exaggerated fear. We may wish that the scientific discoveries which have made possible such instruments of terrific destruction had never been made, but such regrets are of no practical help. The jinni has escaped and can never be put back into the bottle.

In any rational view of the situation, it seems far safer to maintain the present situation, in which each side possesses a nuclear deterrent, than to sign a rash "Ban the Bomb" pledge, only to wake up a few years later with the sickening knowledge that the Soviet rulers, not for the first time, had deceived us and achieved an unsurpassable lead in decisive weapons.

The surest way to parry the threat of unilateral extermination or subjugation of Americans and other free peoples is to keep that threat mutual and applicable to the Soviet Union. If this sounds like a harsh proposition, it should be remembered that the character and objectives of the Soviet rulers and the appalling power of weapons made possible by modern science are harsh facts.

With deliberately undertaken large-scale war probably ruled out because of the knowledge on both sides that all-around ruin, rather than positive and clear-cut victory, would be the probable consequence, the communist struggle for world domination will most probably continue with other means, regardless of how many top-level conferences (which can never resolve the basic antagonism) may or may not be held. The mere existence of each of the two competing systems is, in a sense, a challenge to the other, although the challenge is not likely to be decisive. The higher standard of living in the United States and western Europe, as far as it is known behind the Iron Curtain, is already a propaganda asset of some value. Although many Russians, Poles, Czechs, Germans in the Soviet Zone, and others living under communist rule may know that Americans, Britons, French, and West Germans are, by and large, better fed, clothed, and housed and enjoy a freer way of life, there is little they can do to compel their rulers to give a higher priority to raising their living standards.

There is no scientifically proved inherent reason why either the modified democratic capitalism of the West or the modified dictatorial communism of the East (both of which have departed pretty far from some of the original principles of Adam Smith and Lenin) must collapse, although we know less of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the communist system than of our own. The Soviet Achilles' heel, one feels, may be imperialism, even though communists profess to be violent anti-imperialists.

It has been well said that one can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. Soviet military force crushed the Hungarian fight for freedom, just as it suppressed, with less bloodshed, the general strike in Germany in 1953 and other outbreaks in Czechoslovakia the same year. The threat of this force kept the Polish shift toward a more moderate and nationalist form of communism from going much farther than it did. But there is no reason to believe that the Hungarians or the Poles or the Germans in the Soviet Zone or any other people living behind the Iron Curtain are satisfied with their lot or reconciled to the prospect of indefinite Soviet domination. In fact, I brought back strong impressions to the contrary from a visit to Poland in 1957 and from contacts with

Soviet Zone Germans who were visiting West Germany.

Both sides in the cold war have been and are beaming propaganda to the peoples on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The principal agencies on the American side have been the Free Europe Committee and the Committee for Liberation. The former directs radio broadcasts in the languages of the peoples of eastern Europe, the latter to the peoples of the Soviet Union. The possible results of such propaganda are limited. No realistic observer, least of all the experienced operatives of the two committees, expects revolt against the overwhelming power of a police state, backed by Soviet military power, as a sequel to broadcasts, however excellent or eloquent. Indeed, it is not the purpose of either committee to incite a revolt which, as the example of Hungary showed, could only end in the slaughter of some of the best and bravest anti-communists.

There is unmistakable value in any free voice in the desert of conformity which the communist state seeks to create. The proper function of political broadcasts behind the Iron Curtain is not to raise unrealizable hopes of Western military support, which could only lead to disillusionment. It is, rather, to fill the role of the nonexistent organized political opposition, to supply the news items which are omitted in the official press and radio broadcasts, to implant seeds of doubt in the infallibility of communist dogma, to exploit rifts which may develop between the communist states themselves and social and economic conflicts of interest which develop in the evolving communist society.

Direct communist propaganda of the old-fashioned soapbox type has little visible appeal in the West. When standard communist clichés appear in the English subtitles of Soviet films, the normal American audience reaction is a loud burst of laughter. This kind of propaganda, to be sure, may be more effective among the poor and illiterate peoples of Asia and Africa. In the West, the communist agent, official or unoffi-

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cial, is most dangerous when he talks least like a communist, when he drops all revolutionary slogans and professes to desire only peace and "relaxation of tensions," without, of course, recognizing Soviet responsibility for creating the tensions in the first place.

The present leader of the communist camp, Soviet dictator Nikita Khrushchev, has repeatedly boasted that communism will win the cold war not by arms but by surpassing the capitalist standard of living.[7] And some Americans, impressed by Soviet success in launching earth satellites, are concerned about whether Khrushchev may not be right. This concern, I believe, is unwarranted. Ability to launch a sputnik bears no relation to ability to create an everyday comfortable standard of living.

With its absolute control of manpower and scientific and economic resources, a dictatorship can easily carry through a crash program for reaching a single economic or military objective. But no dictatorship, either of the communist or of the fascist type, has ever succeeded in raising the living standard of its subjects above a very Spartan level. This is not a coincidence. A prerequisite for a comfortable standard of living is a consumer-centered economy in which the success of a business enterprise depends on its ability to anticipate and satisfy consumer wants. A state-managed economy, in which there is no pressure to satisfy the consumer and the slogan "The customer is always right" would be utterly strange and outlandish, will always give satisfaction of consumer needs a very low priority.

Although the Soviet Union has developed into a relatively more formidable military power than Tsarist Russia, the United States is in many ways economically farther ahead of Russia than it was when Tsarism was overthrown more than forty years ago. The annual United States output of a vast variety of consumer goods, including such durables as automobiles, washing machines, radio sets, plumbing equipment, and whatnot, is so far ahead of the Soviet that comparison is almost meaningless. In a normal year, the United States produces about 6 million automobiles and has gone as high as 8 million. The highest figure of motor vehicle production recorded in the Soviet Union was under 500,000, and most of these were trucks. At the beginning of 1958, the United States possessed more than 60 million telephones; the number in the Soviet Union was under a million. Even in Moscow there is no generally accessible telephone book.

The Soviet Union is so far behind the United States and the economically more advanced countries of western Europe in scores of basic items in a high standard of living that its prospects of catching up, at any time, under its present economic system, seem extremely dim. Among these items are good roads, specialized private shops, restaurants and cafés, tolerable housing, and clothes of attractive cut and make, to say nothing of automobiles and telephones. To use one of the Russian peasant figures of speech of which Khrushchev is so fond, he will no sooner see his Soviet subjects better fed, clothed, housed, and generally cared for than Americans than he will see his own ears. The Soviet Union is a tremendous and permanent military threat as long as it remains under communist rule. It is a political and propaganda menace in some of the educationally and economically retarded parts of the world. But its standard of living is no threat, no challenge to the United States or western Europe, and there is little prospect that it ever will be.

The fear is also expressed that the Soviet Union will win the cold war by stepping up its foreign trade and its economic-aid programs. This is used as an argument for freer trade policies and enlarged subsidies to foreign countries by the United States. Freer international trade is something the United States, with its top-heavy favorable balance of exports over imports, should practice in its own financial interest and in fairness to its own consumers, who are entitled to get cheaper foreign goods if these are available. It was discouraging to see primitive, short-sighted protectionism raising its head with the advent of the 1957–58 recession, in defiance of all logic and experience. The extremely high Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 was certainly no help to American industry or labor in the big depression of 1929–33.

Outright gifts to foreign countries should be viewed with more caution and reservations. The Marshall Plan, in retrospect, may be considered a first-rate achievement in economic statesmanship. No doubt there was some waste, but graft was kept to a minimum and the political dividends, in the form of a revived, prosperous Europe committed to free economies and free political institutions, was easily worth the price. There is also a good case for supplying nuclear and missile weapons to reliable European allies and for helping to keep up the armed forces of countries like South Korea and the Chinese Republic in Formosa, which are saving American troops from having to hold the line against Red China.

When the United States is urged, with no direct reference to its own defense, to bail out the bottomless ocean of Asian and African poverty, to underwrite in advance the deficits in ambitious plans of economic expansion drawn up by foreign bureaucrats, it is time for cool-headed skepticism. It is a purely arbitrary assumption that unless country *x* gets *y* dollars free for nothing, country *x* will go communist.

We should be quite unresponsive to a kind of blackmail that has become all too common. This occurs when some diplomatic representative of Backwardarea lets it be known, with more or less subtlety, that unless his government receives a generous handout from the United States Treasury, said government will turn to Moscow. A nation cynically prepared to sell itself to the highest bidder is not worth buying, if only because there can be no assurance that it will stay bought.

An incident that occurred in the spring of 1958 shows the dangers and pitfalls of undiscriminating foreign-aid handouts. The government of the small Arab country of Lebanon, which had received 38 million dollars in economic help, along with some military aid, announced that this was not good enough. The United States must provide 170 million dollars in the next six years—or else. In the event that Uncle Sam did not sign on the dotted line, Lebanon would deliver a truly crushing blow. It would refuse American aid altogether! Something must have gone wrong with our diplomacy in this part of the world when a government can get the idea that it is conferring a favor by accepting the largesse of the American taxpayer. To the foreign representative who threatens or hints that his country will go communist if its government does not receive a prompt subsidy, there is only one sensible, dignified answer: "Go!"

The supposed danger that the Soviet Union will conquer the world either by foreign-trade operations or by economic subsidies has been blown up out of all proportion to the realities of the situation. The trade of the Soviet Union (population about 200 million) with the non-communist world in 1957 was about equal to the volume of foreign trade of busy, prosperous little Switzerland (population 4.5 million). The Soviet share in world commerce before the war and since the war has been microscopically small, even smaller than that of Tsarist Russia, which ranked very low, in proportion to area, resources, and population, among the trading nations of the world. The volume of Soviet trade with outside countries could increase several times over without affecting existing international commerce patterns very much.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union, where the government monopolizes foreign trade, cannot and will not use this trade as a political weapon on occasion. In some respects, Soviet poverty is a commercial asset, just as our wealth is a handicap. The Soviet Union can conclude barter deals for foodstuffs and raw materials, of which we have a plentiful supply at home. But, in the popular American phrase, so what? The outcome of the cold war will not be affected if Soviet citizens get somewhat more rice, dates, fruits, and cotton as a result of these deals.

It is most improbable that the Soviet rulers possess either the altruism or the economic reserves to make good the bill for overcoming economic backwardness in countries outside Russia's immediate empire. Where there is an immediate political objective, in Afghanistan, Egypt, or Syria, low-interest loans or even outright grants may be forthcoming. But the supposed danger and the supposed obligation for the United States to move in with massive government-to-government subsidies have been much exaggerated.

Without using military force, the Soviet Union cannot obtain secure and permanent control of a country that is remote from its own frontiers. To the extent that Soviet barter deals or aid bolster the economy of an economically backward country, political stability may be enhanced and the growth of indigenous communism halted. The obsession in some circles with the idea that we must, at all costs, give away more of our substance than the Soviet Union is giving, that Uncle Sam should become Uncle Atlas, carrying the whole load of deficits for the ambitious development schemes of economically retarded countries and, incidentally, getting more kicks for his pains than thanks, is a psychological puzzle.

The American trait, excellent in some circumstances, that may become our greatest danger in the setting of the cold war is the desire for quick results. The circumstances exclude both a rash crusade, which would most probably begin with a major, all-around catastrophe of mutual destruction, and a morally and politically suicidal policy of appeasement. This compels us to play a waiting game with a semi-Asiatic enemy to whom time is of no consequence.

Regardless of how the Quemoy crisis in American foreign policy turns out, it has raised two questions of serious and abiding concern. The first is whether public opinion in the United States and its allies can be counted on to rally to a firm stand against communist aggression. The second is whether the peoples of free countries can voluntarily create a spirit of unity capable of countering the forced unity which prevails in countries under communist rule. The issue of the cold war, the ultimate survival of Western civilization, depend on the answers to these questions.

What was at stake when the Chinese communists committed a wanton breach of the peace in the Strait of Formosa, backed by rocket-rattling threats from Moscow, was something much bigger and more significant than the disposition of two small island groups off the South China coast. What was being tested was whether the great communist empires of China and the Soviet Union, working together on a blackmailing, squeeze-play basis, could take what they wanted by force and threat of force and thus intimidate the United States into running away from or evading its voluntarily assumed treaty obligation to an ally.

The response of the Administration, as affirmed in repeated statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, was to try to steer a narrow course between the undesirable extremes of all-out war and appeasement. There was "aid short of war" to the Nationalist defenders of Quemoy. There was no offensive action against the Chinese mainland. The Chinese Reds were repeatedly invited to agree to a "dependable cease-fire."

The shrill chorus, "Why die for Quemoy?" set up by a variegated group of appeasers, defeatists, anti-anti-communists, pacifists, and politicians interested in making capital out of a national emergency was, to put it mildly, no help in this crisis. The emptiness of this question becomes apparent if one looks back to 1861 and imagines someone asking, "Why fight for Fort Sumter?"

Quemoy, like Fort Sumter, was an occasion, not a cause, of conflict. The cause of the shelling of Quemoy was not the desire of the Chinese Reds to get possession of this little group of islands. It was, rather, the constant impulse to aggression on the part of communist states, which can only be curbed by the kind of firm resistance which such aggression met in the blockade of West Berlin and the invasion of Korea.

The Chinese communist leaders and their partner, Soviet dictator Khrushchev, have made it brutally clear to all but the incurably blind, deaf, and dumb that they would not be satisfied with the cession of the Quemoy and Matsu groups. These are mere steppingstones to the conquest of Formosa. Should we tear up our treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government and scuttle and run from Formosa, there would soon be another Moscow-Pieping squeeze play aimed at Japan, the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam. West Berlin, much less defensible militarily than Quemoy, is being defended at Quemoy.

Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations have clearly renounced the idea of using force to upset the *status quo* in communist-ruled countries, even when the appeal to our hearts and consciences has been agonizing, as in the case of the heroic Hungarian uprising. If to this policy of non-intervention in countries behind the Iron Curtain we add the policy of running away when the communists begin to bare their teeth in some new scheme of aggressive expansion, the whole world balance of power will soon shift decisively in favor of the totalitarian powers. When voices advocating appeasement are heard, it is well to remember these sober words of warning from Winston Churchill:

"If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed, if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly, you may come to a moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves."[8]

It is always easy to make out a fallacious case for retreat and surrender by contrasting the smallness of the immediate occasion of conflict with the sufferings and sacrifices of war. What is overlooked is that small surrenders lead to big surrenders. There is no peace in appeasement. The aggressor, like the blackmailer, always comes back. The "Why die for Danzig?" "Why die for Quemoy" argument is at least twenty-five centuries old. Here is how it was answered by the Athenian statesman Pericles when it was suggested that Athens could avert war by revoking a relatively unimportant decree breaking off economic relations with the smaller city-state Megara:

"I hope that none of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara decree. . . . Why, this 'trifle' contains the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give way you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance, while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals."[9]

Critics of American support of the defense of Quemoy have fallen into a number of misconceptions. In opposition to many loud assertions to the contrary, the strategic significance of the islands is that of defensive outposts for Formosa, not of bases for invasion of the mainland. Should such an invasion ever occur, and this would only happen as a result of a big uprising in China itself, the mountain-ringed province of Fukien, opposite Quemoy and Matsu, would not be a suitable landing place. The course of developments showed that Quemoy could be and was "defensible." Opposed to the argument that Quemoy and Matsu "belong" to the Chinese mainland is the far more convincing consideration that when, in 1955, the inhabitants of the near-by Tachen group were given the choice of living under communist rule or being resettled in Formosa, 18,505 left and 19 remained.

There has been much talk of Quemoy being an "unfavorable battle ground" and of our "lack of allies." But it seems naïve to the point of absurdity to imagine the skilled and ruthless communist experts in conquest and subversion attacking us at our strongest point. When our alliance with Nationalist China was ratified by overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress, everyone knew that no other country was involved.

There is no such thing as a "wrong time" and a "wrong place" to stop communist aggression. The place to stop it is whenever and wherever it shows itself, given two conditions: vigorous local resistance and American capacity to intervene effectively. Both of these conditions existed in the case of Quemoy.

The Verdun of the free world has been at different places in different times, depending on where the communists were driving for conquest. In 1948 and 1949, it was in West Berlin. From 1950 to 1953, it was in Korea. In October-November, 1956, it was on the barricades of Budapest. In the autumn of 1958, it was at Quemoy. Different scenes, but only one struggle: against the grand communist design of world conquest.

Many years ago, when I had completed my narrative of the main events of the Russian Revolution and civil war, I tried to reach some conclusions about the causes of these events. Why had the communists succeeded, not only in seizing power, but in holding power against the challenge of the various White movements? Certainly not because people were better off as a result of the Soviet regime. The first years of communist rule were a nightmare of hunger, cold, and epidemics. Not because the majority of the people were for them. Ten per cent would have been a liberal estimate of the proportion of communist sympathizers.

There were a number of subsidiary reasons for the triumph of the communist cause in Russia, but in my judgment, after years of studying the records of the Revolution, there was one primary cause. The communists were united by iron discipline; their opponents were hopelessly divided. This is why the communists took over Russia. This, I feel in my more pessimistic moments, is how they may be able to take over the world.

The contrast between the ruthless unity of the Moscow-Peiping Axis and the weak divided counsels in the free world on the Quemoy issue is frightening and dismaying. One is reminded of the darkly prophetic lines of Yeats.

"The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity."

One wonders whether the people in America and across the Atlantic who blithely recommend a humiliating retreat and surrender by the United States in the Strait of Formosa have thought through the consequences of such a step for the future of peace and freedom. If we can be bluffed and scared out of underwriting, as we certainly can underwrite, the successful defense of Quemoy, what about the future of British Hong Kong, an island also very close to the mainland? If, partly under the pressure of short-sighted allies, we run away from Quemoy, who can say that we will stand fast in Berlin? If America evades or flatly breaks its treaty obligations to Nationalist China (a noted columnist recommends this as "disentanglement"), where is the assurance that America will honor any other treaty commitment? Once doubt on this score prevails, what is to stop a stampede of appeasing surrender to Moscow or Peiping by our weaker allies?

The defense of Quemoy is at once a symbol and a test, a test of our clear-sightedness in recognizing that there must never be a backward step before communist violent aggression, a test of our courage in drawing the necessary conclusions from this basic principle. Let us hope that we can pass this test and preserve the symbol of freedom.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# An American Conservative Manifesto

CONTRARY to their reputation in some circles, most American conservatives today are individualists. As a consequence, they often disagree vigorously among themselves about what conservatism stands for, how it should be put into effect, and what its order of priorities should be. To add to the confusion, there are occasional Trojan Horse efforts of individuals to pass themselves off as conservatives without reasonable qualifications for the term. So it is incumbent on anyone who regards himself as a conservative to be as clear as possible in his own mind about what he believes and why.

First of all, what is to be conserved? Here the starting point for an American conservative is the basic philosophy of government and society which emerged from the American Revolution—a rare example of a revolution that generated a truly conservative constitution. The United States has been most successful when it has closely followed the ideas and traditions of the Founding Fathers, with reasonable adaptation, of course, to changed circumstances in industry and agriculture, in domestic and foreign affairs. It has failed most conspicuously when it has abandoned these ideals in favor of imitations of European statism, against which the Revolution was a revolt and a protest.

Conservatives should stand strongly for a government of limited and divided powers, kept in equilibrium by a system of checks and balances. This same principle should govern economic relations. Big business and big trade-unionism are permanent features of a highly industrialized modern society. Only a Utopian believes in the possibility or desirability of breaking up the big industrial combinations, which have contributed so much to scientific and technological progress, or of crushing the trade-union movement. But if the consumer is not to be unduly squeezed, a genuine equilibrium in bargaining power must be maintained between management and trade-union leadership. Neither big business nor big trade-unionism should be allowed to consider itself above the law. Conspiracies in restraint of trade, collusion in racketeering, oppression, and intimidation should be clearly defined as illegal and vigorously and impartially prosecuted.

Just as big business was the main offender in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when its growth and excessive power outran appropriate regulatory action, so has the enormous growth of organized trade-unionism since the beginning of the New Deal led to abuses which call for legislative remedies. Many trade-union leaders are upright men, devoted to the interests of their fellow-members, but a minority, as shown by the hearings before the McClellan Committee, have become deeply imbedded in a sordid mire of corruption, gangsterism, and sinister connections with the underworld.

The time has long passed when the right of workers to organize in unions was seriously questioned. Now the problem which should be receiving more attention from Congress is how to protect the worker who does not choose to belong to a union. The right to work is at least as respectable and precious as the right to strike. The rank-and-file union man should also get more protection from oppression and corruption, and there should be much stiffer legal sanctions against "goon squad" violence, whether directed against independent union members or against company personnel and property.

The McClellan Committee, investigating racketeering and illegal practices in the trade-union movement, has produced a mountain of incontrovertible evidence that many union organizers should be behind bars for their outrageous violations of the laws protecting persons and property against violence and destruction. Indeed, not a few of these organizers have "served time," not for anything connected with labor-management disputes, but for acts of common criminality.

Typical cases of union-inspired violence include the blinding of a truck driver in Nashville with tear gas and the burning of two truck drivers in Atlanta with a "Molotov cocktail." These events occurred as the McClellan Committee was investigating the case of a Texas union organizer, one Raymond Shafer, who invariably resorted to the Fifth Amendment under questioning. Mr. Shafer's activities, according to evidence and testimony introduced at the Committee's hearing, included bribing Mexicans to burn trucks, trying to arrange the murder of an employer whom he disliked, and ordering that a man who had incurred his displeasure be beaten unconscious and have the word "rat" etched into his face with acid.

This close identification of certain trade-union organizations with racketeering and brutal crime is a national disgrace. One does not find this sort of thing on even a remotely comparable scale in the trade-union movements of Great Britain, Germany, and other free European countries. Conservatives should lose no opportunity to expose, denounce, and fight this evil. Intelligent and realistic conservatives will not dispute or oppose the right of wage workers to organize unions and bargain collectively. They will, however, emphatically deny, dispute, and oppose the right of either party in an industrial dispute to place itself above the law by inciting sabotage, violence, and intimidation.

It is important for the economic health of the nation, and to prevent undue exploitation of the consumer, that collective-bargaining strength be kept on a basis of reasonable parity. What has happened too often in the postwar period in the United States is that management chooses the line of least resistance by accepting trade-union demands for wage increases and "fringe benefits" that are out of line with increased labor productivity. Then management recoups its profit margin by raising prices. This is one of the major causes of inflation, which bears especially hard on fixed-income groups, among whose members are some of the poorest and most helpless.

When Charles E. Wilson was Secretary of Defense, he came in for a good deal of criticism and ridicule when he was quoted as saying that what is good for General Motors is good for America. It is high time to recognize that what may be good, in the short run, for highly organized sections of the labor movement, is by no means necessarily good for the nation, that there is a real public interest in defeating strikes called on behalf of inflationary wage demands.

In politics, as in economics, conservatives should stand for the check-and-balance theory, neutralizing power, as far as possible, by distributing it widely and not permitting undue concentration of power in the hands of any individual, group, or agency. This underlying principle of the Constitution has been threatened in modern times by two developments: excessive centralization of power in Washington and profligate government spending.[1] The two trends, indeed, go hand in hand because the prestige of every burgeoning federal agency depends on the amount of money it can extract from Congress.

The alarming shift in the United States from the individual-centered society of the early Republic to a state-directed order is most graphically reflected in the more than fiftyfold growth in the incidence of taxation over a period of forty years.[2] Although national wealth increased and the value of the dollar declined during this period, such a rate of increase in taxation was far too rapid. There is only one logical conclusion to an ever increasing turn of the tax screw. This is to place the individual on some kind of subsistence income and let the state take care of his needs through various forms of handouts. This is not the kind of life for which the American colonists at Lexington, Saratoga, and Yorktown thought they were fighting.

When the Eisenhower Administration came into office in 1953, many Americans expected a serious effort to reduce bureaucracy and restore to the states their proper functions, which have been withering away as a result of increased centralization. But very little actually happened. The number of persons employed in national bureaus was not reduced. By way of contrast, Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, main architect of the German recovery, practiced what he preached by cutting personnel in the Ministry of Economics from 2,500 to 1,647 during the first year of his administration.[3] A U.S. Government commission, headed by Clarence Manion, outspoken foe of government paternalism, was set up to consider transferring to the states some of the functions that have been taken over by the swollen federal bureaucracy. But Manion was dismissed, and little has been heard of the work of this commission.

The progressive income tax as its present levels represents the greatest triumph of European socialism and statism over the American ideal of individual opportunity. Its inherent injustice and its undesirable economic and moral consequences are analyzed in detail in another chapter. Conservatives should give a high priority to drastic revision of our federal taxation system, with one of the most urgently needed reforms the raising of at least half of our revenue through indirect forms of taxation.

Conservatives should also carry the banner of sound money. Creeping inflation, which may not always remain at a creeping pace, is the gravest threat to the stability and integrity of our economic and financial system. Inflation is a thief with a

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hand in everyone's pocket. What makes the inflationary threat very insidious is that in contrast to a depression, with its immediate, obvious hardships of unemployment and industrial stagnation, the first effects of inflation are pleasing. Business booms. Everyone seems to have more money. It is only gradually, perhaps when it is too late to stop the accelerating process, that the evil effects of this drug are felt as savings melt away in real value and it becomes necessary to resort to larger and larger doses of the inflationary drug in order to keep the economy functioning.

As part of the fight against inflation, conservatives should try to get our economy off the stilts on which it is now somewhat precariously perched. The conservative should oppose impartially and firmly in theory and try to curtail as much as possible in practice all privileges and handouts for special pressure groups. Specifically, he should be against tariffs and price-fixing arrangements, against excessive and monopolistic powers for trade-unions, and against trying to replace the operation of the normal laws of the market place with expensive and wasteful subsidies in agriculture. *No one owes a living to inefficient producers.*

It will not be easy to take away from the American economy the built-in artificial supports which benefit powerful interest groups, but these supports are important contributory causes of inflation. It may be necessary to be content with slow halting progress at first, but the ultimate conservative ideal should be clear: a genuinely free competitive economy, with a free field for all and special handicaps for none.

In general, conservatives should support the American Constitutional system of a government of limited and divided powers against all encroachments on the part of a centralizing, power-hungry bureaucracy and any attempt by one of the three co-ordinate branches to usurp functions properly belonging to the others. There is, however, one provision of the Constitution which has long been obsolete with regard to

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practical effect and in which change would favor conservative principles. This is the procedure under which the president is chosen by an electoral college, in which each state is entitled to a membership equal to the combined number of its representatives and senators. The idea behind this procedure was that the president should be chosen indirectly, by free balloting of the presidential electors. But this did not work out successfully in practice. From a very early period, the electors have felt an obligation to vote for the candidate of the party nominating them.

There are two objectionable aspects of the present method of selecting the president, apart from its complete artificiality. A candidate for the presidency may be elected on a minority vote. (This occurred in the elections of Hayes and Harrison and almost happened in the case of Hughes in 1916.) And, since the whole electoral vote of a state goes to the candidate with a plurality of votes, however small, minority groups are able to wield an influence out of proportion to their numbers. The victory of Grover Cleveland over James G. Blaine in the very close election of 1884 has been widely attributed to the angry reaction of Irish Catholic voters to the indiscreet remark of a Protestant pastor, a Blaine partisan, identifying the Democratic Party with "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion."

Both of these undesirable features of the present system could be remedied by a Constitutional amendment providing that the electoral vote of each state be divided in precise proportion to the number of popular votes received by each candidate. Under such a system, the election of a president by a freak distribution of votes would be impossible. And the voter in a minority group, ethnic, economic, or whatnot, could not wield undue influence. There would be no temptation to appease an influential minority in a particular state because the whole electoral vote, which, in the case of a large state in a close election, might determine the outcome, would not be at stake.

Under the practice of government by three co-ordinate branches, each acting as a check and balance on the other two, there is always danger of usurpation by one of the branches. Some presidents have stretched the executive power to extremes. Franklin D. Roosevelt was not forthright and candid in his dealings, either with Congress or with the people who elected him, as he steered the United States toward involvement in the second world war. The Constitutional balance of powers was threatened when a Congressional oligarchy, playing on war hates and passions, sought to oust President Andrew Johnson from office after the Civil War. More recently, there has been a marked tendency of the Supreme Court, headed by one of its least learned Chief Justices, Earl Warren, to take over the proper function of Congress and the state legislatures by making law instead of interpreting law. The decision reversing previous Supreme Court rulings and overriding the nearly unanimous judgments of many legislatures by declaring segregated public education unconstitutional and a number of rulings upsetting Congressional and state legislation unfavorable to communists and communist sympathizers are examples of what Judge Learned Hand probably had in mind when he suggested that the Court was arrogating to itself the functions of a "third legislative chamber."

How to curb this tendency of the Court to write its own prepossessions into law without eliminating or weakening the necessary influence of the judicial third branch of the federal government is a difficult and delicate problem. In some cases a clearer and more specific definition of intent in writing Congressional legislation may be the answer. In others a Constitutional amendment may be necessary. In extreme cases, where the Court has substituted its judgment for that of elected state legislatures and decreed law which does not meet the test of the reason and conscience of most of the people affected, noncompliance through the protracted employment of all possible legal retarding devices and passive resistance seem morally justified.

Most American conservatives do not find their principles adequately represented by either of the two principal political parties. There have been suggestions that conservatives unite in a party of their own, and there have been some tentative experiments along this line. From the standpoint of pure logic, the suggestion is plausible. Certainly "middle of the road" Eisenhower Republicanism has offered little to the conservative cause. The difficulty with the "middle of the road" philosophy is the constant tendency to sidle a little farther to the Left.

There may be understanding and sympathy for the conservatives who supported the candidacy of T. Coleman Andrews and Clarence Manion for president and vice-president in 1956 and who voted for other forlorn-hope independent conservative candidates for state offices. However, the failure of any of these candidates to muster impressive support at the polls drives home a lesson which conservatives should heed if they do not wish to lapse into the sterility of such miniscule political groups as the Socialist and Socialist Labor and Prohibition parties. The lesson is the strong American tradition against parties with a clearly marked and consistent political ideology. The typical American party is not a band of zealots intent on realizing some political or economic doctrine. It is a large loose organization with the primary objective of attracting voters and winning elections.

A major difficulty that American conservatives would face in trying to launch a third party is the absence of an obvious, nationally accepted leader. Herbert Hoover has emerged from a smoke screen of slander and vilification to take his place as a highly respected elder statesman, justly honored for his many services to his country and to the world. But he is beyond the age of active political leadership. There is no recognized successor to the late Senator Robert A. Taft as outstanding leader of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. American conservatism lost a potential leader of impressive quality and personal magnetism when Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, after his losing fight against the involvement of the United States in the second world war, chose to lead his life as far as possible from the limelight of politics and publicity.

So the prospects that a conservative party of national significance will appear are slim. Nor is there much likelihood that the Republican Party will adopt and pursue a consistently conservative policy. In view of these circumstances, conservatives, it would seem, will experience least frustration if they adapt themselves realistically to the American political system of two massive parties with a slight margin of difference between them and concentrate on educational work, on getting clear in their own minds what they stand for and realize as much of their program as possible by energetic activity at all levels, from making their views known to members of Congress to throwing their support to honest candidates for municipal office and to school-board members who show an intelligent concern for what is being taught and how it is being taught.

The conservative is, almost by definition, a nationalist and patriot. He cherishes and tries to keep alive the ideals of liberty and justice and equality of opportunity which successive generations of Americans, from early pioneer days, have handed down, one to the other. He does not believe that what Lincoln called "the mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land" can or should be supplanted by loyalty to a Utopian dream like a world government or an artificial contraption like the United Nations.

To be a nationalist does not mean to be a chauvinist or imperialist, contemptuous of other nations and indifferent to their rights and interests. Conservatives, with their sense of history and tradition, should be especially conscious of the American debt to the Judaeo-Christian and Greco-Roman bases of Western civilization, preserved and transmitted through the national cultures of the European nations, both large and small. This lends an emotional overtone to the cool-headed, practical calculation that Europe must be saved from the threat of a new barbarian invasion from the East. The conservative, as far as he has any influence, should support in American foreign policy those attributes of tenacity, patience, and purposeful persistence that sometimes receive a low rating in the volatile atmosphere of a democracy, where sometimes the impulse in foreign affairs is to run after some new thing at the risk of falling into some more or less cleverly baited bear trap.

The conservative should never forget or, as far as possible, allow others to forget the consistent Soviet record of duplicity and brutality in dealing with other nations, pointed to the ultimate objective of communist world domination. In that record lies the best vindication of an American policy, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, of firm, vigilant mistrust, even if short-sighted critics try to discredit such a policy as "inflexible."

The conservative in America sometimes finds himself in the anomalous position of a rebel. Intellectually and temperamentally, he believes that the burden of proof is on the advocates of change. He agrees with Lord Falkland's dictum: "When it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change." But during the last quarter of a century, America has moved so far away from conservative values, in fields ranging from economics to education, that the conservative now finds himself in the position of critic of many aspects of the established order. It is symptomatic of the changing intellectual climate that perhaps the most typical expression of the dissatisfied student viewpoint in the thirties was *Revolt*

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*on the Campus*, by James Wechsler, who evolved from a communist into a fairly Left Wing New Dealer. The tocsin of student revolt in the fifties was conservative William F. Buckley's *God and Man at Yale*, an indictment of a well-known university for allegedly neglecting religion and giving economics too Leftist a slant.

The wise conservative will not fix his eyes too nostalgically on some year or some era of the past, for the past can never be fully regained or restored. The conservative should, rather, start from the present, set the conditions and institutions of the present against the background of his ideals, and judge and act accordingly. He should especially recognize himself and convince others that the cause of conservatism today is the cause of liberty and individualism.

By and large, Americans are, I think, more conservative than some existing legislation and the tone of some editorial commentary would indicate. The steam has gone out of the New Deal Leftist upsurge of the thirties for two reasons. First, many of the welfare-state institutions which were the stock in trade of those who considered themselves liberals and progressives have become part of the established order of things. Second, many social and economic remedies which were confidently recommended, in the blueprint stage, as certain remedies have been tried in practice and found to be not panaceas at all.

However, a positive faith in conservatism as a philosophy with meaning for our time has not replaced the growing apathy toward Leftism. The case for conservatism in economics and political science, in music and art, and in literature and education is too often allowed to go by default because many people are silent about their sincere convictions for fear of being stigmatized as old fashioned and accused of "wanting to go back to the days of William McKinley."[4]

Perhaps the most conspicuous deficiency in the conservative camp is the absence of any recognized intellectual general staff, something comparable with the ADA on the other side. Such an organization, operating under some such name as Conservative Action, could perform much useful work in fields where work is badly needed. It could carry out political and economic research, with a view to translating conservative principles into practical solutions. It could publicize the records, good or bad, from the conservative standpoint, of individual senators and congressmen. It could publish and keep up to date an honor roll of states with reasonable taxation systems and a dishonor roll of states in which the provident are most mercilessly fleeced for the benefit of the improvident. It could focus attention on any situation anywhere in the country in which conservative ideals were involved or threatened.

Such a "brains" group could develop useful contacts and exchanges with conservative groups and publications in Europe, for there is much to be learned from the experience of countries with politico-economic systems and problems similar to our own. It could dig out the key points of valuable information which are often buried in long Congressional reports. While remaining nonpartisan and supporting individuals of conservative views, regardless of party affiliation, Conservative Action could light up the issues in presidential and important state and local political contests.

It is an organization of this type, not what would almost certainly be an ineffectual splinter political party, that could raise the conservative banner for all to see. The basic conservative aim, in the present state of American society, is to substitute for the pathetic fallacy of the state, which creates no wealth enriching everyone, the proved, sound formula for individual and national well-being. This is the creation of conditions under which there is full equality of opportunity and its inevitable accompaniment, substantial inequality of reward. It is along this road that America can hope to become what its founders believed in and worked for: a Republic of free citizens, not an assembly line of mass-produced robots or a grab bag for pillage by every powerful group interest.

It is in politics and economics that concrete recommendations for conservative actions are easiest to frame. There is an element of wholeness about the well-rounded conservative philosophy which induces in the conservative certain attitudes in such areas as morals, education, and aesthetics. In morals, the conservative will find himself on the side of all the great prophets and teachers who stress the importance and reality of individual choice between good and evil. It is noteworthy that no great religion is identified with any particular political or economic dogma. What makes for the permanence of a religious faith is its applicability under all political systems by men and women of all occupations and interests at all times.

Recognizing the infinite variety of human character, ranging in differing individuals from heights of nobility and virtue to depths of meanness and vice, the conservative feels that the main forces shaping human character and personality come from within, not from without. He will be suspicious of the efficacy of external mechanical remedies for eliminating evil in human beings. He will observe that a tremendous proliferation of social agencies, designed to provide "security" from the womb to the tomb, has not diminished crime and vice in Great Britain and that record heights of material prosperity in the United States have been accompanied by record figures of crime, both adult and juvenile.

The conservative believes that man's moral fate is in his own hands, and he will instinctively reject mechanistic theories that make the human being a mere reflection of his surroundings or a puppet of his heredity. The conservative believes that what a man is must be considered more significant than how he came to be what he is. He will not, in excessive sympathy with the criminal, forget sympathy for the criminal's victims and the right of these victims to adequate

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protection from the law and from public-security agencies.

In education, the conservative will stand strongly for the rights of the exceptionally gifted, as well as of the peculiarly retarded. Recognizing the vast diversity of minds and temperaments, he will set his face like flint against educational theories that would shrink a child's brain to conform to some egalitarian standard. To the extent that he has influence as a parent, a teacher, or a member of a school board, he will use that influence in favor of stressing the basic intellectual disciplines and eliminating altogether or cutting down to a minimum frills and hobbies that defeat and distract from the main purpose of education, which is training the mind to think on the basis of solidly acquired knowledge.

In aesthetics, the conservative will cherish the classical values of simplicity, lucidity, restraint, and understatement. He will not accept obscenity and obscurity as the credentials of genius. In art, he will prefer the classical masters to "abstract" art, in which chimpanzees have proved themselves as proficient as its human practitioners. As far as is known, no chimpanzee has ever painted a *Sistine Madonna* or a *Mona Lisa.*

The case of modern music has been discussed in Chapter Eleven. In music, as in other arts, the conservative will not let himself be fooled or bluffed into losing and denying his values by the pressure to conform, which, in the present age, is often stronger from the political, economic, and cultural Left than from the Right.

The foregoing, then, are the principal items in a credo to which most authentic American conservatives could subscribe. If and as conservative principles are more widely understood and adopted, there will be better citizens in a stronger republic.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# *A Personal Word*

ALMOST twenty years ago, I published the story of my life up to 1940 under the title *The Confessions of an Individualist.* Partly for the benefit of readers of that book, who may be interested in a brief sequel, partly because my reactions to the events of those two decades help to explain my evolution as a conservative, I am ending this book with an account of an individualist's progress from 1940 until 1959.

I completed my *Confessions* amid the blackout of Paris during the first months of the unnaturally quiet warfare which ended so abruptly in May with the eruption of the German forces into Belgium and the Netherlands and the swift fall of France. To me, the form in which the war came, with Great Britain and France fighting Nazi Germany while Stalin stood grinning on the sidelines after pocketing the spoils of eastern Europe as the price of his neutrality, was a profound personal tragedy. I had always felt that an adroit, far-sighted Western diplomacy could have shifted this line-up and diverted Hitler into an eastward movement against the Soviet Union. If war had to come, surely a Kilkenny cats' fight of the dictatorships was the least undesirable form it could take.

This view, I might add, is not retrospective hindsight. This is what I wrote, as a prediction of what might be expected as a result of the war, immediately after the British and French declaration of war on Germany in September, 1939. After describing the ruin and desolation which war would bring to Europe, I continued:

"It will be a sword, not peace, that the warweary peoples will find at the end of their Via Dolorosa.

"For Stalin, whose early acquisitions offer only a slight foretaste of his ultimate ambitions, will then be able to step in with a fresh army and all the poison gas of his propaganda. Contemptible and ineffective in normal times, this propaganda, as experience has shown, operates most powerfully on the masses, when they have been driven almost to hysteria by the sufferings of war.

"The original war objective, the defense and restoration of Poland, cannot be realized unless the Soviet Union is also conquered. It will not be merely a question of the eastern provinces of Poland, which have been already seized with the familiar Bolshevik accompaniment of killing large numbers of people marked out by culture and religious faith. *As soon as Germany breaks down the Red Army will be in a position to seize the whole of Poland and much more in the Balkans besides.*"[1]

There were flaws of emphasis in this forecast: communist propaganda, as distinguished from Soviet military force, was much less effective after the second world war than after the first. But I think it stands up pretty well in a retrospect of twenty years, by comparison with most of what was being written in American publications on the subject at that time. Much of this seemed to boil down to the somewhat naïve idea that if only Hitler were defeated, no matter how or under what circumstances, we should all live happily ever after.

Living in France until the military collapse in May-June, I sensed both in Paris and in travels through the provinces an extremely low state of morale. On one of my trips, I happened to read, in a history of the French Revolution, one of the fierce, burning appeals of the Committee of Public Safety at the time when France was invaded by enemies from all sides. I was impressed by the complete absence of any remote similarity to this spirit in the second world war.

Those discontent with the war ranged from conservatives, whose views about the desirability of diverting Hitler eastward coincided with my own, to communists, who, in this period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, made every effort to sabotage national defense, especially in the factories, where their influence on the workers was fairly strong. The only Frenchmen who were really enthusiastic about the war were a limited group of middle-class intellectuals, usually with some definite British or American associations. So it was no great surprise, although it involved considerable uprooting in personal life, when the French lines cracked like eggshells before the German armored thrusts in May and June.

I still remember the Saturday in Paris when news arrived that the Germans had taken a little town in Normandy called Forges-Les-Eaux. When I located this spot on a large map, it looked as if the tide of invasion was lapping around Paris itself. My wife and I went to a last opera performance of Thomas' *Mignon* on Sunday. On Monday, the government had decamped in a disorderly panic, leaving no forwarding address. Since neither of us could drive, we got out of Paris at almost the last possible moment, thanks to the hospitality of a Japanese colleague, whom I had known in Japan, who took us, with what hand baggage we could carry with us, into his overloaded car.

After a harassing drive, with many detours, on roads packed with refugees, we reached Tours, where the government had found temporary asylum. British General Spears and Churchill himself have given vivid, top-level pictures of the complete chaos that prevailed, even in the highest political circles, in this total debacle—military, political, moral. We had a distinctly worms-eye view of the same process. The collapse of France made such a profound impression on me that I have never since this experience been able to think of France as a major power.

From Tours we made our way, with the help of a friendly official in the Ministry of Information, to Bordeaux on a train reserved for the Ministry. The trip was slow and tiresome, but no bombs fell. From Bordeaux we hitchhiked our way to Saint-Jean-de-Luz, near the Spanish border. Individual Spanish and Portuguese visas were not being issued. I vaguely remember taking an enforced holiday from journalistic work (there was no means of communicating with the United States) and reading a French history of the vicissitudes of the Byzantine Empire until arrangements were worked out for the considerable number of Americans who had reached the southwest corner of France to cross into Spain and await transportation from Lisbon to America.

A few pathetic scenes of this great national collapse remain fresh and vivid in my memory. The old Jewish couple, slowly walking back, hand in hand, from the Spanish border post where they had been refused admittance. The cultivated Belgian official, quoting Latin and Greek authors in a fantastically overcrowded Bordeaux restaurant and saying: "I must get away to the Belgian Congo. There I can hope to lead a civilized life again." The strained, attentive, resigned faces of the French crowd as they listened to Petain's first broadcast, with the fateful words: "*Il faut cesser le combat.*" The woman in Saint-Jean-de-Luz in whose house we found temporary shelter and whose last words to us were: "Say a prayer for France."

Returning to America after an absence of eighteen years (apart from a few short visits), we settled in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the shadow of Harvard. This was because I continued writing for the *Christian Science Monitor* for a time and also served as an occasional reviewer and consultant on political and economic articles for the *Atlantic Monthly*. The first of these connections ended in 1941, the second in

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1945. But by that time we had put down roots in Cambridge, and it has remained our home.

There were two main reasons, I believe, that brought about the termination of my long journalistic association with the *Monitor*, which had lasted since I went to Russia in 1922. I have never been a Christian Scientist. This was of minor importance when I was in remote outposts like Moscow and Tokyo, but it became a matter of more concern, I suspect, when I returned to the United States. Belief in Christian Science presumably induces a mood of optimism about the state of the world which I have never been able to share, especially since the outbreak of the second world war and its easily predictable sequel, the enormous increase in the power and capacity for mischief of Soviet communism. The other reason was a difference of opinion about proper American policy toward the war. The *Monitor*, editorially, was for getting in, or at least for taking steps which made involvement increasingly unavoidable, and I was for staying out.

At first, there was a somewhat bleak atmosphere about our homecoming, what with the problems of adjustment after living so many years abroad, the absence of the regular weekly paycheck, and the abandonment of our worldly goods, such as they were, in France. (Most of these were recovered, at considerable expense, after the war.) However, I proved to be no exception to the rule that war creates full employment. The war years were filled with lecture trips, preparation of articles for a number of magazines, and radio and other debates. I returned to my old college, Haverford, at the invitation of then President Felix Morley to give lectures and hold seminars in international affairs. For two winters, I commuted regularly between Cambridge and Haverford two days a week. I also lectured on Japanese politics and economics at CATS, a typical wartime abbreviation for Civil Affairs Training School. This was an Army institution, located at Harvard, designed for officers who would take part in the administration of occupied Japan.

Too much work, not too little, was my problem during the war years and has been up to the present time. Too much day-by-day work for a proper balance of basic study and contemplation.

Some of the publications to which I contributed during the war succumbed to the high casualty rate of organs of opinion in the United States. I became alienated from others in viewpoint after the war because our reasons for differing with the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration were different. I was not opposed to participation in the war on grounds of absolute pacifism. I was not anti-British or fanatically anti-imperialist, although I recall venturing the suggestion that the swift Japanese sweep over southeastern Asia during the first six months of hostilities showed the weakness and impermanence of the carriers of the "white man's burden" in that part of the world. Least of all, and just because I had become so familiar with Soviet communism, was I pro-Nazi or pro-fascist. I was one of the first American journalists to stress the deadly parallels between communist and fascist totalitarianism.

From the time Hitler came into power in Germany, I felt very strongly, almost as strongly as I have felt about any political problem, that the only promising solution for the spread of the totalitarian blight was to work for a Kilkenny cats' fight of the dictatorships. I could see no long-range hope in supporting, unconditionally, one horrible form of tyranny against the other. Yet this was the end result of American and British policy before and during the war. The fruits are now visible for all to see.

After Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war, the United States had no alternative except to fight. But fighting need not and should not have precluded some thinking about the shape of things to come. Our objectives should have been a non-Nazi Germany as a barrier to prospective Soviet expansion in Europe and a chastened but not impotent Japan as a counterweight to Soviet and Chinese communism in the Orient. But only a few far-sighted men in government service held, or perhaps even understood, these views, and such heretics were distinctly in disfavor during the war. I recall how one old friend in the State Department was disinclined to receive me in his office at this time; he preferred to talk while driving around the streets of Washington.

Unreserved trust in Stalin's word and in his pacific and democratic intentions became an article of faith, a guarantee of political respectability. No wonder the Alger Hisses, the Harry Dexter Whites, and their friends in Soviet spy rings had such an easy time in plying their trade! Making frequent visits to Washington and keeping as closely in touch with foreign-policy trends as possible, I became increasingly shocked and dismayed by the failure of influential figures in government and of leaders of public opinion to show any comprehension of the nature of the Soviet regime or of what Stalin's designs would be if the war ended with the Soviet Union as the only great power on the Eurasian land mass.

Especially distressing was the almost complete lack of understanding and sympathy for the tragic plight of Poland among American liberals and Leftists. It was not surprising that war passion should blot out the consciousness of the desirability, from the standpoint of cool-headed national interest, of preventing the total destruction of Germany and Japan as great powers. The treatment of Poland was a moral touchstone for Allied purposes in the war, which began with the avowed objective of safeguarding Poland's independence and territorial integrity. The Poles had put up a desperate, if hopeless, struggle against overwhelming Nazi military superiority at a time when Stalin and Hitler, Molotov and von Ribbentrop, were exchanging toasts and messages of congratulation and sharing the spoils of the independent countries of eastern Europe.

There was no upsurge of moral indignation, except among a handful of individuals, against the policy of appeasing Stalin at the expense of Poland—as Hitler had been appeased at the expense of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Poland's territorial integrity was abandoned at Teheran, its national independence at Yalta.[2]

During these years, I became personally acquainted with Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski and other representatives of the Polish government-in-exile in the United States. I never met one who remotely resembled the standard Left Wing caricature of every Pole who wished to keep his country free from communist and Russian domination as a "feudal fascist." But this counterfeit money of slander was taken at face value all too widely.

The Polish issue led to the breaking off of an association I had maintained for many years with the *Atlantic Monthly*, from the time when I began to contribute articles to that magazine from Moscow in the late 1920's. After I returned to the United States and settled in Cambridge, I regularly attended editorial meetings in the *Atlantic* office, with its impressive portrait of James Russell Lowell, submitted opinions on political and economic contributions, and published a number of articles and reviews. In the later years of the war, I became impressed with the number of pro-Soviet articles which appeared in the *Atlantic*. Contributions by authors, however good their qualifications, who took a critical attitude toward Stalin and communism were systematically turned down.

The climax was reached when the *Atlantic*, in 1945, published two articles on conditions in Soviet-occupied Poland by Anna Louise Strong. Miss Strong was a veteran warhorse of communist propaganda who, to give her credit, never tried to camouflage or conceal her strong emotional sympathy for communism. These articles contained many factual inaccuracies and, as regards viewpoint, could have appeared in *Pravda* or any other Soviet publication. I have not verified this point, but I strongly doubt that either of her articles was included in the jubilee edition commemorating the *Atlantic*'s one-hundredth year of publication.

There were so many protesting letters from readers, especially from Americans of Polish extraction,[3] that the *Atlantic* commissioned Raymond Leslie Buell to write a commentary from a different point of view. Buell, who died shortly afterwards, was a distinguished specialist in foreign affairs and author of a standard work on Poland. But when his article was submitted, the editor of the *Atlantic* refused to print it, giving as his reasons that the article was "not objective" and that it was premature anyway to pronounce judgment on what was happening in Poland. Neither of these considerations had affected the decision to print the communist propaganda of Anna Louise Strong. Buell wrote an understandably warm letter of protest, of which the following paragraph is characteristic:

"I am concerned about freedom not only in Poland, but in America. If erstwhile liberals are not interested in its fate in Poland, can we count on them to fight for its preservation here? I do not believe so. Totalitarianism may yet win in this country and the world, due in part to the new attitude of historic journals like the *Atlantic*. As for myself I have made my own decision. I shall go down fighting for what I believe to be right, that is, for the maintenance of the Christian concept of the rights of the individual and human dignity."

I also felt that the end of the road had come, as far as collaboration with the *Atlantic* was concerned, and I wrote to the editor, in part, as follows:

"I have only recently read the two articles on Poland by Anna Louise Strong. The gulf between an editorial viewpoint which would regard these articles as suitable for publication in an American noncommunist magazine and my own is so wide that I don't think my former assignment of submitting opinions on political and foreign affairs contributions could be continued with much advantage to either of us. . . .

"If these articles had represented an isolated exception I would not feel so strongly on the subject. But it seems to me that they represent only the most extreme expression of a 'Russia Can Do No Wrong' attitude which was not characteristic of the magazine when I became associated with it, but which has been markedly reflected in its contents since 1942.

"It has often seemed to me that contributions superior to many which were printed in background knowledge and thought content were turned down if they contained criticism, however well founded in fact, of Soviet institutions and policies.

"What seemed to me regrettable in *Atlantic* editorial policy in these last years was not openmindedness in printing occasional favorable articles about Soviet policies and achievements. What was regrettable was the conscious or unconscious closemindedness that led to almost automatic rejection of capable and informed contributions which contained some note of criticism."[4]

This incident seems worth recalling because it was, I am sure, typical of what went on in many American magazines, publishing houses, and public and private agencies during this period of self-induced intoxication with the supposed democracy of Stalin's dictatorship. One could cite many similar cases: The storm of well-orchestrated abuse that greeted the publication of William L. White's *Report on the Russians*, which broke the taboo that nothing must be published about the unpleasant sides of Soviet life. Or the concerted demand for the suppression of a novel by the Russian *émigré* writer Mark Aldanov. Or the diversion of Hollywood films to crude and blatant Soviet propaganda.

In recollection, Boston seems to have been especially hard hit by what might be called the fellow-traveler disease. A conservative old publishing house installed as its chief editor a man who brought out a long series of books on politics and public affairs which possessed no box-office appeal and no merit, except their obvious communist sympathy. Obviously, a book appearing under the auspices of this publishing house or an article published in the *Atlantic Monthly* carried far more prestige and conviction than something published by a known communist book firm or magazine. For some time, a respectable old religious journal was edited by a man who seemed to be running a marathon race to join a record number of communist-front organizations.

Again and again during the war years, I was impressed by the obvious effectiveness of a small band of ardent communist sympathizers, sometimes even of one such sympathizer, operating in the midst of a much larger group of confused "liberals" who did not understand the issues involved and who were afraid of being labeled fascists or reactionaries if they objected to communist slanting of publications and resolutions. Whether located in a government office, in a trade-union, or in a magazine or publishing house, the dedicated communist or the fanatical fellow-traveler can accomplish amazing results because he knows what he wants and his colleagues and associates, as a rule, do not.

Up to and after Yalta, I advocated the cause of Polish freedom in the limited organs of expression that were open. I felt a little sense of vindication when, in 1957 on a visit to Poland, I put the question to a Polish intellectual who had stayed in the country during and after the war, rejecting the possibility of emigrating, whether I had taken a too one-sided, black-and-white view of the situation. His answer was swift and unequivocal: "No, you were right. It was a black-and-white moral issue. The great majority of the people in Poland hoped for the return of the government-in-exile. They felt a bitter sense of letdown and desertion after Yalta, when they realized that the Western powers would not effectively support their freedom."

In regard to the war in general, my reaction was deeply divided. This was reflected in an exchange of personal confidences with a German friend, who has subsequently risen high in the service of the Federal Republic, some years after the end of hostilities. My friend, an officer during the war, had been in sympathy with the attempt to overthrow Hitler in July, 1944, and had been fortunate enough to escape the subsequent reign of terror.

"Of course I wanted America to win the war and Hitler to fall," I said, "but the thought of the Red Army sacking some of the old centers of European civilization, of communist tyranny spreading far beyond its previous borders, was horribly repugnant."

"Many on our side of the line had just the same feeling of inner doubt and division," he replied. "We felt we had to fight for our country. The Morgenthau Plan and the slogan 'Unconditional Surrender' left us little alternative. But the idea that such a monstrous regime as nazism would dominate Europe indefinitely was so terrible that I always felt, as a religious man, that God would not permit such a disaster to happen."

It was interesting to learn, years after the war, that the greatest leader of the Western coalition felt a strong mixture of foreboding in the very hours of victory. This comes out in one of the most significant passages of Sir Winston Churchill's massive chronicle of the second world war:

"The indispensable political direction was lacking at the moment when it was most needed. The United States stood on the scene of victory, master of world fortunes, but without a true and coherent design. Britain, although still very powerful, could not act decisively alone. I could at this stage only warn and plead. Thus this climax of apparently measureless success was to me a most unhappy time. I moved amid

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cheering crowds, or sat at a table adorned with congratulations and blessings from every part of the Grand Alliance, with an aching heart and a mind oppressed by forebodings."[5]

During the last two decades, there have certainly been few occasions in public affairs calculated to give satisfaction to one who cherishes conservative values. I recall a few dates which gave me a sense of exhilaration: Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, which, I hoped, would mean his downfall, along with Stalin's. MacArthur's surge over the 38th Parallel. The rare moments of open revolt behind the Iron Curtain—in the Soviet Zone of Germany in 1953; in Poznan in 1956; most of all, the ten heroic, glorious, tragic days when the Hungarian people, with little but their bare hands, fought the armed might of the Soviet empire.

But each of these occasions in time brought its aftermath of disillusionment. By the time the war was over, Stalin's paranoid tyranny not only stood unshaken in Russia but, with our own aid and connivance, was fixing its tentacles on a hundred million Europeans outside the Soviet frontiers. Joy over what had looked like long-deferred victory in Korea gave way to distress as, under the pressure of timid and lukewarm allies and with undue deference to an impotent and hopelessly divided "United Nations," we failed to take advantage of the atomic weapons and air and naval power that could, in the opinion of some of our best military experts, have brought us decisive victory. Not since Yalta did I feel such a keen sense of a wrong turn having been taken as when we settled for a stalemate in Korea.

I remember the feeling of mingled shame and discouragement which came over me when the news of Yalta was received in February, 1945. I had been lecturing that day in a city in upstate New York, and the Yalta communiqué was the main subject of conversation at an informal supper after the lecture. The general mood among the average educated Americans (not communists or communist sympathizers) at the supper was one of happy good cheer. Hadn't Roosevelt proved that he could get along with Stalin? Wouldn't we all live happily ever afterward? Among the dozen persons present there were two who saw in Yalta, with its abandonment of the Poles and the other peoples of eastern Europe, cause for mourning, not for rejoicing. One was an Estonian woman, a refugee, whose husband had been seized and shot when the Red army overran that country. The other was myself.

The simultaneous crisis of Suez and Hungary in late 1956 produced in me a reaction of profound sadness, of strong intuitive feeling that grave blunders had been made. I was shocked by the spectacle of the United States chief delegate in the United Nations almost panting with eagerness to line up this country with the Soviet butchers of Budapest and the unfriendly neutrals of the Arab-Asian bloc in condemning two of our principal allies in NATO. There was apparently a fatuous belief that this would win us the permanent friendship of extreme Arab nationalists. Of course, nothing of the kind has happened.

I wondered at the time, and still wonder, what there was in Egyptian dictator Nasser's record of international troublemaking to warrant our intervention to save him from the political downfall that would certainly have been his fate if the Anglo-French expedition had moved on to occupy the whole Suez Canal, Cairo, and Alexandria. The balance sheet of this diplomatic undertaking looked negative at the time and still looks negative. By our conduct, we made it almost impossible to deal effectively with the problem of indirect aggression in the Middle East, and we alienated in Great Britain just those conservatives who would normally be on our side in opposition to communism.

To be sure, for a short time Eisenhower and Dulles were in the unusual position of being favorites of the British Laborite Left. But it is already clear that although moderate British Labor leaders like Hugh Gaitskell and his predecessor,

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Clement Attlee, are realistically aware of the Soviet communist threat, they are under strong pressure from Left Wing and pacifist elements in their own party. In the event that the Labor Party should come into power, these elements might well force the Party leaders, perhaps against their better judgment, into positions at variance with our own on such important questions as "disengagement" in Germany, recognition of Red China, and dangerous concessions in disarmament.

The Suez dispute is already overshadowed by the crowding press of new events, but its consequences are still to be felt. Had Nasser been politically eliminated in 1956, there might well have been no military revolt in Algeria, with all its shock to French political institutions, in 1958.

The double standard of morals in the UN, represented by doing nothing against the unprovoked Soviet aggression in Hungary while simultaneously calling down thunder and lightning against the actions of Israel, Great Britain, and France (the provocation was almost overwhelming in the case of Israel and very strong as regards Great Britain and France), seemed offensively hypocritical and a new demonstration of the uselessness and even harmfulness of the UN. American diplomatic officials were reported as being in a state of "cold fury" because of the British failure to consult in advance about the Suez expedition. All my reserves of "cold fury" were used up as I listened to the last despairing cries for aid over the Budapest radio stations before the black night of Soviet oppression closed in again.

Although I felt strongly that the American official attitude in the Suez crisis was deplorably mistaken, the Anglo-French planning and execution of the enterprise were also sadly at fault. Former British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, a weak, vain man with a predilection for tired and flabby platitudes, was the worst conceivable executor of a venture that required swiftness and iron resolution.

The one bright spot in the sorry international picture of that time was the speed and efficiency with which the Israeli citizen army routed the Egyptian forces in the Sinai area and captured large stocks of Soviet equipment. Up to this time I had never felt emotionally committed in the Arab-Israel dispute. I had never been in this part of the world. Both Zionist and Arab propaganda seemed to evade vulnerable points of criticism. It seemed to be a situation where there was, in the familiar phrase, much to be said on both sides.

But I experienced a psychological change from neutralism to positive sympathy when I saw little Israel, a country that could conceivably be destroyed by one hydrogen bomb, display qualities of firmness and resolution and serene courage that seemed sadly lacking in some larger and less exposed countries. I have encountered a similar reaction in other conservative anti-communists who had previously been indifferent or even somewhat hostile to Israel.

It is, one fears, a sign of the steady deterioration of the Western position that while it is easy to suggest alternative courses of action at Yalta or in Korea, it is hard to say, even in hindsight, what could have been done to ward off the Hungarian tragedy without incurring the risk of nuclear warfare. It does seem, however, that more could and should have been done, diplomatically and through the UN forum, to brand the infamy of the Soviet behavior in Hungary and to make the restoration of freedom in that country an absolute prerequisite for any "relaxation of tension" between East and West.

Perhaps the best of many indignant comments on the crushing of Hungarian freedom came, curiously enough, from an unstable French Left Wing intellectual who had previously shown fellow-traveler inclinations. It was Jean-Paul Sartre who wrote, in a polemical message to the Communist Party of France, after Hungary: "Once you could have been thought of as the Party of the murdered. Now you are the Party of the murderers."

In a picture of generally thickening international gloom, I found a few sunny spots in my frequent trips to Europe after the war. It was heartening to watch the rapid economic recovery of western Europe—and without any resort to political or economic totalitarianism. During and immediately after the war, I had been inclined to overestimate the permanence of bombing destruction in Europe. About 1953, I suddenly woke up to the fact that European living standards, by and large, were above those of the prewar period.

From boyhood I have admired the German cultural achievement in music, literature, history, and philosophy. Detesting nazism as I did communism, and for much the same reasons, I have always been happy to count individual Germans, like individual Russians, among my friends. Moreover, I have always considered Germany, or as much of Germany as is free, an indispensable element in the European anti-communist front. So it was a source of special satisfaction to observe the speed of the German recovery from the shambles to which the country had been reduced by bombing, invasion, and divisive foreign control. It was no accident that this recovery started when Economics Minister Erhard made a bonfire of all wage and price controls and staked his country's future on the normal working of private initiative, with a minimum of state interference.

Making due allowance for such favorable factors as high German educational and technical standards, the well-known German capacity for hard work, and the Marshall Plan aid which flowed into Germany after American policy took a more constructive turn, the transformation of the Federal Republic, within a decade after the end of the war, was a phenomenal achievement. The cities, phoenixlike, had risen from masses of rubble. Some twelve million destitute refugees had found jobs and homes. From a desolate ruin dependent on American relief for a hungry subsistence existence, Germany has in recent years become one of the more prosperous countries of Europe, its goods finding larger markets in all parts of the world, its shops full of good quality merchandise, its level of real wages above prewar, its people touring all European countries in large numbers.

Immediately after the war, Germans preferred cigarettes to worthless paper marks. Now the German currency has become the second strongest in Europe, next the Swiss franc. Depreciation in the purchasing power of German currency has been less of a problem than it is in the United States. In the summer of 1957, there was a speculative stampede, embarrassing to the German financial authorities, to exchange pounds and francs for marks.

This "German miracle," as it is often called, was brought about by old-fashioned conservative methods in economics and finance, without budget deficits or other Keynesian devices. No wonder the German people returned Chancellor Adenauer to office with increasing majorities in three national elections. No wonder a reviewer in the Leftist Laborite British weekly, *The New Statesman*, poured out all the vials of vitriolic wrath in reviewing Erhard's book, *Prosperity through Competition*. For Erhard, the guiding spirit in the German recovery, has done more than any living man to defeat socialism in the most effective way: by proving that capitalism creates better living conditions for more people.

An especially pleasant interlude in almost all my European trips has been a visit to the mountain republic of Switzerland. Here I found a Shangri-La in more ways than one. Switzerland is ideally suited for one of my favorite outdoor recreations, mountain walking. Unlike America (where the wilder stretches of the national parks are the last refuge of the walker), Switzerland does not proceed on the assumption that everyone has a car and prefers driving to walking. Every Swiss mountain resort has an enticing variety of trails for the walker, together with stiff and serious ascents for the climber. I have even discovered delightful places, like Zermatt and Mürren and Wengen, that cannot even be reached by car.

Some of my happiest days since the end of the war have been spent in all-day hikes among the Swiss mountains and lakes, a packed lunch and a book to read in resting periods in my old rucksack. Of all the wonderful regions of this mountain paradise the Engadin, especially the St. Moritz–Pontresina–Sils triangle, is my favorite.

But I have admired and enjoyed much more in Switzerland than superb scenery. For Switzerland, a little country without colonies or natural resources, except for the hydro-electric power in its mountain streams, seems to me pretty close to Utopia in its political, social, and economic institutions. It has certainly solved with conspicuous success some of the most baffling riddles posed by modern industrialism. Despite the lack of *Lebensraum*, of overseas possessions, the highly industrious, well-educated, and competent Swiss enjoy one of the highest living standards in Europe.[6]

The Swiss living standard is the product of intelligently directed hard work, of an unsurpassed educational system, of the successful development of specialized, quality industries, and of a sound, honest financial system which makes the Swiss banks a magnet and a refuge for foreign capital. Switzerland has full employment without inflation. Its trade-unions are free, but strikes are virtually unknown. People of three nationalities and languages (four, if one counts the Romansch speaking peasants of the Engadin) live together in harmony and respect, united by an unostentatious but strong Swiss patriotism. Some of the Swiss newspapers, notably the internationally famous *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, are a mong the best in the world. There is a continuous round of music and art festivals, and a visiting American publisher learned with surprise that there are more bookstores in Switzerland than in the United States. Nowhere in Switzerland have I seen a slum or a "juvenile delinquent." An altogether admirable country and people. Some day I hope to be able to take time out and study closely the forces that make Switzerland what it is. I cannot imagine a more pleasant assignment.

One reason for my instinctive fondness for Switzerland is that this country, having escaped Europe's last two disastrous wars and being most sturdily resistant to the anti-humanist tides of communism and fascism, has changed little in spirit since the nineteenth century. And I am, by historical and cultural preference, definitely a man of the nineteenth century, even though I was born only three years before the beginning of the twentieth. A list of things that I most heartily detest would read as follows, not in any definite order of priority:

Obsession with material gadgets;

Cocktail parties;

Asphalt roads jammed with cars;

Music without form, melody, and harmony, i.e., most modern music;

Literature that tries to disguise lack of inner content with contrived obscurity and/or obscenity;

"Juvenile delinquents" and, even more, lachrymose professional coddlers of "juvenile delinquents";

"Progressive" (for which I would read "silly") educationists who place "adjustment to peer group" and "life adjustment" courses in baton-twirling, basket-weaving, car-driving, and how to behave on a date in priority over the acquisition of precise knowledge in the basic intellectual disciplines;

High-powered advertising;

Jazz and the monstrous regiment of male and female crooners, groaners, yowlers, and howlers who play, sing, and dance to jazz tunes;

Gangsters, racketeers, and goon squads;

Graduated direct income taxes and other devices for pillaging the thrifty for the benefit of the thriftless;

The "organization man," the conformist and expert in office intrigue, whether found in government service, business, academic life, or anywhere else.

As may be realized, most of my pet dislikes are far more characteristic of the twentieth century than of the nineteenth. Indeed, I am convinced that the nineteenth century or, more precisely, the one hundred years from the fall of Napoleon to the outbreak of the first world war, was the Golden Age of Western civilization. In the perspective of the mid-twentieth century, this era seems an interlude of true liberty between the earlier tyranny of despotic monarchy and aristocratic privilege and the totalitarian dictatorships and collectivist experiments which have robbed the individual of his liberty, in whole or in part, in our own time.

With so many disappointments in the course of international affairs, with such a strong sense of alienation from the main trends of the modern age, it might be imagined that my life has been one of frustrated unhappiness. Paradoxically enough, this is emphatically not the case. Looking back over a span of more than threescore years, I consider my life quite felicitous, partly through good fortune, partly because I have always tried to live up to a homespun creed of self-reliant and self-sufficient individualism. As readers of this chapter may infer, my difference with the viewpoint of what might be called the American Establishment about intervention in the war and my "premature" anti-communism during the war years closed to me certain outlets of expression. This consideration weighed very little in the balance, compared with the maintenance of my intellectual integrity. I have seen no reason to change my opinion on either of these subjects.

The love and companionship of my wife, Sonya, have contributed more to the happiness of my life than anything else. With different childhood backgrounds (I grew up in American middle-class surroundings; she came to the United States from Russia with her parents as a child), we have become

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more and more closely united by common tastes, sympathies, interests, and activities.

We both contracted (forty years ago) the common, youthful disease of sympathy for communism, and we unconsciously took the surest and most permanent cure for it by going to the Soviet Union for a long period of residence. Sonya's co-operation was invaluable in my Russian books. It was her fortunate combination of American nationality with an idiomatic knowledge of Russian that supplied many of the illustrative incidents in *Russia's Iron Age*. We worked side by side for years, assembling material for my two-volume history of the Russian Revolution. Sometimes it was a strain on the eyes to read the dim print on the prematurely cracking paper, a mute testimonial to the desperate physical conditions during the years of blockade and civil war.

After Russia, we shared the experience of Japan on the eve of the big bid for empire that failed, of France in the shadow of war and in the misery and humiliation of collapse. Now we have lived together for almost twenty years in Cambridge, revisiting Europe from time to time, enjoying hiking vacations on that beautiful island, Mount Desert, off the coast of Maine, sitting together at concerts of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Here our reactions are a little on the schizophrenic side. We are divided between admiration for the matchless musicianship of this great orchestra, when it is applied to the interpretation of the musical classics, and shrinking revulsion from cacophonous experiments, which are often inflicted on the captive audience.[7]

Sonya and I are not always in agreement; it would be a dull life together if we were. My reaction to communism and to the growing collectivism in America and western Europe has been an access of "rugged individualism"; Sonya feels that there is more of a case, in justice and necessity, for the "welfare" or "handout" state. I have more sympathy with European ways of life, especially in education; Sonya, as often happens with new citizens, is the sturdier champion of most things American. But I doubt whether any two persons could be more closely united by shared experiences in many parts of the world and by so many common likes and dislikes as regards persons and ideas and habits.

My good health has been part of my good fortune. In my early sixties, I have yet to experience an operation or a serious illness. I have no regular doctor, feel a strong aversion to medical check-ups, and have a conviction that minor ailments will run their course if left alone. Candid friends, including my wife, occasionally point with alarm or ridicule to a bulge around the middle part of my anatomy. This is probably the result of my permanent addiction to chocolate, a compensation for more popular stimulants, alcohol, tobacco, and coffee, which I do not like. My defensive retort is that I still play tennis singles three times a week and enjoy nothing as much as a fifteen-mile mountain hike on a fine day.

There is a streak of the practicing anarchist in me. I am equally averse to exercising and submitting to close supervision and authority. Here again I have been fortunate. With brief exceptions, my "office" has always been the study in my home. My work has been and always will be conducted on a highly independent basis.

A radical at twenty and a conservative at sixty. This kind of evolution is familiar enough to be almost banal. But in my case there is a unifying element: concern for human liberty. It is because of increasing disillusionment in the feasibility of Utopian shortcuts to freedom and prosperity, as a result of personal experience and study of history, that I have reached the conviction that conservatism is the surest shield of liberty and the best defense of individualism in the specific conditions of the twentieth century. That is why I consider myself a conservative.

Of one thing I feel confident, barring some crippling physical handicap or some universal catastrophe. I have never been and shall never be bored. My sense of intellectual curiosity has remained keen and constant. I can imagine no greater pleasure than the acquisition of more knowledge and, if possible, more insights and wisdom in the subjects for which I feel special interest: history, political science, economics, current world affairs, literature, and philosophy. Since the amount of knowledge to be gained in any one of these fields is infinite and since one's days on earth are limited, I know that I shall never want for activity and occupation.

Perhaps my greatest difficulty is to combine daily journalistic work with an adequate amount of study and research for its own sake. I find myself constantly buying books which I have no opportunity to read. Whole shelves of my modest library seem to stare at me accusingly because of the many volumes which I have not yet read. Perhaps later years will bring a solution for this dilemma. I am sometimes tempted to shut up what has been a pretty busy typewriter and devote a long period to independent study and self-education.

Perhaps the best end of this personal postscript to the story of my evolution as a conservative is a quotation from a work which I have never opened without feeling the petty vexations and minor disappointments of life fall into perspective and melt away. I refer to the *Meditations* of the noble-minded philosopher who once ruled the Roman Empire, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus:

"At what time you will, it is in your power to retire into yourself, and to be at rest, and free from all business. A man cannot anywhere retire better than to his own soul. . . . And therefore let your chief fort and place of defense be a mind free from passions. A stronger place and better fortified than this has no man."

This is the message which Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic on the throne who did what one man could to breast the tidal wave of disasters which finally submerged the Roman Empire, has handed down to those of our own troubled time with the perception to heed and the strength of will to practice.

# *Footnotes*

# *Footnotes*

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, 169–75.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. It is significant that Mr. Bretscher, who would certainly be classified in America as a conservative, habitually uses the term "liberal" in referring to his own views and those of the economists with whom he sympathizes. This semantic confusion will be discussed in Chapter Three.

2. C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism*, 20–21.

3. The intervention in Egypt should either have been called off or pushed through to success, regardless of what Moscow (and Washington) might think. Nothing is more disastrous than a half-hearted resort to force.

4. As a European, he regarded liberalism and capitalism as synonymous.

5. There was truth, as well as humor, in this wisecrack about the first phase of occupation: "When will Germany recover? In one hundred and two years, one hundred years of foreign occupation, two years of letting the Germans manage their own affairs."

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE

1. See Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 660, 661.

2. *Ibid.*, 658, 673, 674.

3. See Eugene Lyons, *The Red Decade.*

4. New York *Times*, January 16, 1958.

5. Such campaigns were organized against William L. White's *Report on the Russians*, Trotsky's biography of Stalin, and Mark Aldanov's *The Fourth Seal.*

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6. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 67; italics added. This observation offers good reasons for the hope that America, if it does not succumb to statism, will emerge triumphant in the ordeal of economic competition with the Soviet Union.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR

1. Because of the limitations of this book, I will touch only briefly on the leading ideas of Burke and other conservative theorists. For an excellent one-volume presentation of Burke's most important writings, see Ross J. S. Hoffman and Paul Levack, eds., *Burke's Politics*. There is a brief but stimulating discussion of Burke's political philosophy in Peter Viereck's *Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill*, and there is an excellent longer interpretation in the first chapter of Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind*.

2. A very illuminating treatment of this subject is given by J. D. Talmon in *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*.

3. Talmon, *op. cit.*, 113.

4. *Ibid.*, 127.

5. See *Thoughts on Scarcity*, cited in Harold J. Laski, *The Rise of Liberalism*, 227.

6. See "Burke's Philosophy of Politics," the Introduction to *Burke's Politics*, xix.

7. See George A. Peek, Jr., ed., *The Political Writings of John Adams*, 150, 152.

8. *Ibid.*, 193.

9. Kirk, *op. cit.*, 96.

10. Cited in Viereck, *op. cit.*, 118.

11. Peek, *op. cit.*, 201.

12. John C. Calhoun, *Disquisition on Government*, 56–57, cited in Kirk, *op. cit.*, 155–56; italics added.

13. Viereck, *op. cit.*, 57, 58.

14. The modern Swiss are very cautious in their use of the word "democracy" because they remember vividly what their country suffered as a result of the intervention of the "democratic" French after the French Revolution. A Swiss publicist remarked to me that the Russian troops who came into Switzerland at that time to fight the French showed good discipline, in contrast to the Red Army hordes who swarmed into central Europe in the last months of the second world

war. "Of course," he said reflectively, "it was the French *then* who were the revolutionaries."

15. Viereck, *op. cit.*, 159.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

1. Peek, *op. cit.*, 121.
2. Cited in the Introduction to *The Political Writings of John Adams*, xx.
3. De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, 109.
4. *Ibid.*, 67, 96.
5. *Ibid.*, 344, 345.
6. *Ibid.*, 135.
7. *Ibid.*, 242, 243.
8. *Ibid.*, 219.
9. *Ibid.*, 490.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX

1. The King is reported to have replied: "You're an American, aren't you?" Had this come from Edward VII or some sophisticated monarch, the question would have carried the suggestion of rebuke, but George V, a plain, direct personality, was probably merely trying to make an appropriate bit of conversation in an unusual situation.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Cited by Wilhelm Röpke in *Welfare, Freedom and Inflation*, 43.
2. Edward H. Chamberlin, *The Economic Analysis of Labor Union Power*, 46.
3. See Alexander G. Korol, *Soviet Education for Science and Technology*.
4. See James B. Conant, *Education and Liberty*, 83.
5. It is deplorable that not a member of this gang of young degenerates received a death sentence.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx*, 188.
2. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, 585.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE

1. See Plutarch's *Lives*, 189.

2. In this country and, to a greater extent, in Great Britain, conversion to other uses of spacious homes built in an age of economic freedom is a familiar sight, and physical demolition is not uncommon. In the essay "Does the State Build Homes?" Russell Kirk, in *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice*, gives a vivid description of the disappearance of stately British homes that were once centers of culture and community spirit. In this and other social and economic matters, Britain offers a preview of what may be expected in the United States after a decade or two if the present policy of treating the citizen as a milch cow for the tax collector is not reversed.

3. The law referred to provides for the collective responsibility of all taxpayers for the total sum of the tax levied on a province or district.

4. George Finlay, *Greece Under the Romans*, 221, 222.

5. One of the causes of the American Revolution was the imposition of unjust taxes. The following grievance in the original Declaration of Independence might well take first place in a new list of grievances of independent citizens against the modern collectivist and bureaucratic state: "He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance."

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER ELEVEN

1. His incisive little book, *The Agony of Modern Music*, makes a most effective case against contemporary music in very brief compass.

2. Henry Pleasants, *The Agony of Modern Music*, 101–102.

3. *Ibid.*, 7.

4. Wyndham Lewis, *The Demon of Progress in the Arts.*

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWELVE

1. De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, 413, 414.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1. Italics added.

2. It was at Bandung, Indonesia, that a large group of Asian and African powers, including Red China, met for combined action against "colonialism," except for the Soviet variety.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1. Admiral Miklós Horthy, with the title of Regent, ruled Hungary by authoritarian methods after the downfall of Béla Kun's communist regime in 1919.

2. See his article, "Alternatives for Security," in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1958), 204.

3. These lectures are available in book form: *Russia, the Atom and the West.*

4. This is not a proposal by Mr. Kennan, but a number of commentators took up this cry after Vice-President Nixon's hostile reception in Peru and Venezuela.

5. De Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, 138.

6. An excellent, first-hand account of the training of these future Soviet agents for governing Germany is to be found in Wolfgang Leonhard's *Child of the Revolution.*

7. This is an old ambition of Soviet communism. Thirty years ago, under Stalin, there was an official communist slogan: to overtake and outstrip America. Unexpressed popular appraisal of the slogan is reflected in an anecdote, or parable of the time, representing a Soviet citizen as saying to a communist: "Please, Comrade, when we come abreast of America, let me off. I don't want to go any farther."

8. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, I, 348.

9. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, 79, 80.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1. The federal government is not solely to blame; state and municipal administrations can be just as reckless with their taxpayers' money.

2. The United States tax take was $7.92 in 1917 and $446.36 in 1956 according to an article by General Douglas MacArthur in the March 17, 1958 issue of *Human Events.*

3. See Ludwig Erhard, *Prosperity Through Competition,* 24.

4. Why the "days of William McKinley" should be considered unspeakably bad is a puzzle. As a matter of record, America was quite prosperous during the McKinley Administration, and the average American probably faced fewer worries then than he does today.

## FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1. William Henry Chamberlin, *The Confessions of an Individualist*, 285; italics added.

2. The two best accounts of the betrayal of Poland by its Western allies are Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, and Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland.* The former is rich in personal reminiscences of the author's experiences as Poland's Ambassador to the United States; the latter is more heavily documented.

3. Polish-Americans, in their overwhelming majority, remained profoundly skeptical about the democratic pretensions of the government that was created in their country by Soviet bayonets.

4. Both Buell's letter and mine were published in full in the February 6, 1946 issue of *The New Leader.*

5. Churchill, *op. cit.*, VI, 456.

6. The Germany of Adenauer and Erhard, with its booming exports and free trade, has disproved the crude, ignorant Nazi theory that Germany required conquests or colonies in order to be able to support existence. It has done this under very unfavorable conditions, with Germany divided and its eastern provinces annexed by foreign powers.

7. I know that certain musicians in the orchestra are, privately, as averse to modernist cacophony as I am.

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